


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AMERICAN STATESMEN

IN FORTY VOLUMES

VOLUME XXXIX

THE RE-UNITED NATION—GROWTH
AND PROSPERITY

WILLIAM MCKINLEY





Ida Saxton McKinley

American Statesmen

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The Home of William M. Kinley



HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

American Statesmen

WILLIAM MCKINLEY

BY

CHARLES S. OLCOTT

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II



BOSTON AND NEW YORK
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THE LIFE OF WILLIAM McKINLEY

CHAPTER XXIV

INTERVENTION

ASIDE from the natural sympathy for the patriotic aims of the Cubans and compassion for their sufferings, there were numerous other considerations which caused the people of the United States to demand a speedy end to the war. The sanitary conditions in Cuba, and particularly in the harbor of Havana, none too good in time of peace, had become so bad because of the war as to threaten the health of the southern States, where an epidemic of yellow fever was greatly feared. The commercial interests were suffering heavily because of the war. The people of the United States were unable to obtain their supplies of sugar and tobacco, of which enormous quantities are imported from Cuba, and were no longer able to send wheat, corn, meat, and various manufactured articles in exchange. The investments of Americans in Cuba were rendered unproductive by the war and were in great danger

of total loss. The wholesale destruction of mills and plantations by both Spaniards and Cubans was making these properties valueless as securities for the large loans by American capitalists. President Cleveland, in his annual message of 1896, estimated the amount of American capital invested in Cuba at \$30,000,000 to \$50,000,000 and the volume of trade between Cuba and the United States in 1894, which was the year before the insurrection began, at \$96,000,000. Besides the pecuniary risk and loss, there was the constant menace to the lives of Americans resident in Cuba, Spain being unable or unwilling to give the protection to which they were entitled by treaty.

Moreover, the maintenance of neutrality necessitated the expenditure of millions of dollars by the United States Government in policing a coast-line of three thousand miles,¹ with the constant danger that at any moment some act of violence might create a new cause for friction, as in the case of the Virginius.

In addition to all this, there was the probability that Spain would be unable to end the war. She had refused the good offices of the United States when

¹ So efficiently was this done that not a single military expedition or armed vessel was permitted to leave the shores of the United States in violation of the law. (See President's Message of December, 1897.)

proffered by President Cleveland, avowing that no pacification could be effectual that did not begin with the complete submission of the insurgents. The Cubans continually asserted that nothing short of independence would be satisfactory to them. Spain had spent a vast sum, estimated at \$300,000,000, in prosecuting the war, and had sent to the island armies outnumbering the entire body of male adults capable of taking arms for the insurgents, yet had made no progress. It was therefore reasonable to ask whether the time had not arrived for Spain, of her own volition, to "put a stop to this destructive war and make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony and to mankind" — a question which was asked of the Spanish Government at the earliest possible opportunity.¹

On the other hand, there were two strong reasons why President McKinley refused to be hurried into a declaration that would mean war. The first was that the country was ill-prepared for the emergency. The coasts were undefended. There was a shortage of men, ammunition, and supplies in both army and navy. When war became probable the most hurried preparation had to be made. Even against so weak a power as Spain, the navy was inadequate, and

¹ Note of the United States to Spain, September 23, 1897. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1898,) p. 571.

the Secretary was obliged to supplement his fleets by such hurried purchases as he could make of merchant ships to be transformed into auxiliary cruisers, gunboats, and colliers. It was vastly to the credit of the Administration that when hostilities actually began, the nation was reasonably well prepared for the struggle, as the successful outcome proved.

The second reason for making haste slowly was a change of administration in Spain that gave birth to a new hope of final adjustment without war. On the 8th of August, 1897, Señor Canovas del Castillo, the strong-armed autocrat of Spain, was assassinated by an anarchist. It was his blind obstinacy, assisted by the fierce vindictiveness of his emissary, Weyler, that had brought the Cuban situation to a crisis from which recovery was impossible. Canovas was succeeded as Prime Minister, though not until October 4, by Praxédes Mateo Sagasta, one of the leaders in the revolution of 1868 and a man of far more liberal spirit. The order for the recall of Weyler followed five days later. A programme of reforms was adopted and a new scheme of autonomy for Cuba devised. Of this welcome change, Mr. McKinley said in his message of December 6, 1897: —

“That the Government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which recession with honor is

impossible can hardly be questioned; that in the few weeks it has existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its professions is undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain and to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed. She has recalled the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized world. She has modified the horrible order of concentration, and has undertaken to care for the helpless and permit those who desire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so and assures them of the protection of the Spanish Government. . . . The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken."

Stewart L. Woodford, of New York, was appointed Minister to Spain on the 16th of June. His preliminary instructions as shown by the correspon-

dence of the Department of State, left no doubt of the intention of the President to bring the war in Cuba to an end — without humiliation or embarrassment to Spain if possible, but by forcible intervention if need be.

The response to the note of September 23, in which the President offered the “most kindly offices” of the United States to end the war, promised autonomy for Cuba under Spanish sovereignty, proposed to continue military operations energetically and vigorously but humanely, and politely suggested that the United States keep hands off and devote more attention to stopping the filibustering expeditions. The Department of State saw reason for encouragement in the reply, but properly resented the statement that the United States had not fully enforced the neutrality laws.

On the 25th of November the Queen Regent signed three decrees, extending the provisions of the Spanish Constitution over Cuba, fixing the electoral laws, and establishing autonomy. The year closed with the President and his advisers hopefully awaiting the result of the new Spanish policy.

But the promise of autonomy, if ever made in good faith, was foredoomed to failure. The insurgents had been deceived too often to trust in any promises the mother country might make, while the Spanish

party in Havana, who upheld the policies of Weyler, were opposed to granting concessions of any kind. The Minister of the Colonies asserted that autonomy was not given to the insurgents, but only to the peaceful and loyal Cubans. It was found, moreover, that the reforms were so hedged about with conditions that they really amounted to but little. The legislature could not enact laws without the approval of the governor-general — thus retaining the old absolutism. The Government at Madrid reserved the right to fix the amount to be paid by Cuba to the Spanish Crown — thus defeating the promised fiscal independence. Spanish trade and manufactures were protected by perpetual preferential duties — thus blocking commercial development. Those who attempted to inaugurate the new autonomy not only found themselves opposed by both Cubans and Spaniards, but began to quarrel among themselves. Feeling ran so high that the Spanish opponents of autonomy made riotous demonstrations in Havana in the middle of January, 1898, causing Consul-General Lee to suggest the sending of an American warship to the harbor for the protection of the citizens of the United States living in that city.

The fighting spirit of the insurgents was by no means allayed by the new Spanish promises. From the beginning of the war in 1895 to the 1st of Janu-

ary, 1898, they had seen no less than 140,000 Spanish soldiers incapacitated for further service by death, wounds, or disease, and in spite of the fact that their own losses had been heavy, they still felt competent to prevent any lasting successes by the enemy.

Three incidents now happened in rapid succession all tending to convert the growing resentment of the American people into an ominous thundercloud, through which played, like flashes of lightning, the animated speeches of impassioned orators and the intemperate demands of excited public gatherings, wrought to a pitch of dangerous enthusiasm for a declaration of war. The first was the famous "De Lome incident"; the second was the destruction of the U.S.S. Maine, and the third was the speech in the Senate of Senator Proctor, of Vermont, who had just returned from a visit to Cuba.

Early in February a significant letter was brought to Assistant Secretary Day, by a representative of the Cuban Junta in New York, written by Señor Don Enrique Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister at Washington, to Don José Canalejas, a confidential representative of the Spanish Government in Cuba. The letter was probably stolen by some one representing the Cuban insurgents, and though intended to be private and unofficial, its publication by the

Junta in a New York newspaper on February 9 made the further service in the United States of the Spanish Minister quite impossible. The letter used insulting language about the President, clearly showed the futility of the proposed autonomy, and suggested an utter lack of sincerity on the part of the Spanish Minister in his official capacity. The objectionable portions of the letter, as translated by the Department of State, were as follows: —

“The situation here remains the same. Everything depends on the political and military outcome in Cuba. The prologue of all this, in this second stage [phase] of the war, will end the day when the colonial cabinet shall be appointed and we shall be relieved in the eyes of this country of a part of the responsibility for what is happening in Cuba, while the Cubans, whom these people think so immaculate, will have to assume it. . . .

“The message has been a disillusionment to the insurgents, who expected something different; but I regard it as bad [for us]. Besides the ingrained and inevitable bluntness [*grosería*] with which is repeated all that the press and public opinion in Spain have said about Weyler, it once more shows what McKinley is, weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be politician [*politicastro*], who tries to leave a door open behind himself

while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party. . . .

“I am entirely of your opinions; without a military end of the matter nothing will be accomplished in Cuba, and without a military and political settlement there will always be the danger of encouragement being given to the insurgents by a part of the public opinion if not by the Government. . . .

“It would be very advantageous to take up, even if only for effect, the question of commercial relations, and to have a man of some prominence sent hither in order that I may make use of him here to carry on a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and to try to win over the refugees.”

The President could afford to ignore the disparaging language reflecting upon his personal character, and did so. But the plain implication, that the proposed autonomous government was intended merely to relieve the Spanish Government in the eyes of the American people from the blame of the occurrences in Cuba and to throw it upon the Cubans themselves, was a serious matter. There was also the clear indication that both De Lome and Canalejas believed that nothing would come of autonomy, and that a “military end of the matter” was inevitable. Still worse was the proposition to take up “*even if only*

for effect, the question of commercial relations." The letter was apparently written in December, and soon afterward De Lome was advocating, with every appearance of earnestness and sincerity, the adoption of such a policy.

Señor De Lome, learning of the forthcoming publication of the letter, telegraphed his resignation on the 8th. On the 9th, Assistant Secretary Day confronted him with the original and received an acknowledgment of its authenticity. On the same day a telegram was sent to Mr. Woodford instructing him to demand the instant recall of the Spanish Minister. Before the message could be delivered, the resignation was already in the hands of the Spanish Government, and it was accepted on the 10th. The Ministry expressed its regret, promptly appointed a successor, and the incident was closed within a week. Nevertheless it served to irritate the American public, whose patience was becoming exhausted.

On the very day when the Spanish Government officially disavowed the De Lome incident and reasserted "the truth and sincerity of its purposes and the unstained good faith of its intentions," the terrible event occurred which forever shattered any lingering faith on the part of the American people in either. At 9.40 P.M., February 15, the United States battle-

ship Maine, lying peacefully at anchor in the harbor of Havana, whither she had gone by friendly agreement with Spain scarcely three weeks before, was rent in two by a terrific explosion, causing her to sink almost instantly. Out of a complement of three hundred and sixty men, two officers, and two hundred and sixty-four of the crew were killed or drowned, and sixty others wounded.

The news sent a thrill of horror throughout the country and created intense excitement in Congress. Many Senators and Representatives wished to declare war immediately. The President realized that a very serious factor had been introduced into the problem. Senator Fairbanks, who called at the White House by appointment on the night after the news reached Washington, says that he had never before seen the President in so serious a mood or so careworn in appearance. They discussed the gravity of the situation, President McKinley expressing the fear that the minds of the people would be so influenced by the horror of the tragedy as to embarrass him in his dealings with the larger problem of intervention. He said: "I don't propose to be swept off my feet by the catastrophe. My duty is plain. We must learn the truth and endeavor, if possible, to fix the responsibility. The country can afford to withhold its judgment and not strike an avenging

blow until the truth is known. The Administration will go on preparing for war, but still hoping to avert it. It will not be plunged into war until it is ready for it. Responsibility for the catastrophe in Havana Harbor will be searched thoroughly and with all reasonable dispatch, and when the responsibility is fixed, the Government will be prepared to act, and if the facts warrant it will act with resolution — but not before.”

A court of inquiry which was promptly appointed reported, after careful examination of the hull, that the Maine had been blown up by a submarine mine. The President transmitted the report to Congress in a special message March 28.

Meanwhile Congress prepared for the event which all thought to be inevitable by passing an appropriation of \$50,000,000 for the national defense, to be expended at the discretion of the President. The bill received the unanimous vote of the House of Representatives on March 8 and of the Senate on March 9. It was approved immediately by the President. The reception of the news in Spain is shown by a letter to the President from Mr. Woodford: —

“This morning the papers announce the unanimous passage by the House of Mr. Cannon’s bill putting \$50,000,000 at your disposal. It has not excited the

Spaniards — it has stunned them. To appropriate fifty millions out of money in the Treasury, without borrowing a cent, demonstrates wealth and power. Even Spain can see this. To put this money without restriction and by unanimous vote absolutely at your disposal demonstrates entire confidence in you by all parties. The Ministry and the press are simply stunned.”

It was, indeed, a remarkable demonstration of unity of purpose, patriotism, and power, coupled with a not less extraordinary exhibition of confidence such as has rarely been given to an American President. The grant of \$50,000,000, to be expended solely at the discretion of the Executive, by a vote of 311 in the House and 76 in the Senate, without a single dissenting vote, was an act without a parallel in American history.

On the 17th of March, Senator Proctor, of Vermont, a man of the highest reputation for conservatism, sagacity, and fairness, addressed the United States Senate on the Cuban situation, reporting the facts as he had found them in a recent visit. Whatever may have been the distrust of newspaper statements and sensational magazine articles, there could be no doubt of the truth of Senator Proctor's assertions. He denounced Spanish misrule and said that the Cubans were far better prepared to govern them-

selves than were the Spaniards who had been sent to rule them. He painted a vivid picture of the terrors of reconcentration. "Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one half have died and that one quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved? . . . Deaths in the street have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that they had been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market surrounded by food. These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order."

Senator Proctor's speech made a more profound impression upon the country than had any previous testimony.

With public opinion now at white heat, as shown by the newspapers, magazines, public meetings, and the daily talk in Congress, in the clubs, hotels, and other places, where men excitedly discussed the situation, the President maintained his firm control. War may come, and probably will, he thought, but it must not come until we have proved to the world the justice of our cause and have demonstrated that the last possible effort has been made to attain our

end by peaceful means. The hope of peace, it must be admitted, was then very slender. It was clear that nothing short of independence would satisfy Cuba. Yet as late as February 1, Señor Gullon, the Spanish Minister of State, proposed to maintain Spanish sovereignty "at every hazard." On that date he wrote to Mr. Woodford: —

"The Island of Cuba, as Mr. Olney freely admitted in an official note, has its life and its future bound to those of its mother country, Spain, and the act of conspiring against the perpetual union of the Pearl of the Antilles and the historical discoverer of the American continent not only reveals destructive purposes, but also involves a hopeless attempt. Cuba free, autonomous, ruled by a government of her own and by the laws which she makes for herself, subject to the immutable sovereignty of Spain, and forming an integral part of Spain, presents the only solution of pending problems that is just to the colony and the mother country, the dénouement longed for by the great majority of their respective inhabitants and the most equitable for other states. It is only in this formula of colonial self-government and Spanish sovereignty that peace, which is so necessary to the Peninsula and to Cuba and so advantageous to the United States, can be found."

On February 26, Mr. Woodford reported the feel-

ing of the Spanish Ministry in a letter to the President, in which he said: —

“As hitherto reported, they cannot go further in open concessions to us without being overthrown by their own people here in Spain. This is what made it difficult to get prompt and satisfactory settlement of the De Lome matter, and induced them to accept his resignation before permitting me to have an interview. . . . They want peace if they can keep peace and save the dynasty. They prefer the chances of war, with the certain loss of Cuba, to the overthrow of the dynasty. They know that we want peace if we can get such justice for Cuba and such protection of American interests as will make peace permanent and prevent this old Cuban question from continual resurrection. I told them positively that I regarded the Spanish note of February 1 as a serious mistake; that I should advise all possible delay in answering it; and that whether our answer should be pleasant or disagreeable must depend entirely on practical results in Cuba. While I do not think that they can make any more direct concessions to us and retain their power here, I do begin to see possible ways by which they can make further concessions to Cuba through the insular Cuban government and so, possibly, avert war.”

On March 1, Secretary Sherman, writing to Minis-

ter Woodford, pointed out the futility of autonomy, the only solution of the problem that Spain had yet offered: —

“As for the effect of the offer of autonomy upon the insurgents in the field, it must be confessed that no hopeful result has so far followed. Beyond a few isolated submissions of insurgent chiefs and their following, no disposition appears on the part of the leaders of the rebellion to accept autonomy as a solution. On the other hand, the hostility of the Spanish element in Cuba to this or any form of autonomy is apparent, so that the inaugurated reform stands between the two adverse fires of hostile opposition in the field and insidious malevolence in the very centers of government. That the latter form of opposition would be reduced and eventually overcome in proportion as autonomy proves a success may well be admitted; that autonomy is of itself, and unaided by military success, capable of winning over the insurgent element remains a doubtful proposition.”

Mr. Day in a telegram to Mr. Woodford, March 20, indicated that a decision could not be longer delayed, and suggested April 15 as the latest date the United States would be willing to wait for Spain to restore peace and stop the starvation of the people. He said: —

“Confidential report shows naval board will make

unanimous report that Maine was blown up by submarine mine. This report must go to Congress soon. Feeling in the United States very acute. People have borne themselves with great forbearance and self-restraint last month. President has no doubt Congress will act wisely and immediate crisis may be avoided, particularly if there be certainty of prompt restoration of peace in Cuba. Maine loss may be peacefully settled if full reparation is promptly made, such as the most civilized nation would offer. But there remain general conditions in Cuba which cannot be longer endured, and which will demand action on our part, unless Spain restores honorable peace which will stop starvation of people and give them opportunity to take care of themselves, and restore commerce now wholly lost. April 15 is none too early date for accomplishment of these purposes. Relations will be much influenced by attitude of Spanish Government in Maine matter, but general conditions must not be lost sight of. It is proper that you should know that, unless events otherwise indicate, the President, having exhausted diplomatic agencies to secure peace in Cuba, will lay the whole question before Congress."

The final appeal of the President for peace was made in a telegram of March 26, from Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford: —

“The President’s desire is for peace. He cannot look upon the suffering and starvation in Cuba save with horror. The concentration of men, women, and children in the fortified towns and permitting them to starve is unbearable to a Christian nation geographically so close as ours to Cuba. All this has shocked and inflamed the American mind, as it has the civilized world, where its extent and character are known. It was represented to him in November that the Blanco Government would at once release the suffering and so modify the Weyler order as to permit those who were able to return to their homes and till the fields from which they had been driven. There has been no relief to the starving except such as the American people have supplied. The reconcentration order has not been practically superseded. There is no hope of peace through Spanish arms. The Spanish Government seems unable to conquer the insurgents. More than half of the island is under control of the insurgents; for more than three years our people have been patient and forbearing; we have patrolled our coast with zeal and at great expense, and have successfully prevented the landing of any armed force on the island. The war has disturbed the peace and tranquillity of our people. We do not want the island. The President has evidenced in every way his desire to preserve and continue

friendly relations with Spain. He has kept every international obligation with fidelity. He wants an honorable peace. He has repeatedly urged the Government of Spain to secure such a peace. She still has the opportunity to do it, and the President appeals to her from every consideration of justice and humanity to do it. Will she? Peace is the desired end. For your own guidance, the President suggests that if Spain will revoke the reconcentration order and maintain the people until they can support themselves and offer to the Cubans full self-government, with reasonable indemnity, the President will gladly assist in its consummation. If Spain should invite the United States to mediate for peace and the insurgents would make like request, the President might undertake such office of friendship."

The only conditions upon which peace could be obtained were tersely stated in the following telegram of the 27th: —

"Believed the Maine report will be held in Congress for a short time without action. A feeling of deliberation prevails in both houses of Congress. See if the following can be done: —

"First. Armistice until October 1. Negotiations meantime looking for peace between Spain and insurgents through friendly offices of President United States.

“Second. Immediate revocation of *reconcentrado* order so as to permit people to return to their farms, and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from United States coöperating with authorities so as to afford full relief.

“Add, if possible: —

“Third. If terms of peace not satisfactorily settled by October 1, President of the United States to be final arbiter between Spain and insurgents. If Spain agrees, President will use friendly offices to get insurgents to accept plan. Prompt action desirable.”

“Full self-government with reasonable indemnity” was explained in a cable message the next day as meaning Cuban independence. Mr. Woodford met the President of the Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of the Colonies on March 31 to receive their answer. They proposed to submit the question of the Maine to arbitration; stated that they had revoked the order of concentration and placed a large sum at General Blanco’s disposal for the relief of the needy; but in reply to the President’s proposal of an armistice until October 1 and his offer of friendly mediation, had only the following evasive and wholly unsatisfactory offer to make, namely: —

Pacification of Cuba

The Spanish Government, more interested than that of the United States in giving to the Grand Antille an honorable and stable peace, proposes to confide its preparations to the insular parliament, without whose intervention it will not be able to arrive at the final result, it being understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the Central Government are not lessened and diminished.

Truce

As the Cuban Chambers will not meet until the 4th of May, the Spanish Government will not, on its part, find it inconvenient to accept at once a suspension of hostilities asked for by the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it will belong in this case to determine the duration and the conditions of the suspension.

Keenly disappointed with the poor result of his earnest labors for peace, Mr. Woodford telegraphed the President on March 31:—

“Have just telegraphed to the Department of State my official report of the adjourned conference held this afternoon, Thursday. It has turned, as I feared, on a question of punctilio. Spanish pride will not permit the Ministry to propose and offer

an armistice, which they really desire, because they know that armistice now means certain peace next autumn. I am told confidentially that the offer of armistice by the Spanish Government would cause revolution here. Leading generals have been sounded within the last week, and the Ministry have gone as far as they dare go to-day. I believe the Ministry are ready to go as far and as fast as they can and still save the dynasty here in Spain. They know that Cuba is lost. Public opinion in Spain has moved steadily toward peace. No Spanish Ministry would have dared to do one month ago what this Ministry has proposed to-day."

At this point the President gave up all hope of settlement by diplomatic correspondence. Mr. Woodford, more optimistic than his superior, was allowed to continue negotiations to the last, and on April 9 announced that an armistice had been granted, its duration to be determined by General Blanco. But it came too late and did not go far enough. It contained no guaranty of independence and offered no chance for the President to mediate. The President had made up his mind to tolerate no further evasions, and to proceed at once to forcible intervention. His decision proved a wise one for Cuba, for the United States, and for Spain herself.

On April 6 the powers of Europe took a hand

in the discussion. The representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy called upon the President and presented a joint note, appealing to "the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people" and expressing the hope "that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the reëstablishment of order in Cuba."

Some doubt was expressed of the propriety of receiving such a communication, the United States never having been accustomed to take dictation from Europe. But in this, as in other matters, the President relied upon his natural tact and courtesy. He received the delegation with perfect friendliness and cordiality and answered them with a reply, carefully prepared in advance, which left no doubt of the intention of the United States to end a situation that had become insufferable, without asking the permission of any other nation, nor of the fact that the President had made up his mind that intervention was the only real way to "fulfill a duty to humanity."

The reply was as follows:—

"The Government of the United States recognizes the good-will which has prompted the friendly

communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your Excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guaranties for the reëstablishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there, which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquillity of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity.

“The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.”

The message to Congress which it was understood would be sent on the 4th was postponed until the 6th and again held back, so that it did not go in until April 11. The interval of eleven days was marked by another exhibition of the President's

firmness and courage. Congress was now in a pugnacious mood, both Senators and Representatives clamoring for a declaration of war. President McKinley well knew that his reputation was at stake. If Congress should declare war over his head he would not only be personally humiliated, but the nation would appear before the world as divided against itself. He would, in that case, be forced to conduct the war apparently against his will, and whether he won or lost, his whole political career would be ruined. He knew, too, that no one else is so popular as the hero of a great war. Here was an opportunity to win the plaudits of millions by a vigorous assertion of patriotic purposes and to gain lasting renown as a military leader through the conduct of a war in which victory would be almost certain. But McKinley was as heedless of personal considerations as he had been when he carried the message of General Crook on the battlefield of Opequan. No thought of self ever marred his devotion to duty. While Congressmen stormed and threatened, without knowing the real progress of affairs, McKinley quietly but aggressively pushed his preparations for war and at the same time held back the ever-increasing pressure while he exhausted the last chance to obtain a peaceful solution. A small group of his closest friends, including Vice-President Hobart,

Senators Hanna, Spooner, Platt (of Connecticut), Aldrich, McMillan, Frye, Fairbanks, and others watched the situation daily to see if they could muster strength enough in the Senate to sustain a veto in case a war resolution should be prematurely passed. A certain bellicose Senator of great influence went to the Department of State one day in a furor because the message had not been sent in, and shaking his fists exclaimed, "Day, by —, don't your President know where the war-declaring power is lodged? Tell him by —, that if he does n't do something, Congress will exercise the power."

Even the Secretary of War, who was personally loyal, so far forgot himself as to go to the Vice-President's room in the Capitol and there say with great earnestness to a Senator: "I want you to advise the President to declare war. He is making a great mistake. He is in danger of ruining himself and the Republican Party by standing in the way of the people's wishes. Congress will declare war in spite of him. He'll get run over and the party with him." The senator replied, "I'm sorry I can't agree with you. The President knows exactly what he is doing. There is no more sagacious man in the country. I advise you to stand by him and he'll bring us through all right."

One morning in April the Cabinet room of the

White House was filled with Senators, Representatives, and others, most of them vehemently urging the President to send to Congress his message of intervention. They begged, implored, and threatened. They declared he would ruin his reputation if he delayed another day. The President sat at his desk and before him lay the message, complete, and awaiting his signature. He said that Consul-General Lee had informed him that the lives of Americans in Cuba would be endangered if a declaration of war were made before they could leave and that he was expecting a message from General Lee advising him of their safety. Regarding this as an evasion, some of those in the room continued their clamoring for war, when a cipher cablegram arrived. It brought the news from Lee that many Americans were still in danger. The President felt the strain of the tremendous pressure that was being brought to bear upon him and showed it in the pallor of his face, but he rose to his feet, and pounding the table with his fist, said: "That message shall not go to Congress as long as there is a single American life in danger in Cuba. Here"—turning to his Secretary—"put that in the safe till I call for it."

On the 11th of April, the fateful message was finally presented to Congress. After a full and careful review of all the considerations which justified

the action, the President asked authority to use the military and naval forces of the United States, to secure peace and establish a stable government in Cuba, at the same time announcing that he was prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon him by the Constitution and the law.

It was a solemn moment in the history of the United States and the message was received with intense interest, and listened to in sober silence, broken only by an outburst of applause, when the President, after a careful review of the whole situation, reached a climax in the words: "In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop."

When the President said, "The issue is now with the Congress," his words could have but one meaning. The diplomatic powers of the Government, which lie exclusively in the Executive, were exhausted. Congress alone held the power of declaring war and that weapon was now the only one available. The responsibility was promptly accepted.

CHAPTER XXV

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

ON the 13th of April the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives reported the following resolution: —

“Resolved, That the President is hereby authorized and directed to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there, and establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of their own in the Island of Cuba; and the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use the land and naval forces of the United States to execute the purpose of this resolution.”

On the same day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations offered a resolution upon which it had been at work for a week before the receipt of the President's message. With the preamble it read: —

“Whereas, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating,

as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore, —

“Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: —

“First. That the people of the Island of Cuba, are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

“Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

“Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.”

A minority of the committee urged the addition

to the first clause of the words, "and that the Government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island."

This was the very step which the President had so earnestly opposed, but in spite of the vigorous opposition of some of the ablest men in the Senate, the amendment was adopted on the 16th by a vote of 67 to 21, 24 Republicans voting with the Democrats and Populists in the majority.

The following amendment, proposed by Senator Teller, was adopted on the same day without division: —

"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

The difference between the Senate resolution as amended and that of the House was twofold: First, the Senate proposed to recognize the independence of "the Cuban Republic," although it was well known that the insurgents possessed no organized government worthy of the name, and in spite of the fact that such recognition would have embarrassed the

United States in its handling of the situation, as the President and several senators had clearly shown; and second, the House failed to make plain the demand of the United States that the authority of Spain in the island must cease forthwith. In the next few days there were almost continual conferences, in which for a time a deadlock was threatened. The Republicans of the House loyally supported the view of the President and succeeded in defeating the recognition of the insurgents, meanwhile yielding to the Senate on the demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Spaniards. The resolution, as finally passed in the early morning hours of April 19 by both houses, was exactly the same as it originally came from the Senate Committee, with the addition of Senator Teller's amendment.

It was a wise and clear-headed solution of a much-befogged problem, and a fortunate one as well, for it enabled the President to enter upon the prosecution of the war unfettered by the necessity of subordinating his movements to the wishes of the Cubans and with the American Congress squarely at his back. The resolution was signed on the 20th. The Spanish Minister immediately demanded his passports and left the same evening. The resolutions of Congress were cabled to Mr. Woodford with instructions to make formal demand upon the Spanish

Government for the relinquishment of their authority in Cuba and naming the 23d as the day when, if the demand was not met, the President would take action. Before the United States Minister could communicate this demand, he was notified by the Spanish Ministry that diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken, and left for Paris on the afternoon of April 21.

On the 22d the President proclaimed a blockade of the Cuban ports, and on the 23d called for 125,000 volunteers. On the 25th these two proclamations were reported to Congress with a recommendation for a declaration of war. The desired resolution was passed by both houses and approved the same day, declaring "that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain."

On the next day the President, announcing the declaration of war by Congress, wisely proclaimed that the United States would discountenance privateering, in accordance with the Declaration of Paris, although the nation was not a signatory to that agreement. He also announced that Spanish ships in American ports would be given until May 21 in which to load their cargoes and depart. This prompt and eminently proper decision gave evidence, at

the very beginning, of the high-minded purpose of the President, which subsequent events fully confirmed, much to the surprise of those cynical observers who could see nothing in the war but an aggressive movement against a weaker nation, the sole object of which was the annexation of Cuba.

Preparations for the war rapidly followed. A bill to raise \$100,000,000 additional revenue by imports and taxes was introduced in the House by Mr. Dingley on the 26th of April, and, after much discussion, in which the old questions of the issue of legal-tender notes, the coinage of silver, and the constitutionality of an income tax were again the subjects of controversy, it was finally passed by both houses and approved June 13. It provided for a popular loan, at 3 per cent, not to exceed \$400,000,000, of which bonds to the amount of \$200,000,000 were offered and promptly subscribed for, the subscriptions being sufficient to cover the loan several times over.

On April 22 the President had approved an act to increase the military establishment and to divide the service in time of war into two branches, designated respectively as the regular army and the volunteer army. The regular army on April 1, 1898, was composed of 2143 officers and 26,040 men. Under the new law this force was gradually increased, reaching a total of 56,362 officers and men

on August 31. The President's first call for 125,000 men under the act met with a quick response, as did his second call for 75,000 men in May. The number of volunteers was overwhelming. Secretary Alger estimated that a million men offered their services at the first call, and that more than 25,000 applications were made for commissions, though the number required and actually appointed was only 1032.¹ The forces at the command of the President before the close of the war reached a maximum of regulars and volunteers estimated at 274,717. Fortunately, they were not all needed and 136,000 of them never left the country. The naval force, which at the beginning of the war consisted of 1232 officers and 11,750 enlisted men and apprentices, was increased by the addition of 856 volunteer officers, making a total commissioned force of 2088, while the enlisted strength reached a maximum of 24,123.²

Of the appropriation of \$50,000,000, authorized on the 9th of March, nearly \$30,000,000 was apportioned to the navy, and was used for the purchase of one hundred and three vessels,³ which were quickly transformed into ships of war, besides large supplies of guns, ammunition, and other necessities.

¹ Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War*.

² John D. Long, *The New American Navy*.

³ In addition one vessel was presented to the Government, one was leased, and four were chartered.

The naval forces of the United States at the beginning of hostilities consisted of four first-class battleships, one second-class battleship, two armored cruisers, eleven protected cruisers, six monitors, twenty unprotected cruisers and gunboats, and eight torpedo boats, to which must be added the improvised fleet above mentioned.¹ The sum allotted to the army was used chiefly for coast defenses, ordnance, and the work of the Engineering and Signal Corps. The forts were strengthened, guns placed in position, and the harbors filled with mines² to such an extent that any sudden attack of the Spanish fleet upon our seaport towns — an event that many people dreaded almost to the point of hysterics — could be surely repelled.

With the actual commencement of hostilities, the same iron will that had resisted a premature beginning of the war was now devoted to its prosecution with sharpness and decision. The results of the months of quiet preparation began to appear. As

¹ Spain had but one first-class battleship, one of the second class, three armored cruisers, three protected cruisers, twelve unprotected cruisers, six torpedo gunboats, seven torpedo-boat destroyers, and four torpedo boats. Yet, in spite of this hopelessly inadequate navy, her people were persuaded that the superior discipline of Spanish sailors and the fact (?) that the crews of the Americans ships were made up of "foreign mercenaries" would give Spain the victory. Even in the United States an absurd fear of the prowess of the Spanish navy was developed in the breasts of many timid people.

² Fifteen hundred and thirty-five mines were so placed.

early as October 21, 1897, orders had been issued to Commodore George Dewey to sail for Nagasaki, Japan, and there take command of the Asiatic squadron. Before he sailed, the policy of the administration was outlined to him and he was given instructions regarding the course to pursue in the contingency of a war with Spain.¹ He began at once to collect information regarding the Spanish forces in the Philippines. On January 11, 1898, instructions were cabled to the commanders of the various squadrons to retain in service men whose terms of enlistment were about to expire. Two days after the destruction of the *Maine* the South Atlantic fleet was ordered to proceed at once to Key West, where other vessels were already assembling, so that the Department had a fleet mobilized and ready for instant action should hostilities be found inevitable. Meanwhile the ships under construction or undergoing repairs were completed as rapidly as possible and all the fleets were ordered to engage in evolutions and target practice. On February 25, Commodore Dewey was ordered to mobilize his squadron at Hongkong and advised that in case of war his duty would be to see that the Spanish Asiatic squadron did not escape, and to begin offensive operations in the Philippines.

¹ John D. Long, *The New American Navy*.

On Sunday, April 24, the Secretary of the Navy went to the White House for consultation with the President. As the result, the following cable message was sent: —

WASHINGTON, *April 24, 1898.*

DEWEY, HONGKONG —

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

LONG.

On the same day Dewey had sailed from Hongkong in accordance with the requirements of British neutrality. He received the message on the 26th, and on the 30th his squadron stood off the Island of Luzon at Subig Bay. Close examination failed to reveal the presence of the Spanish fleet at that point as expected, and the squadron sailed for Manila Bay in the evening. On the next morning, May 1, at 5.30 Commodore Dewey, on the flagship *Olympia*, followed by the *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Petrel*, *Concord*, and *Boston*, in the order named, sailed boldly into Manila Bay and with slight damage to his ships and only seven men wounded, destroyed the entire

Spanish fleet of ten vessels, silenced three shore batteries, and held in his possession the harbor of Manila. Thus, in less than a week from the declaration of war, thanks to the foresight of the President and the Department of the Navy, the first demonstration was given to Spain of the utter futility of resistance to the demands of the United States.

The second demonstration, completing the lesson, was to follow only two months later. The proclamation of a blockade of Cuban ports found a powerful squadron at Key West, under Rear-Admiral Sampson, ready to undertake that duty and the other equally important one of intercepting the Spanish fleet, then concentrated at the Cape Verde Islands, under Admiral Cervera. This fleet, the strength of which was overestimated both by the United States Navy Department and by the Spanish Admiral himself, consisted of the *Cristóbal Colón*, a battleship of the second class, and the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Almirante Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, armored cruisers supposed to be comparable with the *New York* and *Brooklyn* in speed and efficiency, though slightly smaller. In addition there were three torpedo-boat destroyers, a new kind of craft the possibilities of which were then unknown but greatly feared. There were also three torpedo

boats and two colliers. It was expected that to this fleet would be added the Pelayo, a powerful battleship of the first class, and the Carlos V, an armored cruiser. It was not then known in the United States that the last two ships were not ready, that the Colón lacked her big guns, that the Vizcaya and Oquendo had defective guns, that the ammunition was bad, and that the Vizcaya, to use the words of Cervera himself, could "no longer steam" and was "only a boil in the body of the fleet." On the contrary, the people of the entire Atlantic seacoast were for several weeks in a state of terror lest this powerful navy should suddenly descend upon their harbors, capture New York and Boston, and bombard all the other cities!

Admiral Sampson, supported by Captains Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick, strongly urged an immediate attack on Havana — a feat which, doubtless, could have been accomplished with a brilliancy rivaling Dewey's achievement. But the Navy Department — wisely, as the event proved — did not wish to risk the crippling of the fleet until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of, particularly in view of the lack of docking facilities which would have made repairs difficult. The Administration also realized that there were no United States troops available to hold the city if captured. The effective

blockade of Cuban ports and a sharp lookout for the Spanish ships were therefore insisted upon as the proper policy.

On April 29 the Spanish fleet left the Cape Verde Islands and for two weeks kept the Navy Department in a fever of uncertainty. On May 11 Cervera appeared at Martinique, and on the 19th, in spite of the vigilance of the swift scout ships of the American navy, sailed into the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. On June 1, Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago and "established a blockade so strict that the Spanish sentinel could hear the cries of the watch on the American ships."¹

The "bottling-up" of Cervera's fleet made necessary a quick change in the plans of the army. Instead of devoting the summer to organizing, drilling, and disciplining the newly recruited forces with a view to sending them to Cuba in October, after the rainy season was over, it became necessary to send an army at once to invest Santiago, and, by coöperating with the navy, to reduce the city, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet, and thus secure control of the entire eastern end of the island.

General William R. Shafter was placed in command and ordered to embark his troops at Tampa, Florida, on the morning of June 8, which he did

¹ John D. Long, *The New American Navy*.

in the midst of indescribable confusion, due to inexperience and the lack of transports; but, owing to a false rumor of the near presence of one of the dreaded Spanish ships, the expedition did not sail until the 14th. The story of this expedition is a sad tale of incompetence, lack of direction, miserable equipment, and blundering, redeemed only by the bravery and determination with which certain officers and most of the soldiers fought their way to victory in spite of the handicaps which one third of a century of unpreparedness had forced upon them. The army was finally landed, and after sharp engagements at El Caney and San Juan, the city of Santiago was "well invested, but with a very thin line," to quote from a dispatch from General Shafter dated July 3. In the same message the general announced that he was "seriously considering withdrawing about five miles," and told of the illness of General Young, General Wheeler, and himself. This discouraging message was received at the White House after a night of intense anxiety in which the President awaited tidings from the front until daylight. It was the darkest hour of the war. Yet simultaneously with this dispatch to the War Department General Shafter, in spite of his forebodings, sent a message to the Spanish commander demanding his surrender.

Then the unexpected happened. At precisely 9.35 A.M., July 3, in the fog of a Sunday morning, the prow of the *Maria Teresa*, the flagship of Admiral Cervera, emerged from the narrow and crooked strait that forms the entrance to the harbor of Santiago followed by the *Vizcaya*, *Cristóbal Colón*, and *Oquendo* in the order named, and later by the torpedo-boat destroyers, *Plutón* and *Furor*. It was a desperate move, made against the earnest protest of the admiral, who declared that the only result of the proposed sortie would be a "horrible and useless hecatomb" and "a sacrifice on the altar of vanity." Yet the orders from Havana and Madrid were imperative and Cervera made no murmur as he grimly prepared to face certain destruction. The blockading squadron, because of the careful preparations of Admiral Sampson, was all ready for the short and decisive combat. In every conning tower was posted his order: "If the enemy tries to escape the ships must close in and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore." The admiral himself, in the *New York*, was on his way to Siboney for conference with General Shafter, but at the first shot turned his ship and speeded westward. Every captain knew what to do. The ships closed in, and in just thirty-five minutes the Spanish flagship, which had been disabled by

one of the first projectiles, was seen to be on fire and headed for the shore. The Almirante Oquendo, the last of the cruisers to emerge, now caught the concentrated attack of the American ships and after a plucky fight against the fiercest and most destructive fire of the day, burst into flames and was beached, a shapeless wreck, half a mile west of the Teresa. With two of the enemy's ships out of the way, the American vessels, now joined by the New York steaming along at seventeen knots, the highest speed of the day, gave chase to the Vizcaya and the Colón, firing furiously with their forward guns. At a quarter past eleven the Vizcaya headed for the shore, struck a reef, and twenty minutes later was blown to pieces by an explosion in her forward magazine. The Cristóbal Colón, meanwhile, having escaped the punishment which her sister ships received, was steaming westward at a terrific speed, hotly pursued by the Oregon, the Brooklyn, the New York, the Texas and the little armored yacht Vixen. At 1.15 a thirteen-inch shell from the Oregon, fired at a distance of five miles, fell so near the Colón that her captain, seeing the certainty of capture, hauled down his flag and headed full speed for the shore. At 2 P.M. the last¹ of Cervera's ships lay

¹ The destroyers, Plutón and Furor, had been riddled by three- and six-pound shells, soon after they came out.

sinking on the Cuban shores, seventy-five miles west of Santiago. During the remainder of that memorable day the officers and men of the American fleet were as busily engaged in rescuing the survivors and caring for the wounded as they had been earnest in the work of destruction in the forenoon.¹ The gallant admiral was among the rescued, and as he was brought on board the yacht Gloucester, attired in a wet coat, an undershirt, and a torn pair of trousers, Captain Wainwright warmly grasped his hand and with undisguised heartiness congratulated him upon the heroic fight he had made.

While all this drama was being enacted, the President and some of his Cabinet sat in the White House anxiously discussing the unhappy message of General Shafter, and considering the means to be employed for his reinforcement. In the evening came a message to the Secretary of War from General Shafter with the news that Cervera had escaped and that Sampson was in pursuit — thus increasing the anxiety, but tempering it with a new hope. An hour later came the information that all but one of the Spanish ships had been destroyed and still later the much-criticized but completely justifiable message of triumph from Admiral Sampson: —

¹ The number of men rescued and made prisoners of war was about thirteen hundred.

"The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of Cervera's fleet."

Thus the anxious forebodings of the morning were turned to joy in the evening and the darkest day of the war, so far as the White House was concerned, became the brightest. For all knew that the end was now in sight and that the policy of the President had practically accomplished the purpose, from which it had never deviated — the speedy destruction of the naval power of Spain.

McKinley, although a man of military experience, was too young at the time of the Civil War to hold a position of command, and since 1865, with the exception of a close supervision of the state militia during his governorship, he had been essentially a civilian. If any one expected, however, that the President, on this account, would step back and relegate the strategy of the war, the raising of armies, the strengthening of the navy, and the necessary measures for offense and defense to the military experts, he was destined to receive a great surprise. The President fully understood that the makers of the Constitution, in providing that the Executive should be commander-in-chief of the army and navy, meant to pay no empty compliment. It was a responsibility to be squarely met and was so

accepted. It could not have been otherwise, for two reasons: First, the years following the Civil War had not developed a man in the army to whom the country could turn in such an emergency with a confidence such as Grant or Sherman or Sheridan would have inspired; and, second, the divergence of views on the part of many able men, in both the army and navy, required a leader, as the Constitution-makers had anticipated, who should be the final authority to determine all questions of policy.

Therefore, summoning to his aid the best advice he could obtain from both departments of the service, the President assumed active command. No orders of importance were issued, from either the War or Navy Department, without his full knowledge and approval, and these were often revised by him. Occasionally he would soften the harshness of a military order, but, not infrequently, he would inject into one of the dispatches a new note of decision and determination. A noteworthy incident of this kind occurred immediately after the battle of Santiago. General Shafter reported to the War Department that General Toral, the Spanish Commander, wished to evacuate the city, the troops retaining their arms and marching out with colors flying. They were to have one day in which to march to some interior point before the Americans occupied

the city. General Shafter and others recommended the acceptance of this proposal, but the President insisted upon an unconditional surrender. He telegraphed to Shafter, through the War Department: "What you went to Santiago for was the Spanish army. If you allow it to evacuate with its arms you must meet it somewhere else. This is not war. If the Spanish commander desires to leave the city and its people, let him surrender and we will then discuss the question as to what shall be done with them." When General Miles reached Santiago, Toral made a second proposition and General Miles joined with Shafter and his generals in recommending its acceptance. He urged that Santiago could not be taken without the sacrifice of thousands of lives; that Toral was not likely to surrender; that the enemy's troops were in good condition; that the non-combatants were now out of the city and a burden to the Americans; that our own troops were in a distressed condition; that there was danger of yellow fever; that it was difficult to protect their health, and almost impossible to transport food to them. The President called the Cabinet together. Admitting the desperate conditions, he argued that Toral really wished to surrender but was playing for better terms; that if allowed to march out with his troops under arms, it would be necessary to fight

him again in a less favorable position; that the moral effect upon Europe of such a concession would be disadvantageous; that to yield when the enemy was in our power would only encourage the war spirit. He therefore insisted upon unconditional surrender, and the event proved his wisdom and demonstrated that the Commander-in-Chief was a better military genius than his generals.

Daily conferences were held in the White House, at which the President, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the Adjutant General were usually present. McKinley kept his finger upon every detail. He rarely left his office until one or two o'clock in the morning, and frequently was there until a later hour. From the war-room, adjoining his office, he kept in telegraphic touch with the front. War-maps covered the walls of this room and tiny flags used as pins showed the positions of the armies and of the ships of the Navy. No one knew better than the President what the various maneuvers meant. He was in constant conference with the members of the Cabinet and other officials. The stream of callers increased enormously. The daily mail sometimes exceeded fifteen hundred letters. The burdens of the Executive became more and more intense and were more severe than those placed upon any other President since Lincoln.

The diary of Mr. Cortelyou during these months contains many references to the strain imposed upon the President. A few extracts will suffice to give, at least, a glimpse of the intensities of feeling: —

“Saturday, April 16, 1898. The Senate is still in session and it is expected that a great many of the Senators will deliver speeches to-day on the pending question. A spirit of wild jingoism seems to have taken possession of this usually conservative body. Men who are supposed to look at current events in a calm, dispassionate way are now talking about ‘war’ and ‘reparation’ as though these were the sole thought of the American people. If one attempts to argue with such gentlemen they will tell you that you do not know what you are talking about, accuse you of unpatriotic conduct and sneer at your reasoning and conclusions. A rude awakening is in store for these self-constituted apostles of freedom and humanity.

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“The President does not look at all well. He is bearing up under the great strain, but his haggard face and anxious inquiry for any news which has in it a token of peace tell of the sense of tremendous responsibility and of his devotion to the welfare of the people of this country. The vile slanders uttered



Geo. B. Outen



against him, and which, be it said to their shame, have not been repudiated by his so-called friends, have only tended to endear him to those of us who see him as he works here in the Executive Mansion, early and late, oftentimes in his office until one and two o'clock in the morning. The sensational newspapers publish daily accounts of conferences that never take place, of influences that are never felt, of purposes that are nothing but the products of the degenerate minds that spread them before a too-easily-led public.

“One of the most absurd of the lies that have found currency of late is the one to the effect that the President sees only the favorable side of the correspondence which comes to the Executive Mansion. To one familiar with the actual practice in this regard the assertion is simply ridiculous. The President sees everything, whether in the shape of mail, telegrams, or newspapers, that can indicate the drift of public sentiment. I have reported to him daily the proportion of favorable and unfavorable comment in the correspondence and have shown him fair samples of each. The fact is that on a most conservative estimate ninety per cent of the entire correspondence that has come to the office since the beginning of the concluding negotiations on the Spanish-Cuban question has been an endorsement

of the President's course — an emphatic appeal for peace and for the exercise of sound reason in the handling of the whole matter. The ranters in Congress, the blatherskites who do the talking upon the street-corners and at public meetings, and the scavengers of the sensational press misrepresent public opinion when they assert that this country is for war except as a necessity and for the upholding of the national honor."

"*Sunday, May 15, 1898.* The President is again looking careworn, the color having faded from his cheeks and the rings being once more noticeable about his eyes. The strain upon him is terrible. Uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the Cape Verde fleet; the growing unrest and threatening character of the European situation, — these, coupled with the many difficulties constantly arising as a result of the short-sighted policy which for so long a time has been pursued by Congress, leaving the country poorly prepared for hostilities, make the burden upon the Executive shoulders a heavy one. Added to these things is the struggle for place among the ambitious gentlemen who desire to serve their country in high-salaried and high-titled positions. And then, too, the present conditions are attended by the usual differences and bickerings among the officers of

the army and navy, which in certain high quarters are altogether too apparent."

"*Sunday, May 22, 1898.* The President also read aloud to Colonel Herrick several letters received from fathers and mothers, begging that the troops be not sent to Cuba during the rainy season now approaching. If some of the malcontents who are shouting 'On to Havana' could see some of this correspondence, from all parts of the country, they would not be so ready to proclaim their views the only correct ones and to represent the President as lacking in strength of character and foresight."

"*June 8, 1898.* In all the movements of the army and navy the President's hand is seen. He is solicitous to the last degree for the welfare of our troops and sailors, but he is determined not to delay the prosecution of the war a day longer than necessary. He is a man of infinite tact and I have seen many a dangerous situation bridged over and not a few unpleasant incidents in the Cabinet circle smoothed out by his good sense and quiet influence."

"*Friday, June 17, 1898.* The President watches the war situation most earnestly and intently. In the evenings before retiring he goes to the war-room

and studies the dispatches before going to his room. In the midst of all this his wise counsel has saved the Government money and lives to an incalculable degree. He is the strong man of the Cabinet, the dominating force; but with it all are such gentleness and graciousness in dealing with men that some of his greatest victories have been won apparently without any struggle."

CHAPTER XXVI

THE END OF THE WAR

THE naval victory off Santiago virtually brought the war to a close. With the city surrounded by the American army and the harbor in possession of the navy, the Spanish commander, General Toral, had no choice but to capitulate. He prolonged the negotiations, however, until July 16, when the agreement was signed, and on the next day General Shafter marched into the city and received the formal surrender. The whole eastern end of the island was secured to the United States and 22,864 Spanish prisoners were sent back to Spain at the expense of our government.

Three movements, one naval and two military, remained to be completed. The first was the proposed sailing of the fleet of Commodore John C. Watson, to make a demonstration against the Spanish coast. The second was the occupation of Porto Rico, already undertaken by General Miles; and the third was the capture of the City of Manila by the forces of General Wesley Merritt.

The proposed naval expedition was widely advertised. The American navy, having destroyed two

Spanish squadrons, now assumed a large importance in the eyes of Europe, and the prospect of these ships crossing the Atlantic and bringing the war straight to the coast of Spain, incidentally destroying the last remnant of Spanish naval power, was not relished. Admiral Camara, in command of the Spanish reserve fleet, had been ordered to the Philippines, but went no farther than the Suez Canal, his movements after that being somewhat uncertain. Business men in the leading ports of Spain, realizing how little Camara's ships could accomplish against the victors of Manila and Santiago, trembled when they heard of Watson's mighty squadron, and brought every possible pressure to bear upon the authorities of Spain to sue for peace. The statesmen of that country saw at last the hopelessness of their effort and the futility of expecting aid from other European nations. The powers, indeed, jealous of the growing prestige of the American nation, were all strongly insisting upon peace and in this they had the vigorous support of the Vatican.

The threatened invasion, following so soon after the decisive action at Santiago, and the attack upon Porto Rico, together with the irresistible pressure at home and abroad, convinced the Spanish Government that the time to end the unequal struggle had arrived. Accordingly, on July 22, the Duc d'Almo-

dovar del Rio, Minister of State, addressed the following message to President McKinley, which was submitted by the Ambassador of the French Republic, M. Jules Cambon: —

July 22, 1898.

MR. PRESIDENT: Since three months the American people and the Spanish nation are at war, because Spain did not consent to grant independence to Cuba and to withdraw her troops therefrom.

Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife and only endeavored to defend her possessions with no other hope than to oppose, in the measure of her strength, the undertaking of the United States and to protect her honor.

Neither the trials which adversity has made us endure nor the realization that but faint hope is left us could deter us from struggling till the exhaustion of our very last resources. This stout purpose, however, does not blind us, and we are fully aware of the responsibilities which would weigh upon both nations in the eyes of the civilized world were this war to be continued.

This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who wage it the hardships inseparable from all armed conflicts, but also dooms to useless suffering and unjust sacrifices the inhabitants of a territory to which

Spain is bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no nation either of the old or of the new world.

To end calamities already so great, and to avert evils still greater, our countries might mutually endeavor to find upon which conditions the present struggle could be terminated otherwise than by force of arms.

Spain believes this understanding possible and hopes that this view is also harbored by the Government of the United States. All true friends of both nations share, no doubt, the same hope.

Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object — the vindication of her prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of insurrection it was her desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature independence. In the present war she has been actuated by sentiments inspired rather by ties of blood than by her interests, and by the right belonging to her as mother country.

Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of war if the United States are on their part likewise disposed.

The President of the United States and the American people may now learn from this message the true thought, desire, and intention of the Spanish nation.

And so do we wish to learn from the President of the United States upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba, and might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason should both Governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island.

In the name of the Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent I have the honor to address this message to Your Excellency with the expression of my highest consideration.

DUC D'ALMODOVAR DEL RIO,

Ministre d'État.

On a hot afternoon immediately following the receipt of this communication, the President invited the members of the Cabinet to accompany him on a trip down the Potomac in a lighthouse tender, the ostensible purpose of which was to escape the heat. The letter was then read and a discussion ensued, lasting several days, which proved to be the longest in which the McKinley Cabinet ever engaged. On the following day the draft of a protocol, prepared in the State Department, was submitted by Mr. Day. It differed from the one finally agreed upon in proposing to relinquish all of the Philippine Islands to Spain, except sufficient ground for a naval station. Upon this question the

Cabinet was about equally divided. All of the arguments with which the country subsequently became familiar were brought forth in favor of abandoning the islands and restoring them to Spain. On the other hand, it was argued that it was impossible to decide definitely at that time whether it would be advantageous or desirable either to surrender the islands or to retain them or some of them; that more information was needed; that the report of Admiral Dewey and his advice should be obtained before final action was taken. The latter was the view which finally prevailed.

At first the President felt a natural revulsion against the acquisition of a vast unknown territory thousands of miles away. He did not want the islands, but, once in our possession, he felt that the people would never be satisfied if they were given back to Spain. Perhaps this feeling was best expressed in the words of a certain distinguished senator, himself an anti-expansionist, who declared that he would "as soon turn a redeemed soul over to the devil as give the Philippines back to Spain." Secretary Wilson was strong for evangelizing the islands and favored keeping the whole group. "Yes," said the President, in his humorous way, "you Scotch favor keeping everything — including the Sabbath."

Secretary Bliss saw great commercial opportunities and he also favored taking the entire group, as did Attorney-General Griggs. Secretaries Gage, Long, and Day stood out for a naval base only, though Mr. Gage later changed his mind. In summing up the varying views the President, remarking that some were in favor of retaining the whole Archipelago, while others wanted Luzon, jokingly added, "but Judge Day only wants a hitching-post." His own decision was to keep all the islands, at least temporarily, and await developments. "Mr. President," said the Secretary of State, after the meeting adjourned, "you did n't put my motion for a naval base." "No, judge," was the answer, with a twinkle of the eye, "I was afraid it would be carried!"

A few extracts from the diary of Mr. Cortelyou will serve to throw further light upon the way in which the character of the reply to the Spanish Duke — so momentous in the history of the United States — was finally determined: —

"*Friday, July 29, 1898.* The session [of the Cabinet] was a protracted one, discussion of the important question of peace proposals by the Spanish Government occupying the entire time.

"Several drafts were made of different portions of the proposed reply to the communication of the

Duke of Almodovar. The Cabinet appears to be nearly if not quite unanimous on the main points which will form the basis of this Government's response. Naturally the disposition to be made of the Philippines consumed most time and elicited the greatest amount of discussion.

"A little after one o'clock Attorney-General Griggs, with a copy of the first rough draft of the reply, — prepared under the President's direction by the Secretary of State and his assistants, — repaired to the President's large office with Assistant Secretary Cortelyou and dictated to him the three main points to be insisted upon by the Government of the United States as essential terms and conditions precedent to an agreement leading to peace. The Attorney-General prepared these points — or it would be more accurate to say that he selected these points — from the manuscripts which he held in his hand, prepared as heretofore indicated by the Department of State; the Attorney-General's dictation being merely to present them in proper form and with legal accuracy."

"*Saturday, July 30, 1898.* The Cabinet met at 10.30 o'clock this morning, to resume the consideration of this Government's reply to the Spanish note. All the members of the Cabinet were present. The

discussion continued without interruption until about 1.15 P.M.

“About this time Assistant Secretary Moore, of the State Department, came over and received a draft of the reply of the United States. This he took with him to the State Department, in order that a clean copy might be made.

“Later Assistant Secretary Adees came to the Executive Mansion with copies of the American note. At the usual time the President went to lunch. He did not remain in the private part of the house very long, but was at his desk in the Cabinet room a little before two o'clock.

“Immediately after the adjournment of the Cabinet a note had been sent to Ambassador Cambon asking him to call at a specified hour in the afternoon. At about two o'clock the President requested Mr. Cortelyou to make a clean copy of the final draft in his possession. This was done very hurriedly and the copy presented to the President in the library, the President excusing himself to the Ambassador — who had already reached the White House — to receive the copy thus made.

“The meeting between the President and the French Ambassador lasted until late in the afternoon, concluding at about 5.30 P.M. . . .

“The President worked incessantly upon the prep-

aration of the reply of the United States. The final changes in that document were largely his own and his guiding hand will be seen at every point in the negotiations. His attitude during the trying hours which have elapsed since the presentation of the Spanish note has been characterized by the same wisdom, foresight, and calm judgment which marked his treatment of the many intricate problems presented to him for solution prior to the declaration of war. . . .

"When the President came into his office at about 10.30 this evening he set to work at once to clear up the work which had accumulated during the week. Secretary Alger was with him a good portion of the evening. The President was in a particularly happy frame of mind; appeared greatly relieved by having disposed of the vexing questions requiring his attention during the latter part of the week. It was evident that to him peace appeared to be not improbable and that the difficulties incident to the preliminary steps in such a momentous proposition had been successfully taken. He made frequent comments upon the suggestions for peace brought to his attention. These suggestions have been coming in from all over the country, by mail and by telegraph, from the highest to the lowest citizen, and together with the comments, editorial and otherwise, in the

public press, formed a not unimportant guide to public sentiment."

"*Sunday, July 31, 1898.* This has been a quiet day for the President. He spent comparatively little time in his office until quite late in the afternoon.

"About four o'clock he went over some of the correspondence giving peace suggestions and other views on the present situation. I made the remark that the final draft of this Government's reply to the note of Spain was a good example of the development of a public paper under discussion — that there had been material changes by himself and the Cabinet since the first draft was made. In reply to this he took from his pocket a sheet of note-paper on which was a memorandum in his own handwriting, made on the day of the receipt of the Spanish note, or at about that time, in which he stated what he would require as terms of peace. These terms as thus stated by the President were exactly those which were finally transmitted to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, through the Ambassador of France."

The reply, thus carefully prepared, was dispatched to the Spanish Minister, by the Secretary of State, William R. Day,¹ on the 30th of July. It

¹ John Sherman resigned April 25, and on the next day the Presi-

referred to the President's earnest labors to avert a conflict and his disappointment that these efforts had been frustrated. It pointed out that the war had been precipitated by Spain's refusal to withdraw from Cuba. Having accepted the issue, the President had, in the exercise of his duty, prosecuted the war in order to secure at the earliest possible moment an honorable peace. In doing so his countrymen had sacrificed their lives and property and heavy burdens had been placed upon them. He, nevertheless, felt impelled to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace. The conditions as originally determined by the President were then stated as follows: —

“The United States will require: —

“First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the island.

“Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forth any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to losses and expenses of the United States. He nominated Mr. Day to be Secretary of State, and John Bassett Moore, Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. Day, who was present at the conferences between the President and the French Ambassador, and took part in them, made careful notes of these talks and took them to Paris with him, where they proved of much value in settling the true character of the negotiations and the proper construction and meaning of the protocol.

States incident to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must therefore require the cession to the United States and the evacuation by Spain of the islands of Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrões to be selected by the United States.

“Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy, and will hold, the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.”

The Spanish Minister, in a lengthy reply, dated August 7, while accepting the first two propositions, left the question of the Philippines in such a state of ambiguity as to make a subsequent misunderstanding more than likely: —

“The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of conquest, since, in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native, supported and provided for by

the American admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore, the Government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines; but as the intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not *a priori* renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms which the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may render desirable."

Mr. Day took the note to the President and suggested a very simple and old-fashioned method. He said: "Let us get it down in black and white. Such a document would be quite handy in dealing with our Spanish friends." With the President's approval Mr. Day went back to the State Department for consultation with Mr. Moore, and suggested the drafting of a protocol. In tactful language the Assistant Secretary laid the proposition before the French Ambassador, thus: —

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

WASHINGTON, *August 10, 1898.*

EXCELLENCY: Although it is your understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday afternoon, is intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish Government of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the President would appoint commissioners to negotiate and conclude with commissioners on the part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit.

Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a protocol, to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken.

I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a protocol, in which you will find that I have embodied the precise terms rendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations

for the appointment of commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment of commissioners to treat of peace.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

WILLIAM R. DAY.

Protocol

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say: —

ARTICLE 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba.

ARTICLE 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an

island in the Ladrões, to be selected by the United States.

ARTICLE 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

ARTICLE 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

ARTICLE 5. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed

shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

ARTICLE 6. Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

This important document was signed on the afternoon of August 12 by Mr. Day and M. Cambon, and the President immediately proclaimed a cessation of hostilities. The announcement was promptly telegraphed to all the commanding officers of the army and navy. It reached Porto Rico on the 13th, compelling General Miles to stop a campaign already virtually won. In a few days his forces would have been hammering at San Juan, with the greater portion of the island in his possession. He had left Guantánamo Bay, with an advance guard of 3415 officers and men, on July 21, in nine transports, convoyed by the fleet, and landed at Guanica, on the south coast of Porto Rico on the 25th. He was reinforced by Generals James H. Wilson, John R. Brooke, and Theodore Schwan, the command eventually numbering 16,973 officers and men. On the

27th he entered Ponce, next to San Juan the most important port of the island, and from that point conducted his operations with swiftness and smoothness, such that in less than three weeks, every Spanish post outside of San Juan was rendered untenable. The campaign was so near completion that it gave the United States an undeniable claim to the island. Everywhere the soldiers were welcomed with the greatest friendliness by the native population, who, like the Cubans, knew the oppressiveness of Spanish rule.

Owing to the greater distance and broken cable communication, the President's order suspending hostilities did not reach Manila until the afternoon of August 16, the delay saving Admiral Dewey and General Merritt the disappointment that had come to General Miles, for on the 14th they had finally compelled the capitulation of Manila and received the surrender of 13,000 Spanish troops. The attack was made at 9 A.M. August 13 (Manila time), a few hours, actual time, after the signing of the protocol.

Thus the war closed with part of Cuba, nearly all of Porto Rico, and the principal city of the Philippines in the hands of the Americans. The expedition of Commodore Watson, having achieved its object, principally through the newspapers, remained at home.

CHAPTER XXVII

A WAVE OF CRITICISM

THE war was remarkable for the speedy accomplishment of its purposes and the small number of casualties on the American side. In the two naval engagements, each completely destroying an entire fleet, only one man was killed and the injury to the American ships was trifling. From April 21 to August 12, the entire losses in the navy were only 18 killed in battle, including those who subsequently died from their wounds, and 67 who died from diseases or injuries, out of a total of about 25,000 men. The losses of the army, in Cuba, Porto Rico, and Manila, were only 345 killed in action, including those who died from wounds. There were 2565 deaths from disease, making a total of 2910 deaths in an army whose maximum strength was 274,717, or a little more than one per cent. Secretary Alger figured that in the first five months of the Civil War the ratio of deaths per 1000 was 17.29, while in the Spanish War it was only 10.59, and that the ratio of deaths from disease was 14.96 per 1000 in the same period of 1861, but only 9.34 in 1898. He adds that "the records of any army in the world do not show

as small a mortality percentage from disease as the Army of the United States during the war with Spain.¹

Yet, in all fairness to the Secretary of War, it must be admitted that a mortality of even one per cent was far higher than was necessary. Since the Civil War great progress has been made, not only in surgery, but in knowledge of infection and the requirements of general sanitation. Of the 2485 enlisted men who died of disease, only two fifths contracted their illness through exposure at the front. In the United States, 1514 men died in camp, more than a third of them from typhoid fever. These men were chosen, at the time of their enlistment, as physically sound, after the most rigorous medical examination. Their sojourn for a few months in a well-chosen and well-regulated Southern camp should have been a beneficial experience for healthy young men. The habits of regularity, simple but nourishing food, and plenty of exercise in the open air should have increased their strength and fitted them for a campaign in the tropics, where camp life could not easily have been made ideal. Such was doubtless the intention. At the beginning of the war, on April 25, the Surgeon-General of the army issued a circular of instructions to the medical officers, point-

¹ Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War*.

ing out the dangers to be guarded against in camp life and giving specific instructions regarding camp hygiene. But in a volunteer army, hastily recruited, there could be but little appreciation of these dangers. Officers, unaccustomed to their duties, failed to see the necessity of rigid inspection and policing. The volunteer soldiers — healthy young fellows as they were — might easily neglect such an ordinary, but vital, precaution as boiling their drinking-water unless compelled to do so by the most rigid discipline. At Chickamauga, in many respects an attractive place and certainly convenient for the purpose, the soil was not suitable for a military encampment. The large amount of clay prevented proper drainage. The ground was cold and damp at night. The water collected in pools, where it was exposed to infection. Although there were springs and artesian wells, the soldiers did not hesitate to use the surface water — not knowing that danger worse than Spanish bullets lurked in it. Thus, partly from their own neglect, but chiefly because there was no one to enforce the orders of the Surgeon-General, disease killed more men in the camps of the United States than in those of the tropics, and nearly five times as many as were killed in battle.

At the close of the Santiago campaign a still worse state of affairs developed, although, because of the

smaller number of men, the aggregate mortality was not so great. When the troops landed at Siboney the surgeon in charge of the beach hospital urged that every house in the village be burned. The warning went unheeded, and the cottages, infected with yellow fever by the hundreds of native refugees, were rashly occupied by the soldiers. In the march to Santiago, toiling through rough trails beneath a burning sun, the men threw away the burdens, of which a little foresight might have relieved them, and the ground was strewn with coats, underclothes, blankets, pieces of shelter-tents in which the men carried their rations, and nearly everything belonging to the soldiers except their guns and ammunition. Some even abandoned their rations, relying upon supply trains which did not come for several days. When the heat of the day had passed and the cold damp night air settled down upon the half-famished men, the suffering was intense. Elaborate directions regarding the use of water for drinking and the necessity of boiling it were disregarded. In the digging of trenches about Santiago in the rainy season, infection from malaria was inevitable. When the notice of bombardment was sent to the Spanish commander in Santiago a horde of miserable, half-starved, and fever-infected inhabitants rushed out of the city and were received with open-handed

hospitality by the American army. In due course, yellow fever was raging all along the line from Santiago to Siboney. Before the surrender of Santiago, General Miles, under date of July 12, telegraphed to the War Department that one hundred cases of yellow fever had appeared. It was then necessary to maintain an unbroken front, for if the Spanish general had known the seriousness of the danger threatening the American army, he might have been even less willing to surrender. The formal capitulation on the 16th relieved the tension somewhat, but it was still necessary to maintain a show of force to guard the Spanish prisoners against the insurgents. Immediate directions were given by the War Department to have the troops removed to a good camp on high ground and General Shafter cabled on July 22 that this would be done "the minute the prisoners can be disposed of." On the 2d of August positive directions to that effect were sent to General Shafter, after a consultation at the White House, but on the 3d he replied that the camp-site had been found unsuitable and that nothing remained to be done except transport the troops back to the United States.

Then came an unfortunate incident, which, though well-intended, proved to be ill-advised, demoralizing, and wholly unnecessary. This was the publi-

cation of the famous "Round Robin," a document signed by the commanding officers at Santiago and addressed to General Shafter, demanding the immediate removal of their forces to the United States and stating that the army was already "disabled by malarial fever to such an extent that its efficiency is destroyed," and likely to be "entirely destroyed by the epidemic of yellow fever sure to come in the near future." It used the imperative and startling words: "This army must be moved at once or it will perish."

This alarming and sensational paper was, by a strange breach of military discipline, given to the Associated Press before it reached General Shafter, and was published in every important newspaper throughout the United States on the morning of August 4. It struck the White House with the force of a thunderbolt. The President saw it, for the first time, in the newspapers and was justly indignant. At that moment the Administration was engaged in its negotiations with Spain, through M. Cambon, for a settlement of the conditions of peace. The public announcement before the whole world that the American army in Cuba was in a state of panic and insubordination and on the verge of dissolution was extremely unfortunate at a time when the United States was awaiting the acceptance of its

demands by Spain and the President greatly feared that some complication might result. As a matter of policy the conditions reported by General Shafter had not been made public and the "Round Robin," therefore, greatly shocked and grieved the whole nation. It was as unnecessary as it was imprudent. The administration had already prepared for the precise step which the signers of the document demanded. There could be no objection to presenting their views to the commanding general in the form of a letter, and, had they done only this, they would have learned that the War Department had already selected Montauk Point, Long Island, as a suitable place for the troops, that the intention was to move them there as rapidly as possible, and that General Wheeler's command had already (on August 1) been ordered home.¹ It was the publication of the letter that was mischievous and insubordinate. It is commonly believed that the "Round Robin" caused the speedy return of the troops, but neither the letter itself nor its publication had anything to do with this movement, which had been already determined.

A wave of criticism against the army and denunciation of Secretary Alger swept over the country. The President was not directly assailed, but his political opponents saw the opportunity of whipping

¹ Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War*.

him over the shoulders of the War Department, and taunted him with the newly coined word, "Algerism." Much that was written and published was wholly sensational and untrue, and the quantity of this output would fill volumes. Those competent to tell the truth could scarcely get a hearing. As a result the President appointed, in September, 1898, a committee of investigation composed of nine members, with General Grenville M. Dodge as president. The charge of General Miles that the canned beef supplied to the army was "apparently preserved with secret chemicals," and ought to be called "embalmed beef," was not substantiated. The commission found no evidence that chemicals had been used. They also reported that the canned beef, issued as rations, was generally of good quality, and palatable if properly cooked. They agreed with General Miles that beef on the hoof and refrigerated meat would have been preferable. In general they attributed most of the evils to the scarcity of trained officers and general unpreparedness. The excitement in the country was so intense that the report of the commission was condemned as a "whitewash." Yet, after the lapse of years has enabled one to form a cooler judgment, the facts seem to be: —

1. The sudden expansion of the army of the United States from approximately 25,000 to 275,000 men

presented difficulties practically impossible of solution within the brief space of four or five months. The regular army was little more than a police force, scattered throughout the country and broken up into small garrisons. The reserve supplies would not have been sufficient to equip 10,000 additional men. Of rifles the Government possessed barely enough of the Krag-Jorgensen type to equip the increased regular army. For the volunteers there was nothing but the old-fashioned Springfield. There was no smokeless powder in the arsenals and no opportunity of immediately obtaining it. The war began, therefore, with the military storehouses practically empty. Besides arms and ammunition, the soldier must have his equipment of cartridge belt, bayonet scabbard, canteen, haversack, blanket, and numerous other articles. Because of the refusal of Congress to make the oft-appealed-for appropriation, the Rock Island Arsenal, the only plant upon which the Government could rely, was capable of turning out only seventy sets of infantry equipment per day.¹ Material for tents was difficult to obtain. There was no khaki cloth in the United States suitable for uniforms and no establishments familiar with its manufacture. All the uniforms, hats, underwear, blankets, and

¹ This was increased to eight thousand per day by the close of the war.

similar necessities, and all the equipment for wagons, horses, and mules, had to be manufactured. Arrangements for transportation by land and sea had to be made, while the task of providing for the supplies of food and medicine was in itself an enormous one. The organization of a huge business such as this required many men of experience and training. Yet at the outbreak of the war, there were only 22 trained officers in the Commissary Corps, 57 in the Quartermaster's Department, and 179 medical officers. It was practically impossible for this small body of men to take care of an army suddenly increased to ten times its normal strength. It is small cause for wonder, therefore, that mistakes were made and that delays, confusion, and discomfort ensued.

2. The officials of the War Department met the emergency with commendable energy. They were handicapped by laws requiring much estimating of costs, scrutiny of orders, keeping of records, unnecessary endorsements of papers by long lines of officials, and endless red tape. Many of them were civilians, appointed under a system which grew up in time of peace. They were lacking, both in military and business experience. Yet the work which these officials performed may be judged by the fact that in the brief period of the war the 57 officers of the Quartermaster's Department manufactured or purchased

546,338 blankets, 390,775 blouses, 523,203 trousers, 476,705 hats, 782,303 shoes, 588,800 leggings, 622,211 flannel shirts, 1,257,002 undershirts and as many drawers, besides thousands of axes, trumpets, camp-kettles, mess-pans, tents, wagons, harness, and other articles in like proportion.¹

3. The sickness was caused largely by the shortage of medical officers. Congress allowed only 192, of whom but 179 reported for duty — an insufficient number even in time of peace. A larger force could have insisted upon the precautionary measures prescribed by the Surgeon-General and thus protected the men from the results of their own neglect. The number of surgeons was entirely inadequate for the care of the sick and wounded, and the Hospital Corps was pitifully small, only 723 men.

4. The parsimony of Congress could not change the character of the American man, and the results of the lack of preparation were in large measure overcome by the superb bravery, resourcefulness, and determination of the average American soldier.

5. Whatever may have been the shortcomings of the War Department, the American people had only themselves to blame. For thirty-three years, following the Civil War, they reposed in fancied security, absorbed in the pursuit of wealth, the

¹ Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War*.

development of their marvelous industries, and the cultivation of the arts of peace. Suspicious of a standing army, they persistently ignored, through their congressional representatives, the appeals of those who foresaw the need of establishing at least some kind of reserve force. Their officers had no opportunity to practice the handling of large bodies of troops. There was no chance to acquire a knowledge of the best methods of mobilizing, transporting, equipping, and feeding even a moderate-sized army. The careful planning, observation, study of strategy, gathering of information, manufacture of material, training of officers and men, building of forts, arsenals, and plants for the making of guns and ammunition — all the requirements that make for reasonable National preparedness — were as foreign to their thoughts as the conquest of Africa.

Under conditions such as these the hands of the President were as securely tied as were those of the Secretary of War. If the navy made a creditable record — as it did — it was due to that gleam of foresight which in President Arthur's Administration created and provided for the development of the new American navy known as the White Squadron, and to the harmony and discipline within the Department. The occasion for wonder lies not in the fact that the blunders of inexperienced officials in

the War Department brought severe criticism upon the conduct of the army, but rather that the few men available for service were able to accomplish so much in so short a time. It is unfortunate that the minds of the people were led to seek scapegoats in the persons of the Secretary of War and various other officials, instead of being made to realize that the fundamental cause of all the trouble was their own lack of foresight. It would not have meant militarism in America to provide an army of moderate size, with ample arrangements for the raising, equipment, and training of a sufficient reserve to meet ordinary emergencies. There is a middle ground between militarism on the one hand and heedless or misguided unpreparedness on the other. There is no danger that the American people will ever permit the former, but the Spanish War demonstrated the very imminent danger of the latter — and this was its greatest lesson.

In his message of December, 1898, the President recommended a permanent increase of efficiency in both the army and navy, and Congress promptly passed laws reorganizing and increasing the personnel of both branches of the service. Again, in his message of December, 1900, he referred to the subject and the strength of the army was increased by Congress to a maximum of 100,000 men.

Through all the public clamor against General Alger, the President, though his patience was sorely tried by the Secretary himself, stood loyally back of his appointee. Besides his realization that much of the criticism was unjust, he had a warm feeling of friendship for Alger, who was a man of unusually lovable nature and many excellent qualities. Yet the growing necessity of a thorough reorganization of the War Department, and the many new problems which the war had introduced, made the retirement of the Secretary inevitable. A political incident, in the spring of 1899, intervened to release the President from the demands of personal loyalty. General Alger became a candidate for the United States Senatorship and as such enlisted the active support of Governor Pingree, of Michigan, who had been a critic of the Administration. It was evident that such an alliance could not be made by one so intimately associated with the entire policy of the President as a Cabinet officer must be, without impairing the mutual feelings of confidence so essential to harmony. To Vice-President Hobart fell the duty of requesting the Secretary of War to resign.

In Mr. Cortelyou's diary of July 13, 1899, occurs this paragraph: —

“Secretary Alger continues the topic of the hour. The President treats him with every courtesy . . .

and the evidently strained relations are made as bearable as the situation can warrant. Each evening I show the President what the papers are saying, and to-night I called attention to the effect that it was unanimous; the great papers of the country joining in the demand for a change."

The unpleasant business reached a conclusion on July 19. The diary of that date reads: —

"This morning I reached the office a little after nine o'clock and had occasion to see the President. He said: 'Get your hat and we will take a walk in the grounds.' As soon as we got out of the house he said: 'Well, he was over and left it with me'; meaning Secretary Alger and his resignation. 'The interview was brief and devoid of any embarrassing features. It is to take effect at my pleasure.' I said: 'Mr. President, it will be a great relief to you and to the country. It was bound to come.' The President said he had had several rather trying interviews with the Secretary before he went to Long Branch. The President appeared much relieved, but was, as always, gentle and charitable in his talk."

The formality of the resignation and the President's reply afford a striking contrast with the informal correspondence between Secretary Hay and the President on a similar subject, to which previous reference has been made: —

July 19, 1899.

SIR: —

I beg to tender to you my resignation of the office of Secretary of War to take effect at such time in the near future as you may decide the affairs of this Department will permit. In terminating my official connection with your Administration I wish for you continued health and the highest measure of success in carrying on the great work entrusted to you.

I have the honor to be

Very respectfully,

Your obedient svt.,

R. A. ALGER.

THE PRESIDENT.

July 19, 1899.

HON. R. A. ALGER,

Secy. of War.

DEAR SIR: —

Your resignation of the office of Secretary of War this day received, is accepted to take effect on the first of August, 1899. In thus severing the official relation which has continued for more than two years I desire to thank you for the faithful service you have rendered the country at a most exacting period and to wish you a long and happy life. With assurances of high regard and esteem, I am,

Yours sincerely,

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

On the 1st of August, General Alger was succeeded as Secretary of War by Elihu Root, of New York. The President's way of inducing Mr. Root to accept the appointment was characteristic. The offer was made over the telephone and Mr. Root replied that he knew nothing about war nor about the army, and therefore was not qualified to serve. The President answered: "I don't want a man who knows about war and the army. I want a lawyer to handle the problems of the new islands and you are the lawyer I want."

Through the able assistance of "the lawyer he wanted," the President succeeded in creating a new army, a modern organization with a new spirit of efficiency. Reforms never before considered possible were placed upon the statute books, Mr. Root appearing before the congressional committees with convincing arguments in favor of the changes desired. Examinations for promotions were made effective and a complete system of military education was developed. Much was done in the direction of coördinating the regulars, the volunteers, and the National Guardsmen. Under this reorganization, with an interchangeable line and staff, the old antagonism between the commanding general and the Secretary of War, which had created so much confusion during the Spanish War, was obviated.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

IN accordance with the fifth article of the protocol, President McKinley appointed as the five commissioners to represent the United States in the negotiations for peace, William R. Day, chairman; Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid. Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Gray were United States Senators and Mr. Reid had recently returned from his post as Minister to France. Mr. Day resigned as Secretary of State and was succeeded by John Hay. John Bassett Moore was appointed secretary and counsel to the American Commissioners.¹

The Peace Commission met in Paris on the 1st day of October, 1898. From the beginning the President kept in close touch, by cable, with all the proceedings, was consulted on every point of difference, and gave his answers with invariable firmness and decision.

¹ The Commissioners for Spain were Don Eugenio Montero Ríos, President of the Senate, chairman; Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don José de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels; and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Division. Don Emilio de Ojeda was appointed secretary.

In his preliminary instructions of September 16 he defined the purpose of the United States in these words:—

“It is my wish that throughout the negotiations entrusted to the Commission the purpose and spirit with which the United States accepted the unwelcome necessity of war should be kept constantly in view. We took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations. We had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest. Through the long course of repeated representations which preceded and aimed to avert the struggle, and in the final arbitrament of force, this country was impelled solely by the purpose of relieving grievous wrongs and removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its tranquillity, which shocked the moral sense of mankind, and which could no longer be endured.

“It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action. The luster and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under

any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. It is believed that the true glory and the enduring interests of the country will most surely be served if an unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory as best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened Republic.

“Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to lasting results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization, rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement, we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere.

"The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

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"In view of what has been stated, the United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the Island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United States, upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of protection and

trade accorded to citizens of one country within the territory of another. You are, therefore, instructed to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and yessels in the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the United States."

The Spanish Commissioners, at the first conference, attempted to secure a restoration of the *status quo* in the Philippine Islands existing at the time of the signing of the protocol, the Americans having actually occupied Manila a few hours after the execution of that document. This demand was refused as without the province of the Commissioners.

General Merritt, having been ordered by the President to go to Paris for the purpose, appeared before the Commissioners on October 4, with opinions on the Philippines by Admiral Dewey, General F. V. Greene, and others, together with a mass of correspondence with Aguinaldo, the leader of the insurgents.

From the 7th to the 26th the conferences were taken up with a heated discussion on the disposition of Cuba. The Spanish Commissioners wished to cede the island to the United States, to be transferred by the latter to the Cubans, and with it the Cuban debt, which the United States was either to assume or pass along to Cuba. The Americans main-

tained that they had never desired sovereignty over Cuba and refused to accept the island, insisting upon its "relinquishment" by Spain in accordance with the protocol. It was clear that the debt which Spain wished to force upon the United States, or Cuba, was not one that had been incurred for material improvements on the island, of value to its future owners, nor for any other pacific cause, but represented the money spent in suppressing the efforts of the Cuban people to obtain greater liberty and a better government — which was the cause of the war and the reason for intervention. The American Commissioners, therefore, refused to assume any part of the Cuban debt, or to accept sovereignty, though expressing willingness to be responsible for the protection of life and property in Cuba during their temporary occupancy.

A personal letter from Mr. Day to the President, dated October 23, 1898, shows with what difficulties the Commissioners had to contend: —

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: —

... The Spanish Commissioners are strenuously pressing certain points, having in view the same object, namely, the assumption on the part of the United States, either for itself or for such government as may be formed in Cuba, of the immense Cuban debt,

incurred principally in the attempts of Spain to perpetuate the misrule of the Island. You will remember that we believed that the protocol had effectually and finally disposed of Cuba, Porto Rico and other West Indian Islands, and Guam. You would be astounded at the ingenuity and persistence with which our opponents undertake to enlarge the meaning of these clear articles. They maintain that we should accept the sovereignty, and that sovereignty includes debts and obligations. You will some day read the mass of argumentation which they advance in support of their position. I think it all arises from the fact that a large number of holders of bonds, many of them here, are in hopes of getting something for their investments in this Spanish debt, for which it is undertaken to pledge the revenues of the Island of Cuba. There is a good deal of feeling here in the Spanish direction. . . .

We telegraphed yesterday that we should stand firm upon our position as to the Cuban debt, and later that we might favor a stipulation in the treaty, — added to the relinquishment as provided in the protocol, — to the effect that the United States, pending its military occupancy, would preserve order and protect life, liberty, and property. It is true that the United States may well be depended upon to do this, but we thought it would strengthen our position

to thus show our willingness to assume the responsibility.

We finished yesterday the translation of the lengthy and labored argument in which the history of the world is ransacked for precedents on the assumption of debts where a state or empire is divided, and last night and to-day we are engaged in the preparation of an answer.

When we reach the Philippine question, if we do, the papers are foreshadowing Spanish claims to the effect that in our representations, interviews, etc., Spain was practically given to understand that the protocol did not mean what it says, and that Spanish sovereignty was in no wise to be interfered with. This astounding claim we shall undoubtedly have to meet. You will remember our rejection of the Spanish answer to our terms because of this attempt to hang on to Philippine sovereignty, and the vague and contradictory terms of their answer; Cambon's insistence that they had meant to accept our terms, and our resolution to resolve all questions by putting the matter into a protocol, embodying the specific terms of our written demands, and to which Spain could either say Yes or No. Cambon telegraphed this protocol to the Spanish Minister. He was authorized by telegram, and later by formal full powers, to execute it. But the ways of Spanish diplomacy are past

finding out, and I am confirmed in my conclusion more than ever that nothing should be left open to negotiation with them, and that the only way to reach satisfactory conclusions is practically to reduce to writing the demands of our Government, and submit them for direct approval or disapproval.

Personally we are on very agreeable terms with the Spanish Commissioners, and our meetings are conducted without friction. Indeed, I think you would be interested, often amused, by the extraordinary exhibition of politeness which accompanies our meetings.

I hope we shall be able to get a treaty, but am a little pessimistic about it. There can be no doubt, however, of the correctness of our position on the Cuban debt, and as we have narrowed the issue to that point, which they concede in the conclusion of their labored argument, which we have just translated, in a statement in substance that it is apparent that it is this question which divides the Joint Commission, and stays our further progress, we shall be warranted in unyielding firmness, let them do as they will. The assumption of this debt, either by ourselves or Cuba, means to visit upon the one or the other the expense of years of Spanish misrule, and to compel either ourselves or Cuba to pay to Spain the cost of its barbarous persecution of the people of

Cuba in the two insurrections which laid the foundation of the most of this debt.

We are awaiting with great interest the instructions for which we telegraphed yesterday, as we feel that upon their acceptance or rejection of our position may depend the future of the treaty.

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WILLIAM R. DAY.

The President settled the question of the Cuban debt on October 25, Secretary Hay telegraphing: "The President directs me to say that under no circumstances will the Government of the United States assume any part of what is known as the Cuban debt . . . nor would the United States engage to use its good offices to induce any government hereafter to be established in Cuba to assume such debt." The firmness of the President made it evident that the American position regarding Cuba must be accepted and the Spanish representatives were on the verge of despair.

The bitterness already engendered was rendering the task of the American Commissioners an extremely delicate one. It became known that the Spanish Commissioners were seeking some kind of concession. Their chairman, Montero Ríos, confided to Señor León y Castillo, the Spanish Ambas-

sador in Paris, who reported it to General Horace Porter, the American Ambassador, that he could not return to Madrid if compelled to accept the entire Cuban debt. A rupture in the negotiations was narrowly averted by the interposition of Castillo, who called on Mr. Whitelaw Reid on the night of October 25. He was firmly told that the Cuban debt would not be assumed by the United States, whereupon he urged that the question be laid aside until it could be seen whether some concessions elsewhere might not be found, which would save the Spanish Commissioners from utter repudiation at home. If this could not be done, he said, rupture was inevitable.

The story of this momentous interview, which probably saved the United States the cost of a resumption of the war, with further complications the extent of which cannot be surmised, is told in a personal letter of Mr. Reid to the President: —

Private

28 October, 1898.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, —

You have doubtless measured at its real worth the submission of the Spaniards on the debt question, about which the dispatches have been saying so much.

My own relation to it was quite fully told in a dispatch to be sent to you personally at the White

House, of which Judge Day told me confidentially. It has since occurred to me that a single phrase in that dispatch might have been liable to a misconception. In the final hint with which my midnight conversation with the Spanish Ambassador, at my rooms, was closed, I said: "There is no hope for you as to the Cuban debt. Leave it. In the greater question of the Philippines it is possible — not probable but possible — that some such concession as you plead for may be found, either in territory or in debt." This referred exclusively to Philippine debt; — not, as you may possibly have thought from the wording of the dispatch, to Cuban debt. . . .

I have not been able to make up my mind as to whether the Spaniards really meant to break off on the Cuban debt, or whether their talk was simply bluff. I incline, however, to the belief that, owing to the Cabinet troubles at Madrid there really was danger of old Montero Ríos going home — which would have broken up the Commission. When I asked Castillo, however, he declared that the Cabinet situation had nothing to do with it; that neither Sagasta nor Montero nor anybody could consent to take the Cuban debt.

His letter to me, asking for an interview, was marked "tres urgente" and sent from the Embassy just as I was going out to a formal dinner. I had no

time to consult with any one, and did not think it would do to refuse to see him. So, as he asked for it that night if possible and at any rate before eleven the next day, I promised to be back at 10.30 and two minutes later he entered my rooms. During the whole interview I gave him no more encouragement than was set forth in Judge Day's dispatch; and I must say that, while suspecting all the time that he was playing a part, I could not but feel that if so he was a consummate actor. At the last he seemed almost to break down, saying, "It is cruel, cruel, most cruel." As he shook hands with me, going away he said, "My old friend, pray God that you and your country may never have to submit to the lot of the vanquished!" and he certainly seemed to say it with manly simplicity and sincerity. . . .

I have some doubt as to whether these people will ever sign any treaty we can afford to make. They reason that they can be no worse off if they fail to sign; and that there is always the possibility of our arousing so much sympathy for them by pushing them to extremes, that there might be a strong appeal for arbitration. Neither do I have much faith in the virtue of concessions. One would only breed a demand for half a dozen more. If they should break, if for but forty-eight hours, a single cable to Dewey would in that time give us the rest of the Philippines and the

Carolines. The last we ought to have — the inhabitants being English-speaking Protestant Christians.

The Spanish Commissioners continue to show the utmost courtesy; but the talk of old Montero is endless and their capacity for producing long documents apparently increases.

Very sincerely yours,

WHITELAW REID.

The protocol definitely fixed the disposition of Cuba and Porto Rico, but left more latitude regarding the Philippines. The Spanish Commissioners now proposed to accept, tentatively, the American proposition regarding Cuba and to pass to the discussion of the Philippine question, hoping, as they said, for liberal treatment.

On this point, obviously the most dangerous and difficult of the entire negotiation, the American Commissioners were not fully agreed among themselves. In his original instructions the President had mentioned the cession of the Island of Luzon as the least which the United States could accept and with it equal rights with Spain for American ships and merchandise in all ports of the islands not ceded. Mr. Day favored taking Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, and various other islands, thus controlling the entrance to the China Sea, with additional harbors

and ports of call, but not the entire archipelago. Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid wished to take all the islands, and Mr. Gray believed it would be wiser to take none of them. Since his preliminary instructions, the President had given many an anxious day and night to pondering the problem. On the 25th he wrote to Mr. Day a personal and unofficial letter as follows: —

EXECUTIVE MANSION.

WASHINGTON, *October 25, 1898.*

MY DEAR JUDGE DAY: —

I have your favor of the 14th enclosing American proposition relative to Cuba, Spanish articles of treaty, rejection by Americans of Spanish articles, further Spanish memorandum and the American memorandum in reply, which have been read with great interest and satisfaction. I am greatly pleased with the progress you are making and the manner in which you are presenting the American case. Your frequent cablegrams are of deep interest and are gratefully received.

When you get through with the propositions settled by the protocol and get to the subject of the Philippines I would like to be advised of the sentiment of the Commission touching the latter. You can send it to me in private. There is a very general feeling

that the United States, whatever it might prefer as to the Philippines, is in a situation where it cannot let go. The interdependency of the several islands, their close relations with Luzon, the very grave problem of what will become of the part we do not take, are receiving the thoughtful consideration of the people, and it is my judgment that the well-considered opinion of the majority would be that duty requires we should take the archipelago.

I will be ready to give instructions when you reach that point. In the mean time I would like to know, in the most confidential manner, how you all feel about it, as I want the benefit of your investigations and judgment.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

HON. WILLIAM R. DAY,
President, American Peace Commission,
PARIS, FRANCE.

On the very day when the President wrote this letter, the Commissioners sent a long telegram expressing their individual views, and asking explicit instructions.

This was answered on the 26th: —

“The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest

of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility."

How the President came to this decision was told in a well-authenticated interview at the White House, November 21, 1899. He was receiving a committee representing the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church, then in session in Washington. The committee consisted of Bishop Thomas Bowman, Bishop John F. Hurst, Dr. Samuel F. Upham, Dr. John M. Buckley, and General James F. Rusling. After the visitors had presented a resolution of thanks to the President for his courtesy to the convention and listened to an appropriate response, they turned to leave, when the President said, earnestly: —

"Hold a moment longer! Not quite yet, gentle-

men! Before you go I would like to say just a word about the Philippine business. I have been criticized a good deal about the Philippines, but don't deserve it. The truth is I did n't want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. When the Spanish War broke out, Dewey was at Hongkong, and I ordered him to go to Manila and to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet, and he had to; because, if defeated, he had no place to refit on that side of the globe, and if the Dons were victorious, they would likely cross the Pacific and ravage our Oregon and California coasts. And so he had to destroy the Spanish fleet, and did it! But that was as far as I thought then.

"When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides — Democrats as well as Republicans — but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way — I don't know how it was, but it came:

(1) That we could not give them back to Spain — that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany — our commercial rivals in the Orient — that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves — they were unfit for self-government — and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker), and I told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States [pointing to a large map on the wall of his office], and there they are, and there they will stay while I am President!"¹

The Spanish Commissioners were slow to admit the altruistic motives of the United States and professed to be greatly shocked at the proposition to take the Philippines. They claimed that the United States had agreed not to take them, but here the

¹ From a report of the interview written by General James F. Rusling, and confirmed by the others who were present. Reprinted by permission from *The Christian Advocate*, January 22, 1903.

protocol was referred to, which showed that the whole question was to be determined by the treaty of peace. Thus the "handiness" of the document was again proved, as it had been once before, in settling the disputed Cuban debt. The American argument was that the war was forced upon this country and that under such circumstances an indemnity should be expected. Mr. Reid estimated that with pensions and other charges, the cost of the war would amount to \$250,000,000 or \$300,000,000. He argued that Spain had no money and could pay only by ceding territory. All she had offered was Porto Rico, which might be worth \$50,000,000. Even if Cuba were added, and estimated at \$125,000,000, the value of the two would not repay the outlay for the war. But we had refused to take Cuba. Would the Philippines, lying halfway around the globe, be worth the difference of \$200,000,000 or \$250,000,000?

On the other hand, the negotiations had been painfully drawn out and at the end of six weeks were apparently no nearer settlement than at the beginning. It was realized that the United States could not afford to crush a weak and fallen foe. To allow the negotiations to be broken without a treaty, and to seize the Philippines by force, would be, as Senator Gray maintained, a course inconsistent with the traditions and civilization of the United States.

To resume the war would be a costly proceeding, involving many more millions, besides placing the nation in a false light before the world. Accordingly, a willingness to make some slight concession for the sake of an agreement began to develop.

At this juncture the important point arose as to whether the Philippines were to be taken by right of conquest or as an indemnity for war losses. Mr. Day wrote the President on November 2: —

Personal and Confidential.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: —

On Saturday night last we received your telegram of instruction. We realize the difficulties you have had to contend with, and the far-reaching consequences of a solution of the question, however made, and know that you have taken the course which you deemed most likely to enhance the welfare of the country, and in the end work the most possible good. . . .

The problem as to the Philippines is much more likely to be troublesome than the Cuban matter, as we are here dealing with a cession directly to ourselves, and must justify our demand upon grounds which will be approved and stand the test of international usage and law. We telegraphed you this afternoon the views of the majority of the Commis-

sioners by special cipher, and I think they will commend themselves to you when you have examined the matter carefully. I think there should be no misunderstanding as to the grounds upon which we can properly demand the cession of the Philippine group. To the majority of the Commission it seems quite clear that we have no basis in international law and usage to make the demand upon the ground of conquest. Conquest — occupation of the enemy's country — the *uti possidetis*, as the books term it, is recognized as a sufficient ground for the permanent holding of territory after war. In the present case we have no conquest to base such claim upon. I enclose herewith a memorandum of authorities that seem to establish the doctrine that a conquest after the signing of the terms of the armistice is ineffectual. When the protocol was signed Manila had not been captured. Siege was in progress, and the capture was made after the execution of the protocol. We have carefully examined all the leading text-writers and authorities, and find concurrence of opinion in the view that captures made after the execution of the agreement for an armistice must be disregarded and restored. This does not subject to personal liability those who have acted in ignorance of the agreement. It is true that the preliminary instruction seems to foreshadow some right of holding by conquest, but

more careful examination leads to the conclusion that that goes too far. True, we had special ground for refusing to give up prisoners of war taken after the execution of the protocol, because the Spaniards would have used them in making war upon the insurgents who, if not our allies, have been so far in coöperation with our naval and military forces as to merit our protection. Our occupation, it seems to us, is under the terms of the protocol, and not by conquest. If this conclusion is sound, it renders unnecessary consideration as to how far the capitulation to Merritt, limited by its terms to Manila and surroundings, can be regarded as a conquest of the Philippine group; nor need we consider how far the United States, as the leading Christian nation of the world, in a war unselfishly waged in the interest of humanity would permit itself to stand upon the ancient practice of holding territory taken from an enemy in course of war, without compensation or other reason for permanent acquisition than military occupation. In the Pan-American Congress of 1890, very strong ground was taken against this doctrine, and had we taken the Philippines by conquest before the execution of the protocol, the United States might well have set an example to the world of repudiating the doctrine that mere conquest gives any right to permanent acquisition. As no conquest in fact took

place until after the execution and delivery of the protocol, what legal basis have we to require their cession to us by Spain? This is developed in the note of July 30, 1898, containing the terms of peace, including your demand upon Spain. After requiring the cession of Porto Rico and other islands as indemnity for the losses of citizens and expenses of the war, it is said (I quote from memory): "Upon like grounds the United States will occupy and hold Manila, etc., pending the negotiation of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines." ¹ The grounds referred to for this occupation and the subsequent disposition of the Philippine Islands are the ones upon which we require the cession of Porto Rico and the other islands, viz.: indemnity for the losses and expenses of the war. I do not mean to say that we should lose sight of the condition of the islands, the broken power of Spain, the state of hopeless anarchy in which our withdrawal from the islands would leave them, etc. These things are legitimate factors in determining the disposition, control, and government thereof. But I wish to submit to your careful consideration that we should not take the untenable ground that Spain should cede the islands because of any right of conquest, great or small, achieved after

¹ See p. 69.

the protocol was executed. For the purposes of this treaty the protocol has fixed the rights of the parties. Conquest may follow if we fail to get a treaty. We can then deal in the rights which flow from such a state of affairs. At the present time it seems to us that the protocol binds our nation no less than the Spaniards.

On Monday afternoon we submitted a proposed article for the treaty, in which cession of the Philippines is made to the United States, and willingness is expressed on our part to insert a stipulation for the payment of outstanding indebtedness for permanent improvements of a pacific character. Our Spanish friends took until Friday to answer this proposal, and we do not know what they will say, or how they will treat the proposal. At the meeting on Friday they will doubtless develop their position. . . .

We are looking for a great amount of discussion as to the construction of the protocol. You will notice from Senator Frye's telegram that he is quite doubtful as to our ability to get a treaty. We shall see. I hope we can close with them in a way which, while conserving all our rights, will show no just ground for complaint of harsh or unnecessarily severe treatment of our antagonist. It need hardly be said that it is of the utmost importance that a peace be agreed to, if possible, that we may proceed with a free hand

to the important work of administering our new colonial acquisitions, as well as promoting our business interests at home.

I was gratified to receive Colonel Hay's telegram approving our course. We are dealing with people marvelously expert in argumentation. They are resourceful in obscuring that which seems plain. . . .

WILLIAM R. DAY.

The Commissioners were informed that the President would cheerfully concur in a reasonable payment to reimburse Spain for the expense of "internal improvements and public works of a pacific character in the Philippines." The demand for the archipelago by right of conquest was given up as untenable, the capture of Manila having been made after the proclamation of an armistice. This was in itself an important concession to the pride of Spain. The cession was demanded as indemnity for losses and expenses of the war, but the American Commissioners gradually came to the conclusion that a small payment to Spain in lieu of the acceptance of any of the burdens of debt would be desirable as the only way to effect a peaceful settlement. To this view the President readily assented, and on November 13 Secretary Hay telegraphed instructions as follows: —

“A treaty of peace is of the highest importance to the United States if it can be had without the sacrifice of plain duty. The President would regret deeply the resumption of hostilities against a prostrate foe. We are clearly entitled to indemnity for the cost of the war. . . .

“You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000, and if you can get cession of a naval and telegraph station in the Carolines and the several concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and Reid, you can offer more. The President cannot believe any division of the archipelago can bring us anything but embarrassment in the future. The trade and commercial side, as well as the indemnity for the cost of the war, are questions we might yield. They might be waived or compromised, but the questions of duty and humanity appeal to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out. You have the largest liberty to lead up to these instructions, but unreasonable delay should be avoided.”

Mr. Day's letter to the President, dated November 19, shows the extreme difficulty of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion: —

Personal and confidential.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:—

... The battle lately has been waged on the construction of the protocol, the Spanish contention being that the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippines could not be drawn in question, and that we were limited, by their construction of the protocol, in the light of previous notes and negotiations, to the regulation of the "internal régime" of the islands. No doubt you will be surprised that such a claim could be made, and more so when you see the voluminous arguments which the Spaniards have advanced in support of their position. It all proves how very prudent it was not to accept the Spanish note of August 7, which you will remember we denounced that afternoon at the White House with some vehemence, setting it aside, and requiring the submission and execution of the protocol. They have brought to their aid the telegraphic reports sent by Mr. Cambon of his various interviews. In the main these are entirely reconcilable with our theory, and altogether irreconcilable with their position that sovereignty was in no case to be demanded over the group. Our contention has been that the whole matter was held open to this time to be dealt with here; that everything in the correspondence, no less than the terms of the protocol itself, establishes

this fact. I think we have made out a very convincing case. . . .

Finally they propose arbitration, or the remission of this question to the home Governments. We have telegraphed you that we expect to decline all this, and to submit the final proposition, asking for the cession of the group, paying them a lump sum of twenty millions of dollars. If this is accepted, then the way will be opened for negotiating the other features of the treaty, all of which have been outlined in the telegram to you. They threaten not to accept, but I am now inclined to believe they will. It may be that Montero Rios, and some of his Commission will resign, but I think the Spanish Government is not going to the extreme of rejecting these terms and requiring the resumption of the war. . . .

We are now disposed to force this matter to an issue, realizing that we have been here a long time, and that argument is exhausted on the subject. It may seem strange to the people at home that we do not get along faster. You are sufficiently familiar with the characteristics of Spanish negotiators to know that you can make about so much progress and no more. Such a thing as accomplishing a given task with the dispatch we would expect in America is utterly unknown to them. There is a certain amount of leeway that has to be given if anything is to be

accomplished. We all feel now that we are in a position to make the pressure final and conclusive, and I think within the next week matters will have reached a crisis, one way or the other. . . .

Our best information seems to be that no other country is inclined to interfere, and all we have to do is to pursue the outlined policy on our part, with a treaty if we can get it, without it if that is impossible. . . .

WILLIAM R. DAY.

The final offer of \$20,000,000 indemnity paved the way for a settlement, though a majority of the Spanish Commissioners opposed it and would have broken off the negotiations. The Minister of State, the Duke of Almodovar, however, instructed them to accept the American propositions as the only means of avoiding "subsequent complications and even greater evils." Further details were then agreed upon, though not without difficulty, and the treaty was signed on the 10th of December, 1898. By its terms Spain relinquished all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, no provision being made for its future government except temporary occupancy by the United States, the latter assuming responsibility for the protection of life and property during the period of occupation. Porto Rico, the entire group

of the Philippines, and the Island of Guam, in the Ladrões, were ceded to the United States, the sum of \$20,000,000 to be paid to Spain within three months after the exchange of ratifications.

A few further extracts from Mr. Reid's letters to the President will serve to give a somewhat intimate view of the work of the Commission: —

Tuesday, 4 October, 1898.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: —

Remembering your hint that private letters would be really welcome, I am sending this, mainly to tell you of our first impressions of our friends, the enemy.

I got a private hint on the day after our arrival, from the Foreign Office, about M. Delcassé's purpose to bring the two sets of Commissioners together socially at his breakfast table. . . .

At the breakfast, Castillo struck at once what I believe is to be their permanent tone — one of rather proud supplication. He came to me, through the crowd on his side, the moment our presentations to the French Premier were finished, and after a few words about his pleasure at meeting "mon ancien collègue et ami" and messages for Mrs. Reid, began at once, "You have had a great victory, the first you have really had over a foreign foe, for

Mexico did n't count. Now you must prove your greatness by your magnanimity."

After the breakfast he sought me again in the smoking-room and renewed the attack. "Do not forget," he exclaimed with increasing energy, "that we are poor; do not forget that we have been defeated; do not forget that it was Spain that opened the New World; do not forget that the greatness of your victory will be dimmed by any lack of magnanimity to a fallen foe." These phrases he kept repeating, with slight variations. Some of them he addressed to Mr. Day, and I translated them promptly. Naturally we both avoided replies that should in any way commit us. But it seemed plain that their rôle was to appeal from the outset to our magnanimity.

Subsequent intercourse has convinced me of the justice of our first impressions about them. They are men of high character and position, but not of extraordinary force. None of them seemed to me the equal of Castillo himself. Three or four of them speak a little English and all speak French — though Montero Rios seems to know little but Spanish. This is a blessing. He is so long-winded in Spanish that if he had an equal command of one or two other languages he would be intolerable. As it is, the interpreter, from time to time, has to

turn the stopcock on the endless flow of his eloquence. . . .

It was really a dramatic spectacle, while these provisions for deeding away the last vestige of their possessions in the world they had discovered and conquered were slowly read and translated. They were all visibly moved and old Montero looked as a Roman Senator might when told that the Goths were at the gates. But they interposed no frivolous objections. . . .

15 November, 1898.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: —

Your letter of October 31st received this morning, through the embassy, gave me a special gratification, altogether aside from its interesting contents. It showed that you were not worn out with recent cares and exacting labors, but were in fact giving the same keen and minute attention to affairs as a year ago when these Spanish troubles were on the point of breaking out. What a world of history in that twelvemonth, through which you came so fresh and buoyant!

Yesterday everybody was predicting that we would get no treaty. The Spaniards themselves said it to American newspaper men like Beriah Wilkins, who visited their Commission at its headquarters.

The French, Spanish, and English newspapers told the same story. Our own Commissioners became impressed by it; and in the evening at dinner I met Count Münster, the German Ambassador (an old friend), who assured me in one breath that these Commissioners would not make martyrs of themselves, and therefore would not sign such a treaty as we required, and in the next that they deceived themselves if they counted on the slightest encouragement from his Emperor. About one day in three I find myself accepting these stories. On the other two I still hope for a treaty. I think I know from inside news from Madrid, from the Court, that the Queen Regent is now convinced that nothing can be gained by contending either for the debt or for the Philippines, and that she is anxious to accept the inevitable and end the agony. On the other hand, Sagasta shrinks from a decision, which, however inevitable, means for him permanent exile from power; and the politicians on the Commission here feel as if they were being asked to sign their own death-warrants. Still, I find it almost impossible to believe that if we stand firm, we shall not get a treaty signed by somebody — though they may force Sagasta himself to do it and require some one to go to Madrid or at least to Biarritz to get it done.

We have had a singularly harmonious and agreeable Commission. All my colleagues have distinctly risen in my estimate of them during these six weeks; and Judge Day, in particular, has shown great clearness, precision of view, and well-balanced judgment. There has been the freest expression of all divergencies of opinion; but from first to last there has not been a personal jar. Senators Davis and Frye have agreed so well with me that when I had written out my views some weeks ago on the Philippines, they joined me in signing them, almost without the change of a word. Judge Day has gradually advanced, under the testimony and argument here and the reports from home, till he does not seem very uncomfortable on our platform. And even Senator Gray, who generally starts out on every question by stating the Spanish side of it, generally lands on ours, — though often with many a protest and reservation. But, considering his politics and position, he is really doing wonderfully well and personally he is most delightful, while nobody can help admiring his honest effort to be fair-minded and judicial. . . .

Every morning I give the Commissioners the summary of French, English, and Spanish newspapers, which my correspondent here makes for me. Thus we begin our meetings each day with the censure of our critics for our unreasonableness, unwillingness

to conciliate, and general brutality towards a gallant but unfortunate people ringing in our ears. . . .

29 November, 1898.

. . . The scene when they presented their answer to our ultimatum in the Salle des Conférences was dignified and mournful. They looked and no doubt felt as if they were at a funeral of some dear one in the family. But their courtesy was perfect; and I was proud of the considerate and perfect bearing of our people too. Even the rabid pro-Spanish *Gaulois* praises it. . . .

Renewing my congratulations, I am, as always, with high respect,

Very sincerely yours,

WHITELAW REID.

The successful negotiation of the treaty was due in large measure to the apparent disposition of the European nations to keep "hands off." England had assumed an attitude of "benevolent neutrality," which every effort on the part of other European Governments had failed to shake. The nations were indifferent to the fate of Cuba and Porto Rico, and cared little about Hawaii. There was some inclination to take it for granted that the United States would not hold the Philippines, but that the islands

would be fought for by Germany and England. The former, however, made no objection to the claims of the American Government, only showing slight uneasiness when it was proposed to take an island in the Carolines as well. The change in the attitude of England from a position of indifference to one of warm sympathy and support is seen in the letters of John Hay to the President.

October 6, 1897.

. . . I have had an informal talk with Lord Salisbury about Cuba. He spoke with considerable reticence and habitual caution; but he acknowledged the deplorable state of affairs in Cuba, the certainty of the complete destruction of the island, if the present state of affairs should continue. He expressed the hope that the new government might do something to restore peace; said that England had no interests in the case except commercial ones, and that they would look with favor on any policy that would restore tranquillity and some measure of prosperity to Cuba. On the whole, the conversation deepened the impression I already had, that we need apprehend no interference from England, if it became necessary for us to adopt energetic measures for putting an end to the destruction and slaughter now going on.

April 4, 1898.

I am waiting the events of the next day or two with intense anxiety, but full confidence that you will do the wise and useful thing.

If sympathy and approval from the outside is worth anything to you, I can assure you it is yours, to the fullest extent, from this country. There is certainly a very wonderful change in public sentiment since I came here, a year ago. All classes, from the throne to the man in the street, now wish us well. I hear evidence of this from the most unexpected sources. Earl Grey, for instance, said yesterday, "Why do not the United States borrow our navy to make a quick job of Cuba? They could return us the favor another time." I had a serious talk with Mr. Chamberlain last night. He is extremely desirous of a close alliance with us, or if that is prevented by our traditions, of an assurance of common action on important questions. "Shoulder to shoulder," he said, "we could command peace the world over." He said again, "I should rejoice in an occasion in which we could fight side by side. The good effect of it would last for generations." Of course I give no encouragement to any suggestion of an alliance, which seems to me impracticable; but I say what seems called for as a reciprocation of so much friendliness. I think the present attitude of the

British Government and people is most valuable to us, and may be still more so in the near future. . . . But why should I waste your precious time with my views? I will only say we are all proud of you and willing to risk our necks on your wisdom and judgment. . . .

June 10, 1898.

I have dispatched to Judge Day a full account of my conversations with Lord Salisbury on the subject of possible terms of peace, which are, as you will see, of the most confidential character. The terms of the cabled instruction of the 8th seemed to indicate some anxiety lest I should have gone too far in these talks. I think my dispatch will show that this was not the case. The upshot of it all is that

1. Lord Salisbury, alone, has been confidentially informed what was the disposition of the President last week, without any committal or engagement whatever.
2. He considered that disposition more generous and liberal than Spain had any right to hope.
3. Without our request, or even sanction, he hinted to the Emperor of Austria that it would be to the benefit of Spain to take immediate advantage of what seemed to be a favorable opportunity; and

4. He got an answer, without our asking the question, that Spain was not yet sensible enough to ask for peace, on even the most reasonable terms. . . .

People interested in Spain and in Cuba come to me every day, begging that some terms of arrangement may be arrived at which will allow Spain to yield without dishonor. The most usual form is the suggestion of ceding Cuba to us for the consideration of an annual tribute. I allow them to talk, and then I tell them I have no authority to speak, and no information to impart. Those who have acquaintance and influence with the Spanish Government, I advise to use their efforts in that direction.

I must congratulate you with all my heart on the splendid result in Oregon. It is a most valuable and significant victory. The country is with you, more than ever. Your policy has been just, humane, and patriotic. It resembles Lincoln's and receives, like his, the support of the many and the criticism of the few — and the support and the criticism come from precisely the same classes as in his time.

July 6, 1898.

I want to congratulate you on the great event which has once more illustrated the Fourth of July. It ought to end the war, but those poor dear Quixotes

act more foolishly than ever. They want to force us, after killing them, to disfigure the corpse.

I see a tendency, on the part of European powers, to a certain irritation with Spain; first, for disappointing them in not having put up more of a fight, and second, in obstinately refusing to ask for peace, now that there is no hope of success. . . .

We have never in all our history had the standing in the world we have now, and this, I am sure, is greatly due to the unfailing dignity, firmness, and wisdom you have shown in every emergency of the past year. You have made all your friends very proud and happy and enormously increased their numbers.

July 14, 1898.

I have sent Judge Day a detailed account of a conversation I had yesterday with Count Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador to this Court. He is an invalid and something of a recluse; his asking for this interview and the stress he placed on it are so significant that it is not easy to resist the inference that he acted upon orders from his Government, and said what he had been directed to say.

What he said, as you will see, amounted to this: the German Government are most anxious that we shall be convinced of the friendliness of their atti-

tude and intentions; they also want us to understand that they wish a few coaling-stations in the Pacific that they think we may give them; they would also like a free hand at Samoa. At the same time I judge from what Hatzfeldt said, as well as from what Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Berlin, told me, that whatever we do or refuse to do, so that our action and our words are pitched in diplomatic tones, — not putting any affront on them which they shall be forced to take up, — they will not quarrel with us. They cannot afford to force a quarrel upon us. They have to watch Russia and France on one side, and England on the other. They cannot be sure of any substantial help from either of these quarters, while we can easily obtain allies, if we see proper to seek them; which probably we will not.

In fact I am rejoiced to say that you hold the game in your own hands. Your wisdom, prudence, and political sense have steered us safely through all the initial dangers of our position. You can now make war, or make peace, without danger of disturbing the equilibrium of the world. I congratulate you with all my heart on this great and bloodless victory at Santiago. It is your work, and you and your friends have the right to be proud of it. That we have escaped the double peril of disease through

delay and of needless slaughter by assault, is due, as every one sees, to your wisdom and your courage, which saw the truth more clearly than others, and had the nerve to hold the rudder true.

As to the coming parley of peace. I am sure you will keep the golden mean between too much liberality and too much rapacity and will make a peace as glorious as the war has been.

Sep. 9, 1898.

... I consider it not the least weighty of the results of your Administration to have changed the condition of dull hostility between us and England which existed a year ago into a friendship firm enough to bear any test you might choose to put upon it.

Aug. 2, 1898.

... We are watching with great interest the progress of your negotiations for peace. If we give up the Philippines it will be a considerable disappointment to our English friends — but of course we can consider nothing but our own interests; and the more I hear about the state of the Tagalog population and their leaders the more I am convinced of the seriousness of the task which would devolve upon us if we made ourselves permanently responsible for them. I have no doubt that Germany has been in-

triguing both with Aguinaldo and with Spain. They are most anxious to get a foothold there; but if they do it there will be danger of grave complication with other European powers.

Our position is stronger than ever before, morally and materially. We have never, even at the close of our Civil War, been so strong in Europe as to-day.

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JOHN HAY.

The struggle in the Senate over the ratification of the treaty marked one of the most critical periods in the Administration of President McKinley. The sudden acquisition of great possessions in Asiatic territory brought new problems which could not be readily grasped nor their real significance foreseen. Senator Platt, of Connecticut, in supporting the treaty maintained that the United States is a nation and as such is entitled to possess the inherent sovereign power to acquire territory; and that in the right to acquire is found the right to govern territory. Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, took issue with the Senator from Connecticut on this point and declared the attempt to govern a people without their consent to be abhorrent to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and to the Declaration of Independence. The opposition of Senator Hoar

created a profound impression. He was a lifelong Republican, a supporter and indeed an affectionate friend and admirer of the President, a man actuated by the loftiest patriotism and conscientious devotion to duty, and a Senator of vast personal influence and unquestioned ability. The true solution required a larger knowledge of the actual facts and a greater faith in the future wisdom, righteousness, and skill in government of American administration than a majority of the Senate then possessed. The President had reached his decision, because he knew, better perhaps than any one else in Washington, what were the conditions in the Philippines; what would be the probable result of turning the islands back to Spain, of leaving them to govern themselves, or of creating a divided responsibility; and what could be accomplished for the islands by an Executive determined to give them a government solely in their own interests, with the powerful arm of the United States to guarantee the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, such as they had never known in their entire history. Such a vision as the President's could not come to a man of less faith in the essential goodness of the American people. It is not remarkable, therefore, that in the brief period of the debate (from January 4 to February 6) the Senate should have hesitated.

The practical consideration which probably influenced the final vote, quite as much as the question of constitutional rights, was aptly presented by the Junior Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge: —

“Take now the other alternative. Suppose we reject the treaty or strike out the clause relating to the Philippines. That will hand the islands back to Spain; and I cannot conceive that any American should be willing to do that. Suppose we reject the treaty; what follows? Let us look at it practically. We continue the state of war and every sensible man in the country, every business interest, desires the reestablishment of peace in law as well as in fact. At the same time we repudiate the President and his action before the whole world, and the repudiation of the President in such a matter as this is, to my mind, the humiliation of the United States in the eyes of civilized mankind and brands us a people incapable of great affairs or of taking rank where we belong, as one of the greatest of the great world-powers.

“The President cannot be sent back across the Atlantic in the person of his commissioners, hat in hand, to say to Spain, with bated breath, ‘I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of one third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too

victorious, and that you have yielded us too much, and that I am very sorry that I took the Philippines from you.' I do not think that any American President would do that, or that any American would wish him to."

The President had a narrow escape from the predicament described by Senator Lodge. The treaty was ratified by only one vote in excess of the required two-thirds. It received 57 votes against 27. One Senator, who did not wish to oppose the sentiment in his State if he could help it, but who nevertheless wished the treaty to be rejected, withheld his vote until after the roll-call. He then voted for it, but if there had been one more opposing vote he would have cast his vote to defeat it. The personal interposition of Mr. Bryan, who preferred any treaty to a resumption of the war, influenced enough members of his party to secure its acceptance. The treaty was signed by the President on the 10th of February and by the Queen of Spain on the 17th of March. It was proclaimed on the 11th of April, 1899, just one year from the date of the famous message of intervention.

Senator Hoar, in his "Autobiography," gives a glimpse of President McKinley during this trying period: —

"When I saw President McKinley early in De-

ember, 1898, he was, I suppose, committed to the policy to which he adhered. He greeted me with the delightful and affectionate cordiality which I always found in him. He took me by the hand, and said: 'How are you feeling this winter, Mr. Senator?' I was determined there should be no misunderstanding. I replied at once: 'Pretty pugnacious, I confess, Mr. President.' The tears came into his eyes, and he said, grasping my hand again: 'I shall always love you, whatever you do.'

"I found we differed widely on this great subject. I denounced with all the vigor of which I was capable the treaty, and the conduct of the war in the Philippine Islands, in the Senate, on the platform, in many public letters, and in articles in magazines and newspapers. But President McKinley never abated one jot of his cordiality toward me. I did not, of course, undertake to press upon him my advice in matters affecting the Philippine Islands, about which we differed so much. But he continued to seek it, and to take it in all other matters as constantly as ever before."

CHAPTER XXIX

THE MAKING OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEN the Administration of President McKinley began, the colonial possessions of Spain in both the Atlantic and the Pacific were in revolt. The troubles of the native population of Cuba had aroused the American people to a high degree of excitement, but those of the Filipinos were not even a subject of common knowledge. The former were within a hundred miles of our own shores, while the latter were halfway round the world. Yet the appeal to human sympathy was the same in both cases. Both had suffered from centuries of misrule, official rapacity and corruption, broken promises, cruelty and oppression. The troubles in the Philippines remained unnoticed because it was no part of the duty of the United States to regulate the colonial policy of Spain, except in so far as it clashed with our own interests. Intervention in Cuban affairs was a deliberate act on the part of the United States, occasioned by the fact that peace in a neighboring island, so necessary to our own tranquillity, could be obtained by no other means. Intervention in the Philippines was the result of a

well-considered strategical move which the war made necessary, but which otherwise was wholly unintentional. A striking proof of this fact is shown in the following correspondence between Mr. Rounseville Wildman, Consul of the United States at Hongkong, and the Department of State: —

Mr. Wildman to Mr. Day

HONGKONG, *November 3, 1897.*

SIR: —

Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called upon several times by Mr. F. Agoncilla, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of the new republic of the Philippines.

Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president, members of cabinet and general in chief of the republic of the Philippines, empowering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign governments.

Mr. Agoncilla offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon. In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in the Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition for the use of his government, to be paid for on the

recognition of his government by the United States. He pledges as security two provinces and the custom-house at Manila.

He is not particular about the price — is willing the United States should make 25 per cent or 30 per cent profit.

He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great admirer of the United States.

On his last visit he surprised me with the information that he had written his government that he had hopes of inducing the United States to supply the much-needed guns, etc.

In case Señor Agoncilla's dispatch should fall into the hands of an unfriendly power and find its way into the newspapers, I have thought it wise to apprise the State Department of the nature of the high commissioner's proposals.

Señor Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he will proceed at once to Washington to conclude the proposed treaty, if I advise.

I shall not advise said step until so instructed by the State Department.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

ROUNSEVILLE WILDMAN,

Consul.

Mr. Cridler to Mr. Wildman

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1897.

SIR: —

. . . You may briefly advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon you, that the Government of the United States does not negotiate such treaties and that it is not possible to forward the desired arms and ammunition.

You should not encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncilla, and should courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged mission.

Respectfully yours,

THOS. W. CRIDLER,

Third Assistant Secretary.

From Mr. Cridler's letter it is evident that even as late as December, 1897, Mr. McKinley could not be tempted to consider in the slightest degree any interference with Spanish affairs in the Philippines, although two months earlier he had instructed Commodore Dewey regarding what he should do in the contingency of a war with Spain. The orders to Dewey were based upon the military necessity of destroying the Spanish fleet in the Pacific, which otherwise would have been a constant menace to the cities of our western shores. The roar of Dewey's

guns on the memorable first of May awakened the United States to a new destiny — a re-birth as one of the great powers of the world. But neither the people of the United States, nor the President, nor the commander of the fleet had the slightest realization on that day of the fateful consequences of the victory.

The responsibilities in the Pacific, thus unexpectedly thrust upon the United States by the exigencies of war, were essentially similar to those which had been assumed in the Western Hemisphere as the result of deliberate consideration. Both required treatment in a spirit of broad philanthropy mingled with enlightened self-interest.

To understand the elements which entered into the problem of redeeming the Philippines and building a new civilization upon the ruins of Spanish misrule, it is necessary to consider briefly what these islands were that fell into the hands of the Americans on the first day of May, 1898.

One of the richest archipelagoes in the world, the Philippine group is composed of islands variously estimated at from twelve hundred to over three thousand in number. Their combined area is about 115,000 square miles — as large as Italy and nearly as large as England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. The largest island is Luzon, 40,969 square miles in

area, or about the size of the State of Ohio. Mindanao is nearly as large (36,292 square miles), and there are twenty-nine others with an area of over one hundred square miles each. All the others are small, and many of them are unnamed. The population in 1898 may be fairly stated at about 7,000,000, nine tenths of whom were more or less civilized, although to a large extent ignorant and illiterate.

The various tribes, of which there are about twenty-five, speaking fifteen or sixteen different dialects, may be grouped into three distinct races — the Negrito, the Indonesian, and the Malayan. The Negritos are weaklings, physically and mentally. In intelligence they are perhaps the lowest of the human family and incapable of advancement. Their number is inconsiderable and they are thought to be doomed to extinction. The Indonesians are inhabitants of the second largest island, Mindanao. They are “physically superior, not only to the Negritos, but to the more numerous Malayan people as well. They are tall and well developed, with high foreheads, aquiline noses, wavy hair, and often with abundant beards. The color of their skins is quite light. Many of them are very clever and intelligent. None of the tribes have been Christianized. Some of them have grown extremely fierce and warlike as a result of their long struggle with hostile Malayan peoples. Others,

more happy in their surroundings, are pacific and industrious.”¹

The great majority of the inhabitants are Malayan in origin, but modified by intermarriage with Chinese, Indonesians, Negritos, and to some extent with Spaniards. They are small in stature, with dark skins and straight black hair. Their numerous tribes differ greatly in degree of civilization, manners and customs, language and laws.

Of the character of these people, Mr. John Foreman, an Englishman long resident in the islands, testified before the Peace Commission as follows:—

“The Tagals (or Tagalogs) are of a very easy, plastic nature — willing in their nature, I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted. The inhabitants of the central islands, or Visayas, are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, — those of Luzon, — but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.

¹ From the *Report of the First Philippine Commission*, January 31, 1900.

“There is a very peculiar class in the Island of Panay, in the neighborhood of Iloilo and in the Province of Iloilo. They are Chinese half-castes, the issue of Chinese men and Visaya women, and they hold the trade, as far as it is in native hands outside the foreign houses, with Iloilo. They are called Chinese *mestizos* or half-castes. They are very abrupt and not very sociable, but have no power, cannot organize themselves, could not do anything, and, of course, would have to knuckle under to anything that might be established. You would probably find them rather cantankerous at first. They are perfectly civilized so far as the civilization of the Philippines goes; they are the cream of the civilization of the Island of Panay, and they trade there and deal with the foreign houses.”

General Francis V. Greene gave the Commission his impressions of the natives as follows: —

“As seen in the provinces of Cavite and Manila, the natives (Tagalogs) are of small stature, averaging probably five feet four inches in height and one hundred and twenty pounds in weight for the women. Their skin is coppery brown, somewhat darker than that of a mulatto. They seem to be industrious and hard-working, although less so than the Chinese.

“By the Spaniards they are considered indolent, crafty, untruthful, treacherous, cowardly, and cruel,

but the hatred between the Spaniards and the native races is so intense and bitter that the Spanish opinion of the natives is of little or no value. To us they seemed industrious and docile, but there were occasional evidences of deceit and untruthfulness in their dealings with us. The bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture, and there were hardly any evidences of manufactures, arts, or mining. The greater number seemed to be able to read and write, but I have been unable to obtain any exact figures on this subject. They are all devout Roman Catholics, although they hate the monastic orders.

“In Manila (and doubtless also in Cebu and Iloilo) are many thousands of educated natives, who are merchants, lawyers, doctors, and priests. They are well informed and have accumulated property.”

Of the personal characteristics of the Tagals, it has been said, “They are big children whom one must treat as little ones.” A writer ¹ in the *Fortnightly Review* gives this graphic picture of them:—

“A Tagal keeps his word, and yet he is a liar. Anger he holds in horror; he compares it to madness, and prefers to it drunkenness, which he also greatly despises. Insult and injustice he cannot brook, and will unhesitatingly use the knife to avenge either. He will never willingly confess a fault, but lie to hide

¹ Lucy M. J. Garnett, July, 1898.

it; yet he receives a flogging for it without a murmur. Debt he considers rather as an inconvenience than a calamity; when in pecuniary difficulties he will spend all his ready cash on a feast to his friends, to keep up appearances, and he never thinks of returning a loan unsolicited. He, on the other hand, never repudiates his debts, but transmits them to his heirs if, at his death, they remain unpaid. Misfortune he bears with stoical and fatalist indifference; concerned only with his immediate necessities, he is apt to let the morrow take care of itself. Under the eye of a master he is the most tractable of beings, and will go without food for hours, without complaint, if supplied with betel nut to chew. He gives himself no airs as a servant, and if hired as a coachman will raise no objection to being employed as cook, carpenter, or boatman, being ready to turn his hand to anything. He has a profound respect for the elders of his family, treats his children kindly, and extends his aid and protection to every one claiming relationship, however remote.

“When, in the interior, he is called upon to offer hospitality to strangers, he not only refuses to accept payment from them in return, but places at their disposal his ponies, vehicles, and gun, and shows them every attention in his power. An intrepid climber and rider, he mounts the tall forest trees like

a monkey, using feet and hands equally; he rides barebacked the most spirited pony, plunges without hesitation into shark-infested waters, and dives into alligator-haunted lakes to attack their occupants. Endowed himself with courage of this description, he has the greatest admiration for bravery in others, and an equal contempt for cowardice. Under a leader in whom he has confidence he makes an excellent soldier; but, losing him, he becomes at once demoralized. Incapable of organization on any considerable scale, no revolt, if confined exclusively to the Tagals, would have a chance of success."

The only educational advantages obtainable by the masses of the people were the primary schools. For these, in 1898, only 1914 teachers were employed, of whom some were merely "assistants," or still worse, "temporary incumbents." The "Report of the First Philippine Commission," estimating on the basis of 8,000,000 population, points out that this is but one teacher for each 4179 individuals.¹ Primary instruction was "obligatory" under the Spanish law, but the provision applied only to children between ten and twelve who were not getting "sufficient instruction at home," and was qualified by the phrase, "when there is a school in the town at such a distance

¹ By way of comparison it may be said that the proportion in Massachusetts in the same year was one teacher to 189 individuals.

that the children can conveniently attend," which rendered it nugatory, for schoolhouses were scarce and far from "convenient" of access. Textbooks, blackboards, and writing materials were conspicuous for their absence, and frequently only oral instruction could be given. The first requirement in the course of instruction in these primary schools was "Christian doctrine and principles of morality and sacred history suitable for children." It was claimed that "in many of the more remote districts instruction began and ended with this subject and was imparted in the local native dialect at that."¹

Instruction in Spanish was required by the law, but the local friars frequently prohibited it and many of the teachers could not understand a word of Spanish. History was also a part of the course, but the only history taught was that of Spain, and the average Filipino remained in dense ignorance of the rest of the world. The teachers were so poorly paid that educated persons could not afford to accept such positions. Most of the natives could boast of no better education than the reading and writing to a limited extent of their own local dialect.

These remarks apply only to the provincial schools. In Manila, especially under the direction of the Jesuits, much better conditions prevailed, although

¹ *Report of the First Philippine Commission*, January 31, 1900.

the facilities were limited. Here, and in a few other places in Luzon and some of the other islands, there were small "private colleges" and "Latin schools." Manila boasted two normal schools, a school of agriculture, a nautical school, a school of painting and sculpture, a military academy, a theological seminary, and the "royal university" known as Santo Tomas, which included the "Royal College of San José." A school of arts and trades was also started, but for lack of proper facilities and financial support it was a failure. Of the educated Filipinos who were the product of these various institutions, the first Philippine Commission said: —

"... The educated Filipinos, though constituting a minority, are far more numerous than is generally supposed and are scattered all over the archipelago; and the Commission desires to bear the strongest testimony to the high range of their intelligence, and not only to their intellectual training, but also to their social refinement, as well as to the grace and charm of their personal character. These educated Filipinos, in a word, are the equals of the men one meets in similar vocations — law, medicine, business, etc. — in Europe or America."

Estimating the capabilities of the Filipinos as a whole, with special reference to their capacity for self-government, the Commission said: —

“ . . . The most striking and perhaps the most significant fact in the entire situation is the multiplicity of tribes inhabiting the archipelago, the diversity of their languages (which are mutually unintelligible), and the multifarious phases of civilization — ranging all the way from the highest to the lowest — exhibited by the natives of the several provinces and islands. In spite of the general use of the Spanish language by the educated classes and the considerable similarity of economic and social conditions prevalent in Luzon and the Visayan Islands, the masses of the people are without a common speech and they lack the sentiment of nationality. The Filipinos are not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type.

“As to the general intellectual capacities of the Filipinos, the Commission is disposed to rate them high; but excepting in a limited number of persons these capacities have not been developed by education or experience. The masses of the people are uneducated. That intelligent public opinion on which popular government rests does not exist in the Philippines, and it cannot exist until education has elevated the masses, broadened their intellectual horizon, and disciplined their faculty of judgment. And even then the power of self-government cannot

be assumed without considerable previous training and experience under the guidance and tutelage of an enlightened and liberal sovereign power."

This, then, was the "raw material" with which President McKinley was to begin the task of "making the Philippines." There remains one element to be considered, namely, the personality of the most conspicuous figure among the native population — Emilio Aguinaldo. This young man, who was only twenty-seven years of age when he first assumed a position of leadership, achieved a fame throughout the world out of all proportion to his real merits. By many well-intentioned people in the United States he was proclaimed as a pure patriot, the recognized leader of his people and a second George Washington. Aguinaldo was none of these. His patriotism was challenged by his own people, as will be seen later, and his leadership was not accepted by the leading lawyers, bankers, merchants, professional men, and important landholders among the educated Filipinos, many of whom early signified their desire to swear allegiance to the United States. He seems to have been a man of considerable shrewdness, though not particularly well educated; he was possessed of an inordinate ambition which overcame his better judgment; he was a man of petty moods, vain, and troubled with the complaint called "big

head." Consul Wildman thought his letters were "childish" and said, "He is far more interested in the kind of cane he will carry or the breast-plate he will wear than in the figure he will make in history." Some facts bearing upon his truthfulness, honesty, and patriotism will be presently considered. To understand his relation to the problem which confronted President McKinley, it is necessary to review, very briefly, some of the events of Philippine history up to the time when Aguinaldo first appeared upon the scene.

One of the most famous voyages of discovery in the history of the New World was that of Hernando de Maghallanes (or Magellan), who sailed from Spain in 1519, and following the coast of South America in quest of the long-desired passage to the Pacific, reached in the next year the waters thenceforth to be known as the Straits of Magellan. Continuing westward he stopped at the Ladrone Islands in the spring of 1521 and shortly after discovered an islet now known as Malhan, lying north of Mindanao. Coasting along the islands of Mindanao and Cebu, he found the natives friendly and took possession in the name of Spain. Magellan lost his life in a skirmish soon afterward, and the Spanish power in the islands was not firmly established until 1565, when Miguel Lopez de Legaspi, with a company of priests

sent out by Philip II, King of Spain, landed in Cebu and took possession with the pious purpose of Christianizing the islands. Thus it was that the Spanish conquest of the Philippines became more an achievement of missionaries than of soldiers, and the Roman Catholic Church came to rule more than the Spanish Government. The priests and friars gradually came into possession of the lands, though without legal title, until they were in a position of absolute dictatorship in their respective parishes. A friar was practically independent of civil authority. He could commit any crime with impunity and his nominal superiors would attempt no punishment beyond some farcical pretense. He meddled in all the affairs of his township and even interfered in the private business and family relations of the people. If a luckless man incurred his displeasure, a simple message from the friar to the governor of the province would cause his arrest and possible banishment, without trial or even explanation. Enormous rents were charged and the people were taxed without mercy, while the friars, who held the land, escaped all taxation and accumulated fortunes. The poor man found the means of gaining a livelihood increasingly difficult. All opportunity for intellectual or moral advancement was strangled. Many stories were circulated, and not denied, of gross immorality on the

part of the priests, besides rapacity and cruelty. These conditions became so unbearable that in 1872 a revolt was attempted, but was suppressed with cruel vindictiveness, wholesale arrests, and executions.

A secret society called the "Katipunan" was then formed as a revolutionary organization, and from this movement resulted the insurrection of 1896, when Aguinaldo first made his appearance as leader. This was in no sense a demand for independence, but simply a protest against Spanish cruelty, oppression, and misrule. What the insurgents desired was set forth in a proclamation in the Tagalog dialect, circulated in July, 1897: —

"1. Expulsion of the friars and restitution to the townships of lands which the friars have appropriated, dividing the incumbencies held by them, as well as the episcopal sees, equally between peninsular and insular secular priests.

"2. Spain must concede to us, as she has to Cuba, parliamentary representation, freedom of the press, toleration of all religious sects, laws common with hers, and administrative and economic autonomy.

"3. Equality in treatment and pay between peninsular and insular civil servants.

"4. Restitution of all lands appropriated by the friars to the townships, or to the original owners, or

in default of finding such owners, the State is to put them up to public auction in small lots of a value within the reach of all and payable within four years, the same as the present State lands.

“5. Abolition of the Government authorities, power to banish citizens, as well as unjust measures against Filipinos; legal equality for all persons, whether peninsular or insular, under the civil as well as the penal code.

“The war must be prolonged to give the greatest signs of vitality possible, so that Spain may be compelled to grant our demands, otherwise she will consider us an effete race, and curtail, rather than extend, our rights.”

The war once started was prosecuted with inhuman atrocities on both sides. Mr. Foreman says that, while Aguinaldo was personally humane, some of his followers were guilty of fiendish outrages. It is charged that they killed a captured priest and cut up his body piecemeal, and that they saturated another priest with oil and burned him on a spit, made of a bamboo pole and thrust through his body. Yet even such horrors were outdone by the Spaniards, under the terrible leadership of Polaveja, the governor-general. A meeting of unarmed natives was surrounded by the police and soldiers on one occasion, when twelve persons were shot and

sixty-two marched off as prisoners. Some of the latter were merely passers-by, not having attended the meeting, yet all were taken to the cemetery the next morning and without trial shot to death.

Hundreds of insurgents were confined in an old fortress, built three hundred years ago, at the mouth of the Pasig River. The floors were below low tide and covered with mud and slime. As the tide rose the water would seep in through the crevices of the ancient masonry and thus twice a day the unfortunate inmates found themselves nearly drowned by the high tide. On one occasion a brutal sergeant threw a rug over the only aperture through which light and air could be obtained and in the next day or two cartloads of dead bodies were carried away.

Executions on the Lunetta, the fashionable concourse of Manila, were of frequent occurrence. Thousands of people would assemble as though the affair were some holiday fête. The prisoners were arranged in a row and at a signal the fatal shots were fired, while fashionably dressed men and women cheered and waved their handkerchiefs and parasols as though it were some brilliant play in a football game.

The war came to an end with the Treaty of Biacna-bato, signed December 14, 1897. An exaggerated notion of the forces and equipment of the insurgents

impelled General Primo de Rivero, who had succeeded Polaveja as governor-general, to try the use of money. The plan worked admirably. For a consideration of eight hundred thousand dollars Aguinaldo agreed that his followers should lay down their arms and that he would immediately leave the country together with his chief officers, of whom there were thirty-two. The Spaniards agreed to a general amnesty and the introduction of all the reforms necessary to correct the evils which had oppressed the country. Four hundred thousand dollars were actually handed to Aguinaldo, in the shape of a letter of credit upon a bank in Hongkong, on the day of his embarkation, but he never received the balance. The promised amnesty was a farce, hundreds of Filipinos still remaining in the military prisons. Some were released in penniless condition in Spain and forced to remain in exile as beggars because without the means of returning home. The reforms were not carried out and the religious orders began to return to their former position of absolute power.

The whole transaction was far from satisfactory to the Filipinos, who were angry because their rights and liberty had been made an object of barter. Aguinaldo was accused of betraying his people for gold. In his defense it was stated that he had refused to divide the money with his leading officers, but insisted upon

holding it in trust, to be used in a subsequent insurrection if Spain failed to keep her promises. This, it was argued, was conclusive proof of the purity of his patriotism as well as of his honesty. The argument, however, will not stand analysis. It might well prove a good investment to hold this large sum in trust for a future insurrection, which, if successful, would make Aguinaldo dictator and bring him future emoluments far in excess of his share of the four hundred thousand dollars then in hand. Moreover, funds were not easily obtainable for revolutionary purposes. On the other hand, what was to become of the money if Spain *should* keep her promises? Was Aguinaldo entitled to this large sum and the remaining four hundred thousand dollars yet to be paid, as a personal perquisite for himself and officers? Would the people have consented to that? Did the Spanish officers pay him this money with the understanding that it was to be held in trust and used against them subsequently? If not, could Aguinaldo have accepted it, honorably, with such intentions? Finally, would any pure patriot, without personal ambition, have sailed away from his native country without some better guaranty of real reform than the word of Spanish officials, whom all had learned to distrust, leaving the people to their fate while he himself carried away a princely

fortune as payment for little more than a year of "patriotic effort? In whatever light it is regarded," the conduct of Aguinaldo was subject to the grave suspicion of selfish motives, rather than disinterested patriotism, and this was fully confirmed by his subsequent relations to the United States Government.

Could the American people have known the whole truth when the Philippine Islands first burst upon their vision as an important element in their subsequent history, the picture thus suddenly brought into view on the first day of May, 1898, would have been about as follows: —

1. A wonderful group of islands, rich in mineral and agricultural resources, with good climate and other natural advantages, and boundless possibilities of industrial and commercial expansion.

2. A heterogeneous population of some seven or eight million souls, of many different races and tribes, one tenth of them wholly uncivilized, and a large majority of the others nominally civilized and Christianized, but ignorant, illiterate, without opportunity for advancement, and living in primitive style, in houses crudely constructed of bamboo poles and leaves of the nipa palm; the entire absence of any semblance of national unity, but in its stead universal jealousy, the Tagalogs distrusting the

Visayans, the Christians hating the Mussulmans of Mindanao and the south, and the native Filipinos despising the Chinese; a "variegated assemblage of tribes" without common sentiment except hatred of the Spanish Government; a miscellaneous collection of people who, in three hundred years of misrule, had never had any experience in governing themselves nor had ever come in contact with other peoples of more advanced ideas, but who had been the witnesses of the most corrupt administration of inadequate laws and the open violation of such statutes by the persons in authority.

3. A nominal sovereignty, thoroughly discredited, whose incapacity for colonial government had been as completely demonstrated here as in Cuba; the administration of justice paralyzed; business suspended; crime flourishing; the people overtaxed; and some of the provinces almost in a state of anarchy.

4. A native population opposed to Spanish rule, but without organization; their only leader in exile, distrusted by the more prosperous and better-educated classes, and openly accused of selling out his people for gold — a man whose army, now disbanded and unarmed, never numbered one half of one per cent of the population, and whose influence never extended to any appreciable extent beyond the Island of Luzon.

Few American Executives have ever been called upon to face a more complex problem or to accept a greater responsibility than was here presented to President McKinley. He neither shrank from it nor ventured an immediate decision. He had foreseen the necessity for the destruction of the Spanish naval power and had sent Dewey to accomplish it. He had even considered the temporary occupation of a part of the Spanish territory in the Pacific, for on May 4 — three days after the victory of Dewey and three days before the official dispatch reached Washington with the news of it — we find him approving the designation of troops by General Miles for possible service in the Philippines and ordering their assemblage in San Francisco. But beyond this he entertained no schemes of aggression. One of many memoranda in the handwriting of President McKinley, now in the possession of his former Secretary, Mr. Cortelyou, will serve to indicate his point of view at this time. It reads: "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want." This policy proved an excellent one, for, without giving up any possible advantage, it gave him time for formulating a well-matured plan of action.

On May 12, Major-General Wesley Merritt was

placed in command of the proposed expedition to the Philippines. The first detachment sailed on May 25, under Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson and was followed on June 15 by a second army commanded by General Francis V. Greene. On the 19th of May, the President issued an order to the Secretary of War, clearly indicating his intention of holding the islands pending a final settlement with Spain. It was characterized by firmness of purpose, practical judgment in outlining the preliminary measures of administration, and above all by a spirit of fairness and justice to the people of the islands and respect for their rights of person and property:—

May 19, 1898.

To the Secretary of War.

SIR:—

The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by the taking of the naval station at Cavite, the paroling of the garrisons, and the acquisition of the control of the bay, have rendered it necessary, in the further prosecution of the measures adopted by this Government for the purpose of bringing about an honorable and durable peace with Spain, to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the two-fold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter, and of giving order and

security to the islands while in the possession of the United States. For the command of this expedition, I have designated Major-General Wesley Merritt; and it now becomes my duty to give instructions as to the manner in which the movement shall be conducted.

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants, and the establishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things, the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expedition, immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation, declaring that we come not to make war upon the people of the Philippines, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, coöperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose,

will receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as between man and man, under the supervision of the American commander-in-chief. The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be preserved. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.

While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind, if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience, and a high sense of justice.

One of the most important and most practical problems with which the commander of the expedition will have to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the Government of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable property of such Government, may be seized by the military occupant and converted to the use of this Government. The real property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity. All public means of transportation, such

as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be appropriated to his use, but, unless in case of military necessity, they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, and all schoolhouses are, so far as possible, to be protected; and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments or archives or of works of science or art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity.

Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, and can be confiscated only as hereafter indicated. Means of transportation, such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but, unless destroyed under military necessity, are not to be retained.

While it is held to be the right of a conqueror to levy contributions upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expenses of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former Government become pay-

able to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the Government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purposes of paying the expenses of Government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army.

Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for when possible in cash at a fair valuation and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given.

In order that there may be no conflict of authority between the army and the navy in the administration of affairs in the Philippines, you are instructed to confer with the Secretary of the Navy, so far as necessary, for the purpose of devising measures to secure the harmonious action of these two branches of the public service.

I will give instructions to the Secretary of the Treasury to make a report to me upon the subject of the revenues of the Philippines, with a view to the formulation of such revenue measures as may seem expedient. All ports and places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be opened, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of

all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.

(Signed) WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Similar in spirit to this letter were the instructions to General Elwell S. Otis, dated December 21, 1898, closing with these words: —

“Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs to the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.”

General Otis issued a proclamation embodying the

President's instruction and closing with the above paragraph. He reported afterwards ¹ that while some of the able Filipino residents thought its publication a mistake in view of existing circumstances, yet it "was received by the better classes of natives with satisfaction." It did not please Aguinaldo, however, who would not have been satisfied with any amount of favors to the Filipinos, even to the extent of absolute independence and self-government, that did not recognize him as the supreme authority of the entire archipelago. He accordingly issued a counter-proclamation solemnly protesting, "In the name of God, root and source of all justice and all right, who has visibly acceded *me* the power to direct my dear brethren in the difficult task of our regeneration, against this intrusion of the United States Government in the administration of these islands."

In pursuit of his declared policy the President appointed the first Philippine Commission on January 20, 1899, consisting of Dr. Jacob G. Schurman, chairman; Rear-Admiral George Dewey, Major-General Elwell S. Otis, Charles Denby, and Dean C. Worcester. Unfortunately the Commission arrived just after the outbreak of hostilities, which prevented them from securing the organization of a civil government.

¹ *Report of General Otis*, August 31, 1899.

Their preliminary report of November 2, 1899, and a more exhaustive one of January 31, 1900, proved of great value and paved the way toward an eventual accomplishment of the work.

Feeling the necessity of inaugurating popular governments in territory where the movements of Aguinaldo's insurgents did not impede it, the President began to consider the appointment of a second commission. About this time, in the autumn of 1899, McKinley went home to cast his ballot in the election of a governor. General H. C. Corbin, who also voted in Ohio, went to his own home, planning to return by way of Canton and accompany the President to Washington.

William H. Taft was then presiding judge of the United States Circuit Court, to which position he had been appointed at the age of thirty-two. One of his associates on the bench was William R. Day, who, after his return from Paris, had been appointed a judge of the same court. It happened that Judge Taft arranged to go to Cleveland on election day, and Judge Day invited him to stop over at Canton to meet the President. On the way Mr. Taft chanced to learn that General Corbin was on the same train and was introduced to him. They talked all the way to Canton and on arrival there went to Judge Day's house, where they found Mr. and Mrs. McKinley.



James T. Sayer

The four gentlemen, with Mrs. McKinley and Mrs. Day, dined and spent the evening together.

On his return to Washington, General Corbin spoke to Secretary Root so enthusiastically about the "young judge" whom he had met as "just the man for the Philippines," that the Secretary was prevailed upon to suggest his name to the President. A few days later Judge Taft received a telegram from the White House. It read: "I would like very much to see you in Washington. If you could come Thursday it would be convenient." The Judge presented himself at Washington without the slightest idea as to what the President wished to see him about, and when told that he was expected to go to the Philippines, he was astounded. "Why, Mr. President," he said, "that would be impossible. I am not in sympathy with your policy. I don't think we ought to take the Philippines. They are sure to entail a great deal of trouble and expense. I don't want them." "Neither do I," replied the President, "but that is n't the question. We've got them. What I want you to do now is to go there and establish civil government." The President then sent for Mr. Root, and the subject was strongly presented to Mr. Taft as an opportunity for service. "It is a critical time," said Mr. Root. "We need you to do pioneer work. We want you to pull your weight in

the boat." There was more talk of the same kind, when the President suggested that the Judge take a week or two for consideration. "I never came in contact with a more sweetly sympathetic nature nor one more persuasive in his treatment of men," said Mr. Taft, in telling the story of this interview.¹ While the Judge was talking over the proposition with his wife and friends, the President enlisted the friendly aid of his old neighbor, Judge Day: —

January 30, 1900.

DEAR JUDGE DAY: —

Your letter of January 29th is at hand. We are deeply sorry that you will not be able to come to the dinner. I do not know when Mrs. McKinley has been made more cheerful than by the receipt of Mrs. Day's letter saying that you would be with us on that occasion, and she had arranged to have you stay with us at the White House. I recognize, however, the business side of it and accept the bereavement with becoming philosophy.

Indeed, on some accounts I am rather glad you are going to Cincinnati, because Judge Taft will consult you about a matter which I have brought to his attention. I want him to go to the Philippines on a Commission to establish civil government in prov-

¹ The story of the appointment of Mr. Taft was told to the writer, partly by Judge Day and partly by Mr. Taft himself.

inces where there is peace. I have had him down here, have gone over the whole ground with him. He took a week to reply. This morning a letter comes, that he wants a little more time that he may consult with his brethren on next Monday. I want you to appreciate, Judge, that this is a very important matter and I invoke your aid to get the consent of Judge Taft to go. It is a great field for him, a great opportunity, and he will never have so good a one again to serve his country. I think he is inclined to accept. You must not make it harder for him to accept.

The Commission which I shall send will have large powers and a wide jurisdiction. They can accomplish great good and help me more than I can tell you in the solution of the important problem in the East. Besides, a Commission made up of men of the character of Judge Taft will give repose and confidence to the country and will be an earnest of my high purpose to bring to those peoples the blessings of peace and liberty. It will be an assurance that my instructions to the Peace Commission were sincere and my purpose to abide by them.

I was glad to get your letter. With best wishes and congratulations,

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

When Mr. Taft returned to Washington to give the President his acceptance, the latter said to him, "I propose to give you the full power of appointment of those who are to assist you." Many applications were subsequently made by politicians for places in the Philippines, but to all the uniform reply was a polite reference of the applicant to the Chairman of the Philippine Commission. "I have always cherished the recollection," said Mr. Taft to the writer, "that he gave me this promise and kept it to the letter."

The appointment proved to be a wise one, for the new Commissioner directed affairs with such tact and judgment that before the close of the Administration a progress had been made in the upbuilding of the Philippines that seemed little short of marvelous to every one except those who, for political and other reasons, continued to find fault with the President's policy.

With Mr. Taft were associated Dean C. Worcester, Luke I. Wright, Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses. The Commission was appointed on the 7th of April, 1900, and after some months spent in familiarizing themselves with conditions on the islands, entered upon the exercise of their legislative powers on September 1. On June 21, 1900, in accordance with the President's instructions, the military governor

published a note of amnesty, as the result of which about five thousand persons, of all grades of civil and military services in the insurrection, including many of the most prominent officials of the former Tagalog Government, took the oath of allegiance to the United States. On July 4, 1901, the Military Government was entirely superseded by the civil government, and Mr. Taft became the first American Governor-General.

The Commission held open sessions, published all proposed measures in the newspapers, and gave the public opportunity to come before them to suggest objections or amendments. Taxes and duties were gradually rearranged in the interest of the people, the police were reorganized, local municipal governments were established in the outlying townships or pueblos, extensive arrangements were made for the up-building of the public schools and the supply of an adequate force of teachers, sanitary measures were adopted, and the way was opened for the building of highways, railroads, and bridges and the active development of the natural resources of the islands. A strict system of civil-service examinations was established in accordance with the law in force in the United States and equal opportunity was given to the Filipinos to enter the public service.

The chief cause of the insurrection of 1896 had

been the complaint against the friars. They had been driven out by the rebels and with the restoration of peace came the important question of permitting them to return. The people of the Philippines, generally speaking, were loyal to the Roman Catholic Church, but bitter in their hatred of the friars, in whose hands had rested the government of the islands by Spain. To permit their return would seem like a return to the old Spanish conditions. The three great religious orders of the Dominicans, the Augustinians, and the Recollects (the Franciscans were not permitted to own property except schools and convents) held 403,000 acres of land and much valuable business property besides. With the expulsion of the friars would come the problem of the ultimate disposition of these possessions. The problem was finally solved by sending Mr. Taft on a special mission to Rome, where he was able to arrange with the Vatican for the purchase of the lands by the United States.

How the President reached his decision to hold the Philippines until the people were capable of self-government has already been told. Reports from United States Consuls, army officers, and others had kept him so well informed that he knew the true inwardness of the problem, when many other statesmen were indulging in high-flown theories

based upon false premises, such as that involved in the conception of the Filipinos as a united people, with a worthy leader in whom they trusted. The President was attacked with great bitterness. His phrase "benevolent assimilation" was sneeringly criticized as hypocritical. He was charged with perfidy in promising independence to the Filipinos and failing to grant it, and accused of turning the "much-vaunted war of liberation into a war of conquest and criminal aggression." The facts are now too well known to require argument. As early as May 26, 1898, the President instructed Admiral Dewey to make no alliance with any party or faction in the Philippines that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future, and Dewey replied on June 6, that he had acted from the beginning in accordance with the spirit of these instructions and had entered into no alliances of any kind. On August 17 General Merritt was instructed that there must be no joint occupation of Manila with the insurgents. The testimony of Admiral Dewey, General Merritt, General Anderson, and General Greene is consistent and conclusive as to the fact that no alliance was made and no promises of independence ever given to the insurgents. On the other hand, as early as May 4, 1898, Aguinaldo met with some of his associates in Hongkong and planned a new insurrection,

in which they expected to unite with the Americans, obtain arms from them if possible, and then, if the government were not turned over to them, to begin operations against their benefactors. This intention was literally executed. Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs came to Manila by invitation of Admiral Dewey and on May 19 called on the American commander on board the Olympia. He was allowed to land at Cavite and organize an army. He was also given some arms and ammunition. "This was done with the purpose of strengthening the position of the United States forces and weakening those of the enemy. No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguinaldo nor was any promise of independence made to him then or at any other time." ¹

Aguinaldo did not wait for any alliance, expressed or implied, with the Americans. Five days after his arrival he took the liberty of promising independence to his people in the name of "the great nation North America, cradle of true liberty," etc., though he admitted in private that no such promise had been made by Admiral Dewey or any other American. With superb effrontery he went on to say that the great nation North America had come to offer them

¹ Statement of Admiral Dewey to the First Philippine Commission.

protection, "considering us endowed with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land." On June 18 he established a dictatorial government with himself as dictator, and on June 23 changed it to a "revolutionary government," proclaiming himself as president, the "personification of the Philippine people" and not to be held responsible to any one "until the revolution triumphs." In July, exasperated by the unwillingness of the American officers to make common cause with him, Aguinaldo began to place all possible obstacles in their way. When the Americans landed, the insurgents were very much in the way, but the opposition was tactfully overcome. When Manila was attacked on August 13, the insurgents lent no assistance, but followed the Americans, intending to loot the city. They were prevented by force from doing this. Aguinaldo demanded the palace of Malacañan for his personal occupancy, and expected to secure the churches, a part of the money taken from the Spaniards, and the arms of the Spanish prisoners, thus confirming the impression that he intended to get possession of these arms for the purpose of attacking the Americans.¹ Of course these demands were refused.

¹ From the *Preliminary Report of the First Philippine Commission*.

The ill-feeling continued to grow. Assaults and robberies were committed by the insurgent troops. Natives, friendly to the Americans, were seized and either killed or carried off to the mountains. Clubs were organized by revolutionary politicians to foster hostility against the American occupants of Manila. The blacksmith shops were kept busy forging bolos, with which to arm a secret militia force to attack the city from within. Persistent attempts were made to provoke the fire of the American soldiers, whose forbearance was taken as evidence of cowardice. The smouldering hate burst into flames on the 4th of February, 1899, when the insurgents, after receiving the assurance that no hostile movement would be inaugurated by the Americans, attacked an American outpost and attempted to rush past the guard. On February 22 the murderous design that had been so long planned was finally attempted, when five hundred insurgents entered the city intending, with the coöperation of the local militia, to massacre all the white inhabitants. The effort was frustrated by the vigorous action of the American provost-marshal. The war thus begun did not end until the 23d of March, 1901, when Aguinaldo was captured.

Those who saw in the President's action a "war of conquest and criminal aggression" took no ac-

count of these facts. To permit a minority faction of malcontents to enter the city of Manila, seize its treasures, and rule over the educated and industrious inhabitants, whose desire was peace, and who realized that protection could come only through the aid of the United States, would have been perfidy indeed. The army had been sent to protect the lives and property of the people and to establish order and security. To retire at the command of a vain and selfish politician, whose intent to plunder had been made only too plain, would have been an act of cowardice of which no American army would have been capable. The sovereignty of America, having once been established, must remain unsullied until voluntarily withdrawn.

There were other grounds upon which the President was attacked. It was said that he had no right to accept the sovereignty of the Philippines because those islands belonged to the Filipinos and Spain had no right to cede them. This argument is refuted by the law of nations. Spanish sovereignty had been acknowledged by the civilized world for three hundred years and no Philippine Government had ever been recognized. Indeed, no such government had ever existed except the abortive one set up by Aguinaldo which scarcely extended beyond the Island of Luzon. The Senate of the United States,

in ratifying the Treaty of Paris, considered the title good and it was good.

Another favorite criticism was that the Constitution of the United States gave no authority for annexing a sovereign people. It must be interpreted, the faultfinders said, in the light of the Declaration of Independence, which maintained that all men are free and equal and that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. The answer to this is that the Declaration of Independence must be interpreted in the light of history. Its signers were men whose ancestors had been trained in the lessons of political liberty and self-government since the days of Magna Charta. They wrote it for themselves — not for the American Indians nor even for the Southern slaves, whom they ignored. Its author, Thomas Jefferson, was the first to maintain that its provisions did not apply in a close, literal sense, to all the inhabitants of the United States, and when under his Presidency a vast territory was purchased from Napoleon, its people, without asking their consent, were subjected to the Government of the American Congress. If the annexation of the Philippines violated the Constitution, so did the Louisiana Purchase, so did the Mexican cession, so did the purchase of Alaska. The argument that the Louisiana Purchase did not

violate the spirit of the Declaration of Independence because the intention was to organize the territory into sovereign States is without force. That instrument could not be affected by the intentions of Thomas Jefferson and Napoleon Bonaparte. A portion of the territory remained outside the pale of self-government for eighty-seven years. The truth is that Jefferson saw in this huge addition to the territory of the original States a chance to make a vast extension of the blessings guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. Strict constructionist as he was, it has been said that Jefferson broke the Constitution into fragments by his action. But this is a narrow view. Jefferson loved his country as much in 1803 as he did in 1776, and still revered the Constitution. What he sought to do, and did, was to broaden the scope of that immortal document, just as Marshall did in the years immediately following. McKinley only followed the lead of these great men in making a further extension.

The right to hold and govern territory and peoples as the result of purchase or conquest is one of the inherent attributes of sovereignty. The makers of the Constitution intended to create a nation — not with limited sovereign powers as compared with their neighbors, but a strong, enduring, self-sustaining

nation with all the powers that make for legitimate growth. It was inconceivable, therefore, that the United States, having obtained possession of certain territory outside its borders, had no authority to retain and govern it.

President McKinley, while holding this view, took his stand upon ground even higher. His conception of nationality was as broad as his humanity. The same Christian spirit which was the law of his personal life was also the law of the Chief Executive of his people. He was no Levite to pass by on the other side when he saw a man stripped and beaten and left half dead by robbers. The Filipinos were in just that condition. They were wounded and bleeding and unable to stand alone as the result of three centuries of selfish exploitation. Only a small minority — very small, indeed, compared with the total population — were sufficiently educated to learn the art of self-government and these were without experience. If the Filipinos dreamed of independence, it was only to escape the bondage of Spain. If they failed at first to understand the altruism of President McKinley and the American nation, it was because in all their experience they had never heard of such a thing as a philanthropic ruler. It is quite conceivable that the man who fell among thieves might have mistaken the good Samaritan for another robber

before he felt the touch of his helping hands. It was inconceivable that a Christian nation, which had spent \$300,000,000 and sacrificed the lives of more than 5500 officers and men to relieve the people of Cuba from oppression, should deliberately deprive the Filipinos of all hope of relief, by handing them over to the same oppressors. Even the most rabid anti-imperialists did not go so far as to demand that, though there were many statesmen who would have permitted it by the adoption of a weaker policy. Those who knew conditions best were a unit in the assertion that any attempt to recognize the independence of the Filipinos would result in anarchy and make the islands the prey of less scrupulous nations. President McKinley realized this fact and knew, further, the unwisdom of first handing the government over to the Filipinos and then establishing a protectorate. He maintained that

“No government can so certainly preserve the peace, restore public order, establish law, justice, and stable conditions as ours. Neither Congress nor the Executive can establish a stable government in these islands except under our right of sovereignty, our authority, and our flag. And this we are doing.

“We could not do it as a protectorate power so completely or so successfully as we are doing it now. As the sovereign power we can initiate action and

shape means to ends, and guide the Filipinos to self-development and self-government. As a protectorate power we could not initiate action, but would be compelled to follow and uphold a people with no capacity yet to go alone. In the one case we can protect both ourselves and the Filipinos from being involved in dangerous complications; in the other we could not protect even the Filipinos until after their trouble had come. Besides, if we cannot establish any government of our own without the consent of the governed, as our opponents contend, then we could not establish a stable government for them or make ours a protectorate without the like consent, and neither the majority of the people nor a minority of the people have invited us to assume it. We could not maintain a protectorate even with the consent of the governed without giving provocation for conflicts and possibly costly wars. Our rights in the Philippines are now free from outside interference and will continue so in our present relation. They would not be thus free in any other relation. We will not give up our own to guarantee another sovereignty.”¹

William McKinley was the first of our Presidents to respond to the call of a broad philanthropy to-

¹ From the letter of acceptance of the Republican Nomination for President, September 8, 1900.

ward other less fortunate peoples. Lincoln heard a similar call and responded with the emancipation of four million slaves. But that was within our own boundaries. McKinley saw that the time had come when the United States, no longer a weakling nation threatened with dissolution, but strong and able, should take to itself the apostolic injunction, "now we that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak and not to please ourselves." He realized that those inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness which our forefathers so ardently desired for themselves were not intended by the Creator as the exclusive privilege of our own countrymen, but were a part of the endowment of the people of Cuba, of Porto Rico, and of the Philippines as well. It was no part of the duty of the United States to watch the corners of the globe for violations of these rights, but when the current of events placed the destinies of these peoples within our hands, it became our duty to extend to them the same blessings of freedom which we ourselves enjoyed. President McKinley was wiser than his critics in seeing that this could be done, so far as Porto Rico and the Philippines were concerned, only by the exercise of a benevolent sovereignty such as the United States alone could offer. So far from violating the principles of the Declaration of Inde-

pendence, he purposed to give that instrument a wider and richer meaning than its signers ever dreamed. Washington, in his Farewell Address, said: "The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquillity at home, your peace abroad, of your safety, of your prosperity, of that very liberty which you so highly prize." This "main pillar" was exactly what the Filipinos did not have, namely, unity of government, and until they could secure it, real independence and liberty were unobtainable. By his sagacious application of the principles of genuine philanthropy, President McKinley brought the United States for the first time to the fulfillment of the noble aspiration of Washington: "It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence." Those who sneer so lightly at McKinley's policy of "benevolent assimilation" should give ear to these prophetic words of the father of his country. Obeying Washington's injunction to "observe good faith and justice toward all nations" and to keep out of entangling alliances, President McKinley successfully inaugurated a policy of helpful

influence in the development of the world and placed the United States at the head of all the nations as the chief uplifter of less fortunate peoples. The power subsequently wielded by the United States in the settlement of affairs in China, the reëstablishment of peace between Japan and Russia so skillfully handled by his successor, and the enlarged respect of other nations in the broader movements of the world's civilization, were all the direct results of President McKinley's exalted vision of the fundamental duty of this nation to make itself a power for righteousness.

CHAPTER XXX

THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN THE ANTILLES

THE treaty of peace between the United States and Spain provided that the former was to occupy the Island of Cuba, and so long as this occupation should continue was to "assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property." The United States Commissioners,¹ under the terms of the protocol of August 12, fixed upon January 1, 1899, as the date for the final evacuation by the Spanish forces. In preparation for the new responsibility the President created the Division of Cuba in the United States Army, and on December 13, 1898, appointed Major-General John R. Brooke to the command, with headquarters at Havana.

The altruistic spirit of the people of the United

¹ In accordance with the fourth article of the peace protocol, the President appointed Major-General James F. Wade, Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, and Major-General Matthew C. Butler as the American Commissioners to superintend the evacuation of Cuba. A similar commission, consisting of Major-General John R. Brooke, Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, and Brigadier-General William W. Gordon, completed the evacuation of Porto Rico on the 18th of October, 1898.

States and that of President McKinley in waging war for the freedom of Cuba without the purpose of annexation was never quite comprehensible to the Spaniards or to the Cubans, who were continually looking, with suspicion, upon every movement, seemingly expecting some trick or subterfuge, notwithstanding the clearly expressed disavowal of such intentions in the so-called "Teller Resolution." It was no wonder they expected the United States to annex Cuba. Jefferson had included it as a part of his dream of expansion; John Quincy Adams considered it "indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union"; the South coveted it; Polk tried to purchase it; and the Ostend Manifesto proposed to steal it. If the doubters could have seen the following confidential letter from the President to General Brooke, their suspicions must have melted away, for sincerity of purpose and genuine altruism shine out in every paragraph. It must be borne in mind that this letter was not intended or used for effect, but was simply the private and unofficial instructions of the Executive to the officer who had been selected to carry out his plans. It has a kind of apostolic flavor, and one almost expects the closing exhortation: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are

lovely, whatsoever things are of good report . . . think on these things."

Confidential.

December 22, 1898.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN R. BROOKE.

SIR: In designating you to fill the office of Military Governor of Cuba, the President is committing to you a responsibility of great importance, and is confiding to you a trust the administration of which will require the exercise of the highest qualities of judgment, tact, firmness, and integrity.

Believing that you are possessed of these qualities, the President has chosen you for this service. Entertaining no doubt but that your long experience and training as an officer will enable you to form a just and comprehensive appreciation of the importance of your task and of the means by which it should be accomplished, I nevertheless have thought it proper, inasmuch as you will exercise your authority in Cuba as the direct representative of the Commander-in-Chief, to make a few unofficial suggestions with respect to the policy to be followed and the measures to be employed by you in dealing with the delicate and perplexing conditions that will confront you.

The foundation of our authority in Cuba is the law

of belligerent right over conquered territory. The United States having actually overthrown the power and government of Spain in a large part of the Island by force of arms, the possession of the remainder has been turned over to the military forces of the United States under the terms of the peace protocol of August 12, 1898, in compliance with the demand of the conquering power. The only lawful authority capable of administering government in Cuba is the President of the United States, exercising on its behalf his constitutional function of Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of this nation. This authority must continue until Congress provides otherwise, or until such time as the people shall have established a firm and stable government of their own, capable of performing its international obligations, and the President shall, in consequence thereof, deem it safe to withdraw the United States forces.

The government to be maintained under this authority by you on behalf of the United States is not in the interest or for the direct benefit of this country, but in the interest and for the benefit of the people of Cuba and those possessed of rights and property in that Island. It is, therefore, important that you keep in mind this fact so that all your conduct may be guided and inspired by that considera-

tion. Although the rule you are to bear is called military, yet it is not to be exerted for military purposes, but in the interest of order and peace and for the preservation and promotion of the rights of liberty and property and the protection of the people in the resumption of all the arts and avocations of peaceful life.

The government you are to administer is intended to take the place, for the time being, of the former civil administration, and should be so conducted as to foster and encourage all classes in peaceful pursuits by throwing around them the powerful arm of our military protection in order to secure a wise, just, and equal administration of law.

The law which you will have to enforce is the civil and criminal codes that prevailed prior to the extinction of Spanish sovereignty, except so far as you may need to modify it for the efficient execution of the purposes for which this government assumed and maintains the temporary sovereignty of Cuba.

I therefore suggest that you take advantage of every favorable opportunity to impress upon the people the fact that the rule of the United States is for the benefit of the inhabitants of Cuba in furtherance and continuation of the humane purpose with which this country interfered to put an end to Spanish oppression and misrule; that the object

of the United States is to give protection to the people, to allow them to resume the pursuits of peace, to build up waste plantations, to resume commercial traffic, to restore confidence, and to enjoy full protection in the exercise of all their civil and religious rights; that to this end, the powerful protection of the United States Government will be exerted, and every possible provision made, to carry out these objects through the channels of civil administration, although necessarily under military control.

The people of Cuba, without regard to previous affiliations, should be invited and urged to coöperate in these objects by the exercise of moderation, conciliation, and prudent industry, and a quick and hearty acquiescence in the system of government which we shall maintain.

They should be fully heard and advised with whenever they come with petitions or remonstrances, and frankly and kindly treated in the disposition of all matters which they submit for your action or decision; and if their desires cannot be complied with, they should have the grounds of refusal fully and frankly explained to them, so far as is consistent with the public interest.

I advise you to mingle with the leading men of all parties in social and public functions, so far as a

prudent regard for the dignity of your position will permit, and to avail yourself of such occasions to establish a relation of mutual confidence between them and you, and to produce in their minds a sentiment of appreciation of the beneficent purposes which this country has towards the people of Cuba.

You will find, no doubt, that there are factions and parties between whom strong jealousy and deep-rooted hostility exist; seek to turn jealousy into emulation, and to unite all in a common effort to build up the country and restore prosperity.

Avoid giving offense to any particular faction, and let all understand that we are working for the good of the whole body of the inhabitants.

Show a ready sympathy in all things that truly concern the welfare of the Island, and especially in any effort to advance the comfort and prosperity of the destitute classes.

Encourage all movements for reform in municipal administration especially such as relate to sanitation and education. But it should be early made manifest that official corruption will not be tolerated, and those who betray public trust will be surely punished.

All acts of official oppression or extortion should be sternly dealt with and the poor or ignorant should be especially protected in this regard.

It should be your especial care to see that the ad-

ministration of justice in the courts is pure and impartial; that persons shall not be detained in prison except upon some specific charge of crime, and that trial in criminal cases shall be speedy.

It is my desire that all possible precautions shall be taken to prevent the commission of depredations of any sort by our own troops. Unauthorized invasions of private houses, stores, or other places of business, as well as acts tending to wound or excite the feelings of the inhabitants, should be suppressed firmly, and sternly if need be. Our troops ought to set an example of order, moderation, and good behavior which shall tend to increase the respect of the Cubans for American authority.

It will be of advantage, I believe, if you will consult with your subordinate general officers from time to time, and keep them advised of the general policy you are pursuing, and thus secure uniformity of purpose and action throughout different sections of the Island. And lastly, so far as you can accomplish it, let your government be a government of law, not one of military force. Be stern and summary where those qualities are necessary, but let moderation, kindness, leniency, and adherence to the forms and rules that pertain to civil government be the characteristics of our rule while we continue to govern this people.

Quoting from my message of December 5, 1898: —

“It is important that our relations with this people shall be of the most friendly character and our commercial relations close and reciprocal. It should be our duty to assist in every proper way to build up the waste places of the Island, encourage the industry of the people, and assist them to form a government which shall be free and independent, thus realizing the best aspirations of the Cuban people.”

(Signed)

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

General Brooke arrived in Havana on the 28th of December. The formal ceremonies of taking over the government from the Spanish officials were conducted in orderly fashion, on January 1. Some suspicion of the good intentions of the Americans was aroused by the refusal of the new governor to permit the Cuban soldiers to take part in the celebration. General Brooke preferred to wait until their excitement had cooled off because of the danger to life and property, but on February 24, their commander-in-chief, General Gomez, was received in Havana with the greatest courtesy, a palace, the summer residence of the governor-general, was placed at his disposal, and for several months he remained there with his staff and escort as a guest of the United

States. The conditions in the island upon the evacuation of the Spanish troops are best told in the words of General Fitzhugh Lee: —

“Business of all sorts was suspended. Agricultural operations had ceased: large sugar estates, with their enormous and expensive machinery, were destroyed; houses burned; stock driven off for consumption by the Spanish troops or killed. There was scarcely an ox left to pull a plough, had there been a plough left. Not a pig had been left in the pen; not a hen to lay an egg for the poor, destitute people who still held on to life, most of them sick, weary, and weak. Miles and miles of country, uninhabited either by the human race or domestic animals, was visible to the eye on every side. The great fertile Island of Cuba in some places resembled an ash-pile: in others the dreary desert. . . . Chaos, confusion, doubt, and uncertainty filled with apprehension the minds of the Cubans, who for the first time had been relieved of the cruel care of those who for centuries controlled their country and their destiny.”¹

A large proportion of the population were starving, and to afford immediate relief the War Department issued supplies amounting to 5,493,000 rations, at a cost of \$1,417,554.07. The distribution of this food, which came in shiploads from the United States,

¹ From the *Report of General Fitzhugh Lee*, September 19, 1899.

began to dissipate the doubts of the Cubans regarding the good intentions of our Government. Work on the sugar plantations and tobacco-fields was found for those able to accept it, though some of the soldiers were restrained by their officers. The disbandment of 48,000 Cuban soldiers was finally accomplished, though not without some quarreling among the Cubans themselves; and each soldier who had seen service prior to the 17th of July, 1898, was paid \$75, this bounty costing the United States Government \$2,547,750.

The progress of Cuba during the year 1899 was a marvel of recuperation and reorganization. Sanitary measures were enforced in Havana and Santiago that kept the yellow fever in check to an extent never known before and promised the early extinction of the plague. Medicines were freely supplied where needed. The sick were cared for and restored to health. In six months over \$2,000,000 of the revenues of the island were devoted to sanitation, the hospitals, and charity. Already the death-rate had been greatly lowered. The people went to work, rebuilding their homes and repairing the roads, the railways, and bridges, while thousands of the soldiers of Gomez found profitable employment in the tobacco-fields where the quick-growing crop enabled them speedily to recover some of their losses.

One of the most remarkable changes was the reorganization of the schools, particularly in the development of primary education. Before the war there were practically no schoolhouses, such schools as there were being held in the residences of the teachers. The enrollment of pupils in the entire island was only 36,306, and probably less than half of that number actually attended school. There were few books and practically no maps, desks, or other appliances. The war broke up even this poor provision for education, and in December, 1899, a year after the peace, there were only 21,435 pupils enrolled. Six months later the enrollment had increased to 143,120. The sum of \$150,000 was appropriated from the insular revenues for textbooks, desks, and supplies, and later one hundred thousand full sets of such material were purchased, upon a single order, at a cost of about three quarters of a million dollars. All over the island the old Spanish barracks were turned into schoolrooms. The total appropriations for educational purposes in 1900 were about four and a half million dollars. A striking instance of American interest in the education of the Cubans is the fact that a fund of seventy thousand dollars was raised by Harvard University and its friends, by means of which 1281 Cuban teachers attended a summer school of instruction in

Cambridge, Massachusetts, returning to their homes "full of new ideas and of zeal for the educational work in which they had found so much sympathy and encouragement."¹

The quick regeneration of Cuba was the result of the President's firmness in demanding absolute control while the work was in progress. From the first he had protested against a premature recognition of Cuban independence. He was a firm believer in the Teller Resolution and in his message of December, 1899, reminded Congress of it adding: "The pledge² contained in this resolution is of the highest honorable obligation and must be sacredly kept." In the same message he said: "We must see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name; a perfect entity, not a hasty experiment having within itself the elements of failure. Our mission . . . is not to be fulfilled by turning adrift any loosely framed commonwealth to face the vicissitudes which too often attend weaker states, whose natural wealth and abundant resources are offset by the incongruities of their political organization and the recurring occasions for internal rivalries to sap their strength and dissipate their energies."

The political "incongruities" and "internal rival-

¹ From *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, Nov. 30, 1900.

² See *ante*, p. 33.

ries" which the President feared were not slow in developing. After taking a census of the island, the War Department first provided for municipal elections and then for a Constitutional Convention. In due course thirty-one delegates were elected, and on the 5th of November, 1900, met in Havana. The military governor, General Leonard Wood, who succeeded General Brooke in December, in calling the convention to order, reminded the delegates of their duty, first "to frame and adopt a Constitution for Cuba," and second, to formulate a statement of what, in their judgment, should be the relation between Cuba and the United States. The delegates, apparently, interpreted the Teller Resolution to mean that the United States would not be particular as to the conditions of sovereignty, but would hand over the government to the people of Cuba the moment a constitution was adopted. Accordingly, the second part of General Wood's admonition was ignored and the session of the United States Congress seemed likely to expire on the 4th of March without any definite agreement as to the future relations between the two Republics.

President McKinley met the crisis with characteristic wisdom and discernment, coupled with a fine example of that rare quality of self-effacement which was one of the elements of his power. On

February 9, 1901, an official letter was sent to General Wood, through the War Department, outlining the action which the United States would expect from the Convention. This letter, written by Secretary Root and somewhat modified by President McKinley, paved the way for the famous "Platt Amendment." In stating the vital interest of the United States in Cuban independence, the letter used these significant words: —

"The United States has, and will always have, the most vital interest in the preservation of the independence which she has secured for Cuba, and in preserving the people of that island from the domination and control of any foreign power whatever. The preservation of that independence by a country so small as Cuba — so incapable, as she must always be, to contend by force against the great powers of the world — must depend upon her strict performance of international obligations, upon her giving due protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all other countries within her borders, and upon her never contracting any public debt which in the hands of the citizens of foreign powers shall constitute an obligation she is unable to meet. The United States has, therefore, not merely a moral obligation arising from her destruction of Spanish authority in Cuba and the obligations of



Win. Root

the Treaty of Paris for the establishment of a stable and adequate government in Cuba, but it has a substantial interest in the maintenance of such a government."

The expectations of the United States, as the antecedent condition of the grant of independence, were then clearly stated: —

The people of Cuba should desire to have incorporated in her fundamental law provisions in substance as follows: —

1. That no government organized under the constitution shall be deemed to have authority to enter into any treaty or engagement with any foreign power which may tend to impair or interfere with the independence of Cuba, or to confer upon such foreign power any special right or privilege without the consent of the United States.

2. That no government organized under the Constitution shall have authority to assume or contract any public debt in excess of the capacity of the ordinary revenues of the island after defraying the current expenses of government to pay the interest.

3. That upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to the government established under the new Constitution, Cuba consents that the United States reserve and retain the right of intervention for the

preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a stable government, adequately protecting life, property, and individual liberty, and discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States and now assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

4. That all the acts of the military government, and all rights acquired thereunder, shall be valid and shall be maintained and protected.

5. That to facilitate the United States in the performance of such duties as may devolve upon her under the foregoing provisions and for her own defense, the United States may acquire and hold the title to land for naval stations, and maintain the same at certain specified points.

These provisions may not, it is true, prove to be in accord with the conclusions which Congress may ultimately reach when that body comes to consider the subject, but as, until Congress has acted, the Executive must necessarily within its own sphere of action be controlled by its own judgment, you should now be guided by the views above expressed.

It is not our purpose at this time to discuss the cost of our intervention and occupation, or advancement of money for disarmament, or our assumption under the Treaty of Paris of the claims of our citizens

against Spain for losses which they had incurred in Cuba. These can well be the subject of later consideration. (Signed) ELIHU ROOT.

Meanwhile the President was in close consultation with Senator Orville H. Platt, of Connecticut, then Chairman of the Committee on Cuban Relations and a statesman for whose ability and influence he entertained a profound respect. He mentioned his desire to have incorporated in the statutes of the United States a definite statement of the future policy of the Government toward Cuba. Senator Platt promptly complied, and on the 11th submitted to the President the following "Provisions which should be incorporated in the Cuban Constitution":—

I. Ratification of the acts of the government of military occupancy, and the protection of interests acquired thereunder.

II. The right of intervention to maintain the independence of Cuba, for the protection of life and property therein, its permanent pacification, and the stability of its government.

III. Naval stations, and a force necessary for their maintenance.

IV. Supervision of treaties with foreign powers.

V. Supervision of the bonded debt of the Island.

With this memorandum as a basis, Senator Platt,

in collaboration with Senator John C. Spooner, drew up the first draft of the proposed legislation. This was approved by the President, and agreed upon, with slight changes, by the Committee.¹

In accordance with the President's wishes, this legislation was incorporated into an amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill. McKinley claimed no credit for his Administration, although it was a great achievement. He accomplished his purpose and his share in it was never known.²

¹ The original memorandum of Senator Platt, and the draft of the proposed amendment, with various suggestions in the handwriting of the President, are preserved among the papers in the possession of Mr. Cortelyou.

² The text of the Platt Amendment is as follows:—

"In fulfillment of the declaration contained in the joint resolution approved April 20, 1898, entitled 'For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and Government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect,'—the President is hereby authorized to 'leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people,' so soon as a government shall have been established in said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:—

"1. That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

"2. That said Government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make a reasonable sinking-fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which,

This significant amendment, which has always borne the name of Senator Platt, was passed by the Senate on the 27th of February, 1901, and by the House on the 1st of March. It was a tangible expression of that sense of responsibility which had actuated the President from the first and which could not be satisfied with merely making Cuba free. It

the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall be inadequate.

"3. That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

"4. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

"5. That the Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

"6. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

"7. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

"8. That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States."

must be a genuine freedom, based upon law and order and self-restraint, the liberty of beneficent government and not of uncontrolled license; and above all, it must be a liberty whose permanence should be guaranteed by the powerful support of the United States. As in the case of the Philippines, it was obvious that no such guaranty could be made unless coupled with control. The Platt Amendment, therefore, was the necessary corollary of the Teller Resolution, redeeming the promise of the latter by making certain an independence of a broad and enduring character.

The Cuban Constitutional Convention included the terms of the Platt Amendment in their Constitution on June 12, 1901, and under the skillful legal direction of Secretary Root, the sovereignty of the United States was handed over to the new Cuban Government on the 20th of May, 1902, with no more confusion than would be seen in Washington when, under ordinary circumstances, a change of administration occurs. There was "no break in the continuity of legal obligations, of rights of property and contract, of jurisdiction, or of administrative action."¹

The wisdom of President McKinley's policy became apparent five years later when the first Presi-

¹ From the *Report of the Secretary of War* (1902).

dent of the Cuban Republic, General Tomas Estrada Palma, found himself confronted by a formidable insurrection, and, as the only means of preventing anarchy, appealed to the United States for intervention, on the 12th of September, 1906. President Roosevelt met the situation by proclaiming a provisional government, with the Secretary of War, William H. Taft, acting as provisional governor until succeeded by Charles E. Magoon. After a little more than two years of intervention the reins of authority were transferred to General Gomez, as President, on the 28th of January, 1909, and the Cuban Government was again set upon its feet.

The Government of Porto Rico was a far less complicated problem than that of Cuba. The American occupation began October 18, 1898, and was gladly welcomed by all classes. Self-government was desired, but independence was not expected. Under the sovereignty of the United States the people believed that the wrongs of centuries would be righted and they looked forward to a new era of prosperity under the new conditions. They desired increased facilities for education, and, perhaps, above all else, the opportunity for industrial and commercial development, which, they hoped, would be provided by a territorial form of government, with free and reciprocal commerce with the ports of the United

States. The Administration of President McKinley desired to give the Porto Ricans all these privileges. Secretary Root said, in his annual report: —

“It is plain that it is essential to the prosperity of the Island that she should receive substantially the same treatment at our hands as she received from Spain while a Spanish colony, and that the markets of the United States should be opened to her as were the markets of Spain and Cuba before the transfer of allegiance. Congress has the legal right to regulate the customs duties between the United States and Porto Rico as it pleases; but the highest considerations of justice and good faith demand that we should not disappoint the confident expectation of sharing in our prosperity with which the people of Porto Rico so gladly transferred their allegiance to the United States, and that we should treat the interests of this people as our own; and I wish most strongly to urge that the customs duties between Porto Rico and the United States be removed.”

In his annual message of December 5, 1899, President McKinley emphasized the same point. “It must be borne in mind,” he said, “that since the cession Porto Rico has been denied the principal markets she had long enjoyed and our tariffs have been continued against her products as when she was under Spanish sovereignty. The markets of

Spain are closed to her products except upon terms to which the commerce of all nations is subjected. The Island of Cuba, which used to buy her cattle and tobacco without customs duties, now imposes the same duties upon these products as from any other country entering her ports. She has, therefore, lost her free intercourse with Spain and Cuba, without any compensating benefits in this market. Her coffee was little known and not in use by our people, and therefore there was no demand here for this, one of her chief products. The markets of the United States should be opened up to her products. Our plain duty is to abolish all customs tariffs between the United States and Porto Rico and give her products free access to our markets."

The people of the United States generally acquiesced in the judgment of the Administration. Congress, however, had different ideas, a majority of the President's party insisting upon the imposition of duties. For a time there was great excitement, and one distinguished Republican Senator exclaimed, in an agony of spirit, "a few weeks ago we were united and invincible; now we are divided and in danger of defeat!" The cry was raised that the duties were to be levied in the interests of the trusts. President McKinley could have secured immediate free trade with Porto Rico by pushing the measure

through Congress with the aid of Democratic votes. But he decided, instead, to change his policy. To an intimate friend, he explained: "We need party harmony on the greater and more important question of the Philippines. I know I shall be charged with weakness, but I prefer to endure any such charges rather than face the future with a disunited party." In his quiet way the President sent for Mr. Dingley and other members of the House Ways and Means Committee, and privately handed them the draft of a compromise. The bill, based upon this suggestion, in its final form provided a temporary duty of fifteen per cent of the Dingley rates, all revenues to be used exclusively for the benefit of Porto Rico, and to cease as soon as the new local government to be established by the operation of the act should provide and put into operation a system of local taxation to meet the necessities of the Government of Porto Rico. In any event the tariff was to cease on the 1st of March, 1902. The bill, which became known as the "Foraker Act," was duly passed, and was approved by the President on April 12, 1900. Civil government was established on May 1, with Charles H. Allen, of Massachusetts, as governor. The new legislative assembly was elected in November and convened on December 3. Free trade with the United States was proclaimed on the 25th of

July, 1901, and again the President's will triumphed, with only a brief delay, while the solidarity of the party was maintained.

Much was said, about this time, on the question, "Does the Constitution follow the flag?" It was claimed that free trade between the States would be automatically extended to annexed territory by the operation of the Constitution. Many lawsuits of importance hinged upon this question, and were taken to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision. That tribunal, on May 27, 1901, sustained the position of the Administration and of Congress as to the Constitutionality of the so-called "Foraker Act" of April 12. The opinion of the majority of the court made the important distinction, that "Porto Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clause of the Constitution."

CHAPTER XXXI

CHINA

THE summer of 1900 brought a new train of anxieties to the Administration, the burden of which fell with unusual heaviness upon the shoulders of the President because of the serious illness, during the period of greatest strain, of the efficient Secretary of State, John Hay. Disturbances arose in China which required, first, swift action to protect the lives and property of foreign residents and, later, skillful diplomacy to preserve the integrity of China herself. It afforded a new opportunity to show to the world a "magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence."¹ McKinley pursued a policy marked by moderation and self-restraint in sharp contrast to the rapacity exhibited by some of the European nations. The close of the Spanish War found the United States stronger in the family of nations than ever before. The former coolness of Great Britain had been changed to a warm friendship. The Treaty of Paris had been signed with the tacit agreement of all Europe to let the United States and Spain settle

¹ See *ante*, p. 192.

their own quarrel. The firmness of President McKinley in insisting upon control of the Philippines and Cuba, pending permanent settlement of their ultimate destiny, had won for him the respect of all the nations. The growing importance of the Far-Western States, the recently discovered riches of Alaska, the prospective opening of a waterway through the Isthmus of Panama, the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines, and the opportunity for enormous extensions of commercial enterprise in the Pacific, had brought the United States nearer to the coasts of Asia than the original colonies were to the mother country. As with the Philippines, a problem not of our seeking was thrust upon us. Whether we liked it or not, the country had outgrown the "period of exclusiveness," and although the injunction of Washington, to avoid entangling alliances or interferences in the political affairs of foreign states, was still scrupulously observed, a certain responsibility to stand shoulder to shoulder with the more enlightened nations for the development of the world had been assumed and could no more be avoided than a boy of twenty-one can escape the responsibility of manhood.

Following the close of the war between China and Japan in 1894-95, the nations of Europe suddenly developed an appetite for some of the choice morsels

to be had for the asking along the Chinese coast. Prior to 1897, the only foreign possessions were those of the British at Hongkong and the Island of Macao owned by the Portuguese. It is true that by the treaty of peace Japan had acquired the Island of Formosa and a part of the Liaotung Peninsula which commands on the north the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, the gateway to Peking; but the jealousy of Germany, Russia, and France intervened to prevent the acquisition of the latter and so the mainland remained intact. In the latter year there were twenty-two open ports in which about ten thousand Europeans and Americans were allowed to live and enjoy the right of owning property under conditional titles, of governing themselves and of exercising special privileges in judicial matters. This, however, was only an appetizer. The next three years were marked by a scramble for concessions.

In November two German missionaries were murdered and in retaliation the Imperial Government promptly seized the port of Kiaochau and held it until the Chinese granted a lease of the port and adjacent territory for ninety-nine years, together with the right to German subjects of exploiting the whole province of Shantung with railroad and mining enterprises. In the spring of the following year the murder of a "French" missionary

— who was probably a Chinaman — gave France an important railroad concession. By summer time the battle of concessions, as Lord Salisbury described it, was on in full force, Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium securing valuable rights. Then they began to covet territory. Russia wanted Talienwan and Port Arthur and got them both, against the protest of Great Britain. The latter demanded and received Wei-hai-wei, on the opposite side of the Strait of Pechili. Thus the merry war for the partition of China went on until December, 1898, when the Chinese Government called a halt.

At this juncture the United States stepped in to exercise its newly acquired international influence, and the Secretary of State, John Hay, accomplished the most brilliant achievement of his career. Notes were addressed to the Governments of Germany, Great Britain, and Russia, suggesting the common agreement of these nations to the policy of “the open door” for China. That is, the nations having certain “spheres of influence” in China were to refrain from interference with the treaty ports or the special interests of other powers, to permit Chinese duties to be collected by the Chinese Government, and to make no discriminations against other nationalities in harbor duties or railroad charges. Subsequently, similar notes were sent to France, Italy,

and Japan. Great Britain was the first to respond, consenting in case all the others did. France, Japan, Russia, Italy, and Germany followed in the order named — each more anxious to have the others join than to comply themselves, but consenting because there was nothing else to do.

While these negotiations were in progress trouble of another kind was brewing. An English missionary, a Mr. Brooks, was murdered in Shantung, by a secret organization the Chinese name of which meant that its purpose was to “uphold the cause of righteousness by force.” It was translated “the Patriotic Harmony Fists,” and this led to the nickname “Boxers.” Its members practiced a grotesque sort of gymnastics, with weird incantations, supposed to make them impervious to sword and bullet. With a wild superstition calculated to appeal to the poor and uneducated masses they proclaimed that all “foreign devils” brought bad luck. Although the society had existed more than one hundred years, during a greater part of which it was under an imperial interdict, the German seizure of Kiaochau brought about a sudden recrudescence. The Boxers not only swarmed throughout the province of Shantung, where the German invasion precipitated the movement, but spread into the more northern provinces and established their camps in the district

about Tientsin and Peking. The missionaries, and especially their native converts, began to feel the full force of the wave of violence and incendiarism. Chapels were burned and native Christians killed by the score. The Chinese Government issued open proclamations against the Boxers and secret edicts encouraging them. The Dowager Empress, who, with the Manchu princes surrounding her, was then in full control, saw excellent possibilities in the use of the Boxers as militia, in case of trouble with foreign powers. Even the open proclamations were ambiguous, describing both Boxers and Christians as "people of our country" to be regarded "with equal kindness," and attributing the outrages to "outlaws and rebels who have joined the society." To make matters worse, Prince Tuan, the father of the heir-apparent, was made a member of the Tsung-li-yamen, or Foreign Office. Tuan was notoriously a patron of the Boxers and intensely anti-foreign in his sympathies.

Under these conditions the American Embassy at Peking soon found itself in a dangerous situation. On May 29, Edwin H. Conger, the American Minister cabled: —

"Boxers increasing. Nine Methodist converts brutally murdered at Pachow. The movement has developed into open rebellion. Chinese Government

is trying, but apparently is unable to suppress it. Many soldiers disloyal. Several railroad bridges and stations near Peking burned. Legations have ordered guards."

This was followed by two other messages, still more alarming: —

"June 4, 1900.

"Outside of Peking murders and persecution by Boxers increasing. Paotingfu railway temporarily abandoned; work on Peking-Hankow line stopped. All foreigners fled. Chinese Government cannot or will not suppress. Troops do not attack Boxers. Relations between the factions of Imperial advisers very much strained. Situation very critical."

"June 5, 1900.

"Situation worse. It is possible we may be besieged in Peking, with railways and telegraphs cut. In that case I ask, as my colleagues are doing, that necessary instructions be given Admiral concert with other chiefs of squadron at Taku to take measures warranted by the situation to eventually deliver Peking."

On the 11th Mr. Conger wrote to the Secretary of State: —

"... The Chinese Government has done nothing

towards suppressing the 'Boxers' except to send their friends out to parley with them.

"They have, ever since the 6th instant, had absolute possession and control of the whole country surrounding the city. The railroad has been open but one day. They have killed many native Christians, at least forty belonging to the American missions, and burning numerous chapels. On yesterday they burned the college of the American Board Mission at Tung-chow together with all their homes, from which on the 7th instant all had been compelled to flee to this city, leaving practically everything behind them. This was done by the Chinese soldiers themselves, or else in their presence and without their opposition. They have burned the summer residences of the British Legation and all the houses of the American Board, Methodist, and Presbyterian Missions at the Western Hills. On the 9th were burned all the buildings of the foreign race-course just outside the city walls. . . . On the 7th it was thought best, by all, to gather in the Methodist compound, which is the largest, the easiest to defend, and the nearest to the Legation. There are now seventy Americans there, fifty-one of whom are women and children. They have a guard of twenty marines, and the missionaries have some twenty guns and revolvers besides. If it becomes necessary they can all

get inside of a large church and defend themselves against quite a formidable siege.

“We have assembled in the Legation compound thirty-two Americans, twenty-five of whom are women and children, with a guard of thirty-five marines and a rapid-fire gun. . . . The probability, of which I telegraphed on the 4th, is now a fact. We are besieged in Peking, entirely cut off from outside communications and our deliverance depends on the concerted action of the naval squadrons at Taku in coming to our relief. The entrance into the city of these additional guards may be opposed by the Chinese army. If so, it may become necessary to wait until considerable reinforcements shall arrive, but they can arrive very soon. . . . At present we are only concerned for the safety and deliverance of the people here, but very soon we will be confronted with the problem of some sort of reconstruction for this farcical Government.

“Its general imbecility has recently been evidenced in so many ways, its total incapacity so clearly proven in its failure to arrest the spread of this unarmed and unorganized ‘Boxer’ conflagration, and its political and financial credit so irretrievably shaken by it all, that some radical changes must be effected, some adequate guarantees given for the future, or else it must be abandoned.”

Persistent efforts to obtain relief were made by the foreign legations in Peking, through appeals to the Tsung-li-Yamen, but that body was already under the anti-foreign influence of Tuan and made only a pretense of response. An appeal for more guards was sent by the foreign ministers to the ships, which, early in June, began to assemble at Taku, and the first relief expedition started on June 9, but its progress was blocked by the destruction of the railroad and the fierce resistance of the Boxers, backed by Chinese soldiery. The foreign admirals at Taku, in an attempt to make a landing in the early morning hours of June 18, were fired upon by the Chinese, and the battle which ensued resulted in the complete reduction of the Taku forts. Admiral Louis Kempff, the American naval commander, although instructed to act with other powers for the protection of American interests, did not take part in the attack upon Taku, on the ground that the United States was not at war with China, and that such a demonstration might tend to arouse more concentrated opposition and prove an obstacle to the relief of the legations. This proved to be the fact, and although Tientsin was captured on the 14th of July, the allied forces were compelled to wait for reinforcements and did not begin the final march to Peking until three weeks later.

The legations were completely isolated on the 19th of June. On that day the Tsung-li-Yamen ordered all the ministers to leave Peking within twenty-four hours. The latter addressed a communication to the Yamen, asking for a prolongation of the time. Receiving no reply, Baron von Ketteler, the German Minister, set out to make a vigorous protest in behalf of the Government. On his way he passed a squad of soldiers, and was shot dead in his sedan chair by the officer in command. Thereupon attacks were made upon the foreign ministers, who hastily concentrated their guards, and took refuge, with the missionaries and other Americans and Europeans, within the enclosure of the British Legation. Trenches were dug, barricades built, and preparations made to withstand a siege. The Chinese burned neighboring buildings including the legations of Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Holland, and at frequent intervals poured a hail of artillery and rifle fire upon the hastily constructed fortress.

Meanwhile the Administration had no word from Mr. Conger and the greatest alarm and anxiety were felt. The President was at Canton for the summer and kept in daily touch with his Cabinet by means of the long-distance telephone. Some of these conversations, stenographic reports of which were carefully made and preserved by Secretary Cortelyou, may

be here introduced as showing how the situation was discussed.

Colonel Montgomery to Mr. Cortelyou

July 3, 1900.

*Col. Montgomery:*¹ I have a communication from the Secretary of State which he intends to send to our representatives at foreign courts and he wants the President to have it and get his approval immediately. This is the document: —

“In this critical posture of affairs in China, it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857, of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce and of protection of the lives and property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extra-territorial treaty rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens, we propose to hold the responsible authors to the utmost accountability. We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power

¹ Colonel Benjamin F. Montgomery, in charge of the telegraph office in the White House.

to protect foreign life and property, we regard them as representing the Chinese people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship. The purpose of the President is as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers, —

“First, In opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger;

“Secondly, In affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property;

“Thirdly, In guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests;

“And fourthly, In aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result, but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

“You will communicate the purport of this instruction to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.” ¹

¹ Printed with the verbal changes as finally agreed upon.

The Secretary of State says: "The situation has been very seriously considered." He thinks the affair is very critical, but as yet he hardly believes, with what information has been received by the Department, that it is necessary to send more troops. He hopes within a day or two to have something more definite. He is afraid the legations in Peking are doomed, and this statement which he forwards he thinks it would be well to send to all the Ambassadors, showing our position and purposes to the world.

The Secretary of the Navy does not think at this time there is anything more to be done except to hurry forward our troops. He expresses no opinion as to the advisability of sending more at this time. He says he has read the statement of the Secretary of State and he fully endorses it; says it is a good document, well expressed, and quite the proper thing to announce. The Secretary of the Navy rather leans toward sending troops, but he does not express himself, leaving that rather to the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War says the Secretary of State is not in favor of sending more troops just at this time. He (the Secretary of War) would like to send another regiment, but he does not feel that he would like to take a regiment from MacArthur. He believes we should send another regiment; that the sentiment

of the country and the conditions seem to warrant it. He believes we will be blamed for not doing so.

Colonel Montgomery says further: "From the way things look the situation seems to be this: The Secretary of State is not fully decided whether any further action should be taken now or not. I am inclined to believe that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy rather favor the sending of troops, although all seem to think they would wait a little while longer to hear. This appears to be the result of their conference.

"The latest received is as follows: —

"A dispatch this morning from Goodnow, Shanghai, to the Secretary of State, says that a runner on the 25th says that the British, German, and Italian Legations were standing. The diplomats and missionaries in the British Legation were under rifle fire.

"The Secretary of State thinks that the legations, if under fire, make the situation very critical. They seem to be surrounded."

Mr. Forster to Secretary Cortelyou

July 5, 1900.

Mr. Forster: The Secretary of State has prepared a telegram to send to the German Emperor, and he wants the President to know of it and make any

changes he thinks should be made. This is the telegram: "The confirmation of the murder of Your Majesty's Minister in Peking and the only too real apprehension that the other foreign representatives may have shared his fate, leads me to tender to Your Majesty and to the family of Baron Ketteler my profound condolences, and to express the purpose of this Government to continue its own operations toward the extension of stability and order in China. *William McKinley.*"

This was submitted to the President. The President requested me to say to the Secretary of State [and Mr. Forster was so directed—to make it as a suggestion] that he believed it would be well to omit the words from and including "and" after the word "Peking" down to and including the word "fate"; also add after the word "condolences" "and those of the American people." And omit, after the word "condolences," beginning and including the word "and" down to and including the word "China," so that the telegram would read: "The confirmation of the murder of Your Majesty's Minister in Peking leads me to tender to Your Majesty and to the family of Baron Ketteler, my profound condolences and those of the American people. *William McKinley.*"

The President and the Secretary of War

Secretary Root: Good-morning. I hope you are well this morning.

The President: Yes, I am quite well, except that I am very much distressed about affairs in China.

Secretary Root: I got your letter by Dawes. I am arranging for troops as rapidly as possible. I do not see how we can send them from Manila, in view of what MacArthur says.

The President: I heard very well what you said up to the point of "in view of what MacArthur says."

Secretary Root: Do you recall the dispatch?

The President: Yes.

Secretary Root: I do not think we can disregard that.

The President: Well, my feeling about that was this, which I fairly expressed in my letter, that if the risk was greater in one place than in the other, if really we could do any good by saving a few days in transporting troops from Manila to China, a few days meant very much, we ought to take the risk. That was all there was of it. For example, I do not know that it would do any good, the matter of a few days or a few weeks. You have more information than I have on that point. And things are likely to change so quickly that it is very difficult really to

determine what is best. I feel that we ought to observe MacArthur's wishes, and yet I feel, on the other hand, if the dispatch of a regiment from Manila would rescue any of our people, we ought to take the chances. And recalling what you said at the beginning of this talk, I think the sending of troops from here is an excellent thing if we have any to send.

Secretary Root: I have withdrawn three regiments from Cuba and two thirds of a regiment from Porto Rico and that will enable me to send regiments from here to the Philippines.

The President: That is to say, you can send three or four regiments from this country after the Cuba regiments get here?

Secretary Root: Yes. The Navy Department has telegraphed Kempff to confer with the other powers and advise us what their views are as to the total number of troops necessary. This dispatch was sent on Tuesday, so I understand. It was sent without my knowledge, but I am waiting with some anxiety for the reply.

The President: It has not come, I suppose?

Secretary Root: No, no reply has come. I only knew of the dispatch through Secretary Hay. I cannot learn of any answer being received. Of course, when the reply comes, it may throw light on the whole situation. Immediately upon its coming, I

will communicate with you. We have nothing to do but to press forward the movement of the troops so that everything will be ready to do as quickly as possible whatever we find necessary.

The President: That is right. I understand that you will dispatch troops from here just as rapidly as possible, and in the order stated, to meet any emergency or any necessity that might arise. Do you hear anything new from China?

Secretary Root: Nothing at all.

The President was quick to see the advantage of utilizing the troops and ships stationed in the Philippines, and of hurrying aid to the legation in China, yet his directions were invariably given as suggestions and never seemed to be dictatorial. The same spirit was shown in his way of "editing," by telephone or otherwise, the official dispatches of the Secretary of State.

The policy of the United States, as outlined in Secretary Hay's dispatch of July 3, was further defined in the President's instructions of July 19 to General Adna R. Chaffee, through the War Department: —

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON, *July 19, 1900.*

GENERAL CHAFFEE,

Care Hyde, Nagasaki.

Secretary War directs that you proceed at once with transport Grant, Sixth Cavalry, and marines to Taku, China, and take command of American land forces which will be an independent command known as the China Relief Expedition. . . . Confer freely with Admiral in command of fleet. Complete understanding and coöperation between the two services is enjoined by the President and message to that effect has been sent Admiral in command naval force. Reports now indicate that American Minister with all the legation have been destroyed in Peking. Chinese representative here, however, insists to the contrary, and there is, therefore, a hope which you will not lose sight of until certainty is absolute. It is the desire of this Government to maintain its relations of friendship with the part of Chinese people and Chinese officials not concerned in outrages on Americans. Among these we consider Li Hung Chang, just appointed Viceroy of Chi-li. You will to the extent of your power aid the Government of China or any part thereof in repressing such outrages and in rescuing Americans, and in protecting American citizens and interests, and wherever

Chinese Government fails to render such protection, you will do all in your power to supply it. Confer freely with commanders of other national forces, act concurrently with them, and seek entire harmony of action along the lines of similar purpose and interest. There should be full and free conference as to operations before they are entered upon. You are at liberty to agree with them from time to time as to a common official direction of the various forces in their combined operations, preserving, however, the integrity of your own American Division, ready to be used as a separate and complete organization. Much must be left to your wise discretion and that of the Admiral. At all times report fully and freely to this Department your wants and views. The President has to-day appointed you Major-General of Volunteers. Qualify and mail oath of office. Acknowledge.

CORBIN.

The fears for the safety of the American Legation expressed in this letter were partly relieved the following day, by the receipt through Mr. Wu Ting-fang, the Chinese Minister, of a dispatch from Mr. Conger as follows: —

“For one month we have been besieged in British Legation under continued shot and shell from Chi-

nese troops. Quick relief only can prevent general massacre."

On the same day Minister Wu received an appeal to the President of the United States from the Emperor of China requesting him to "take the initiative in bringing about a concert of the powers for the restoration of order and peace." The preparation of the reply to this message was considered over the long-distance telephone: —

Colonel Montgomery to Secretary Cortelyou

9.20 A.M., Monday, July 23, 1900.

Colonel Montgomery: The Secretary of State desires me to send you the draft of a reply to the Emperor's message, for approval or amendment by the President. The Secretary thinks it ought to be sent as soon as possible if the President concurs, and he wants to know what the President thinks about printing both messages. This is the message: —

"The President of the United States to the Emperor of China, Greeting. I have received Your Majesty's message of the 19th of July and am glad to know that Your Majesty recognizes the fact that the Government and people of the United States desire of China nothing but what is just and equitable. The purpose for which we landed troops in China was the rescue of our Legation from grave

danger and the protection of the lives and property of Americans who were sojourning in China in the enjoyment of rights guaranteed them by treaty and by international law. The same purposes are publicly declared by all the powers which have landed military forces in Your Majesty's empire.

“I am to infer from Your Majesty's letter that the malefactors who have disturbed the peace of China, who have murdered the Minister of Germany and a member of the Japanese Legation, and who now hold besieged in Peking those foreign diplomatists who still survive, have not only not received any favor or encouragement from Your Majesty, but are actually in rebellion against the Imperial authorities. If this be the case, I most solemnly urge upon Your Majesty's Government to give immediate and public assurance whether the diplomatic agents of the powers are alive and if so in what condition. Secondly, to use all the resources in its command to put the diplomatic representatives of the powers in immediate and free communication with their respective Governments and to be removed from danger to their lives and liberties. To place the Imperial authorities of China in communication with the relief expedition so that coöperation would be secured between them for the liberation of the Legations and the restoration of order.

“If these objects are accomplished it is the belief of this Government that no obstacle will be found to exist on the part of the powers to an amicable settlement of all the questions arising out of the recent troubles, and the friendly good offices of this Government will, with the assent of the other powers, be cheerfully placed at Your Majesty’s disposal for that purpose.”

Secretary Cortelyou to Colonel Montgomery

11.20 A.M., July 23, 1900.

Secretary Cortelyou: Unless the Secretary of State sees some reason to the contrary, the President would advise the publication of the two dispatches (one from the Emperor of China, the other the President’s reply). The President concurs in the draft of reply prepared by the Secretary of State, with the following amendments:—

After “Secondly” strike out “to use all the resources in its command,” so that it will read, “Secondly, to put the diplomatic representatives of the powers,” etc.

In paragraph beginning “To place the Imperial authorities of China in communication with the relief expedition” add after “Legations” “the protection of foreign citizens,” so that it will read, “for the liberation of the Legations, the protec-

tion of foreign citizens, and the restoration of order."

Ask the Secretary of State whether "peaceful settlement" is not better than "amicable settlement"; the Secretary of State to use whichever expression he may think best.

The President desires that the dispatch as thus amended may be communicated at once to the Secretary of State and if the Secretary sees no objection to the amendments, the dispatch should be sent at once.

On the 4th of August the allied troops moved out from Tientsin for the relief of Peking. The force consisted of 8000 Japanese, 4800 Russians, 3000 British, 2100 Americans, and 800 French. The story of that march is one of sickening shame. The advance of the Japanese and Russians was like the coming of the Black Plague. Death and desolation followed in its wake. Prosperous towns, peaceful villages, and peasants' huts were alike looted and burned. The inhabitants fled, leaving their household goods behind. Everything of value was stolen and the rest destroyed. Innocent women and children, the aged, the infirm, the helpless, the cripples, and even babes in arms were brutally shot or bayoneted. Thousands of Chinese women committed suicide, under circumstances that justified the deed.

To them nothing could be worse than to fall into the hands of representatives of the so-called "civilized" nations. The river Pei-ho, along which the allies marched, carried down to the sea thousands of dead bodies, mutilated and dishonored. For miles along its course the fields were devastated, dwelling-houses reduced to heaps of rubbish, and every trace of native thrift and industry ruthlessly demolished.¹

To the lasting credit of the American and British troops it must be said that none of this wanton destruction could be charged to their account, unless, perchance, some disreputable fellow may have broken away from restraint. The American Department of War gave positive instructions on this subject a fortnight before the march began. On July 23 General Corbin telegraphed to all American commanders: "Reports here extensive looting in Tientsin. Report immediately whether American troops took part. If so punish severely. Repress sternly. Absolute regard for life and property of noncombatants enjoined by order Secretary of War."

Early in August the German Field Marshal Count von Waldersee was proposed as commander-in-chief of the allied forces in China. The subject was discussed over the long-distance wire, between Washington and Canton, as follows: —

¹ Based on the account of two eye-witnesses.

11.40 A.M., August 10, 1900.

Colonel Montgomery (talking for Secretary Root, who was listening at another telephone): In the memorandum referring to the placing of Count Waldersee in command, it will be recalled that the original dispatch on the subject said that the Emperor of Russia had indicated his consent and also the Japanese Government. For those reasons the German Government say they would like to have early information as to the views of the Government of the United States as to its command and as to the way in which this Government desired to join the forces in Pechili — the forces under Waldersee. Before I read the dispatch the Secretary desires me to say that the French Attaché tells us that the French Government is willing to have Waldersee. The Russian Government has also signified willingness to accept him and also a dispatch has been received this morning that Great Britain has accepted the German Chief Command with the condition that one or more military officers of each nationality shall be detailed to the headquarters of Count Waldersee.

The Secretary has drafted this memorandum which he wishes me to read: —

“The Government of the United States will be much gratified to secure the command of so distinguished and experienced an officer as Count Walder-

see in any combined military operations in which the American troops take part, after the arrival of that officer in China. We will instruct the General commanding the American forces in China accordingly. We assume that any question as to entering upon further combined movements after the present one on Peking and as to the purpose and general character of any such movements must be determined by each of the powers as the question arises. As to the way in which this Government is inclined to join its forces in any combined movements, it seems that each national force should preserve its integrity as a corps or division under the immediate command of its own ranking officer, who will retain the supreme disciplinary power over his command and control his transportation, supplies, and medical services. As a considerable time must elapse before Count Waldersee can reach China and conditions are rapidly changing, it would seem desirable to leave the question of method to be determined in view of the conditions which may then exist."

The President: Tell the Secretary of War that I think well of the Emperor's suggestion to have Count Waldersee in supreme command. Our military views, as I remember, are all stated in your instructions to Chaffee and the extent of our coöperation is well stated in the note to the powers. With

these limitations you can advise the Emperor of my approval.

Colonel Montgomery : The Secretary heard what you said. He asks do you approve of this, Mr. President.

The President : It seems to me that the acceptance of the Emperor's suggestion is not quite as generous as it ought to be. That is, there are so many conditions and qualifications suggested in the note as to really make our acceptance of the present offer contingent upon things that may happen in the future. That is all very well, but is it necessary in our reply to the Emperor to do more than to accept with gratification the services tendered, with the limitations already expressed in the Secretary's instructions to Chaffee and in our note to the powers? I have not read the proposed dispatch; I have only listened to it as it has been read to me. The impression it makes upon me is that it is rather a formal and a doubting acceptance. I might change my views when I come to see it written out. How does it strike the Secretary?

Colonel Montgomery : He wants me to say that the newspapers this morning are stating that the acceptance of Waldersee in having supreme command would involve the power of discipline and disintegration of our forces and the Secretary wanted to guard against that.

The President: I think that's all well. I think that qualification that the discipline of our division or corps shall be left with the American commander is well, but it seems to me that that would almost follow as a matter of fact and it also seems to me that it is very well to have our American commander have charge of the medical and other supplies and transportation. If each division commander is going to act independently in the matter of transportation, there would be great difficulties. Supposing there is a single railroad to be used, who will say what supplies that railroad will carry to-day or to-morrow, all depending, of course, upon the necessities of the several armies and if all ordered the same way? There has got to be coöperative action not only on the field, but also in furnishing supplies, or else I fear we would get into trouble almost immediately.

Colonel Montgomery: The Secretary says that is what he means by the term, "the question of method to be determined by the conditions as they exist when Waldersee arrives."

The President: I will ask Mr. Cortelyou to write out the proposed dispatch so I may see it in its completeness. The impression it made upon me in hearing it read was just as I said, and if we are going to do it it seems to me the more graciously we do it the better and with the fewest ifs and qualifications, of

course all the time guarding the integrity of our own command. That is what we ought to do and it is quite possible that my view will be entirely changed when it is written out.

Colonel Montgomery: The Secretary says we are running against the possibly serious question of the right to surrender the command of American forces to a foreign officer.

The President: We do not surrender the right as I view it. We are only agreeing to concurrent action in which, for efficiency and convenience, it is better to have a single head.

Colonel Montgomery: That is quite understood by the Secretary, but it seems to him that we ought to have in a communication which accepts the command such limitations as to show that command is not absolute.

The President: That is all right.

[Then follows a long discussion of minor points, verbal changes, etc.]

The President: Did Adeë tell you that I had sent a little message to Conger?

The Secretary of War: No.

The President: Night before last, after we had agreed upon our long messages, it occurred to me that it would carry great cheer to Conger to send him word and I sent him a little dispatch in cipher

telling him how much I rejoiced with the whole American people over his safety and that of the other Legations, telling him further that we were doing and would do everything possible to relieve them and also calling his attention to the important dispatch that you had sent that day. It seemed to me that a word of that sort would be very much appreciated by Conger, if he got it.

The Secretary of War: Yes, it would.

The President: I am coming down next week to spend about a week.

The Secretary of War: Would it do for me to ask Conger for special response as to Baroness von Ketteler?

The President: It seems to me that that would be very appropriate.

The Secretary of War: Mr. Ledyard suffers intensely over it.

The President: I think a dispatch inquiring about that would be very timely.

The Secretary of War: I will have it put into the next dispatch we send.

The President: All right.

Colonel Montgomery: As to your dispatch to Mr. Conger, Mr. President, Mr. Adey talks about giving that to the press. I said I would not do it unless I got your consent.

The President: I do not want that dispatch given out.

To a visitor at Canton, while this conversation was going on, the President afterward remarked: "I don't care who leads the allied armies. What I want is the friendship of China when the trouble is over."

The allied expedition reached the walls of Peking on the 14th of August, on which day General Chaffee relieved the American Legation, and after communicating with Minister Conger, camped outside, near the Tartar Walls. Within the walls of the Tartar City, as the oldest part of Peking is called, is a large enclosure known as the "Imperial City," surrounded by a high, tile-topped wall, inside of which is the "Purple Forbidden City," which contains the magnificent Imperial Palace, popularly supposed to be the depository of fabulous wealth. The Forbidden City is surrounded by a high wall, outside of which is a wide moat. It is approached from the south by a series of immense paved courtyards, divided one from another by high and massive gateways, above which rise great towers and pavilions with yellow-tiled, overhanging roofs.

Learning that the outer walls of the Imperial City had been used by the Chinese as a convenient post from which to fire upon the legations, General Chaf-

fee, on the morning of the 15th, drove them from their position. Four successive gates were captured as the Americans marched straight into the Imperial City, and they did not halt until the division had reached the imposing entrance to the Forbidden City. General Chaffee could have entered and hoisted the Stars and Stripes upon the Imperial Palace itself, holding for America the richest prize of the campaign. But the Government at Washington had no such intentions. Its sole object was to rescue the legation and then to assist in the restoration of China. The Japanese seized the Revenue Board and secured a huge store of money; the French took a palace containing some millions of dollars; and the Russians helped themselves to a large bank with all its contents.¹ In addition to this official looting the private soldiers were permitted to steal at pleasure, and many stories of a revolting character were current.

Count von Waldersee did not arrive with his German troops until after the occupation of Peking. When he did come, he scoured the whole province of Chi-li, destroying villages and executing all who could be identified as Boxers or accused of attacking the Christians. In this merciless warfare he acted upon the orders of the German Emperor himself, who, in a speech to the troops about to leave for China, commanded them "to give no quarter and

¹ Peking Correspondence of the *London Times*.

to take no prisoners, but, imitating the example of Attila and the Huns, to excite a terror in East Asia which would last for a thousand years." He added, "May the blessing of God attend your flags and may this war have the blessed result that Christianity shall make its way into China."¹

Contrasting sharply with this spirit stands the benevolent helpfulness of the President of the United States, who consistently held to the principle that northern China was in a state of anarchy; that the powers had intervened only to save their own citizens; that this purpose accomplished, it was incumbent upon all to rehabilitate the Chinese Government and assist in the restoration of peace. To the demand of the German Government that all persons responsible for the outrages should be delivered into the hands of the powers for summary punishment, as a prerequisite to any negotiations, the Administration replied, through the acting Secretary of State: —

September 22, 1900.

SIR:

In response to your inquiry of the 18th instant as to the attitude of the Government of the United States in regard to the exemplary punishment of the

¹ From an article in the *Zukunft*, by Maximilian Harden.

notable leaders in the crimes committed in Peking against international law, I have the honor to make the following statement:—

The Government of the United States has from the outset proclaimed its purpose to hold to the uttermost accountability the responsible authors of any wrongs done in China to citizens of the United States and their interests, as was stated in the Government's circular communication to the powers of July 3 last. These wrongs have been committed not alone in Peking, but in many parts of the Empire, and their punishment is believed to be an essential element of any effective settlement which shall prevent a recurrence of such outrages and bring about permanent safety and peace in China. It is thought, however, that no punitive measures can be so effective by way of reparation for wrongs suffered and as deterrent examples for the future as the degradation and punishment of the responsible authors by the supreme imperial authority itself; and it seems only just to China that she should be afforded in the first instance an opportunity to do this and thus rehabilitate herself before the world. Believing thus, and without abating in any wise its deliberate purpose to exact the fullest accountability from the responsible authors of the wrongs we have suffered in China, the Government of the United States is not

disposed, as a preliminary condition to entering into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese Government, to join in a demand that said Government surrender to the powers such persons as, according to the determination of the powers themselves, may be held to be the first and real perpetrators of those wrongs. On the other hand, this Government is disposed to hold that the punishment of the high responsible authors of these wrongs, not only in Peking, but throughout China, is essentially a condition to be embraced and provided for in the negotiations for a final settlement. It is the purpose of this Government, at the earliest practicable moment, to name its plenipotentiaries for negotiating a settlement with China, and in the mean time to authorize its Minister in Peking to enter forthwith into conference with the duly authorized representatives of the Chinese Government with a view to bringing about a preliminary agreement whereby the full exercise of the imperial power for the preservation of order and the protection of foreign life and property throughout China, pending final negotiations with the powers, shall be assured.

HILL, *Acting*.

Some of the difficulties of the diplomatic situation may be gathered from the following letter of Mr.

Hay to Mr. Adee, which the latter transmitted to the President with the comment, "I received this morning a characteristic, hard-hitting, and sensible but somewhat despondent letter from Colonel Hay," etc. The enclosure reads: —

NEWBURY, N.H., *Sept. 14, 1900.*

DEAR ADEE: —

I read every day the *Tribune*, *Times*, and *Boston Herald*. The *Tribune* stands by us. The *Times* and *B. Herald*, while civil enough, tell us plainly that if we leave Peking we shall be forever infamous. They also say that if we do not take the lead and keep it, dragging the other powers after us in chains, we are n.g. and McKinley will be beaten in November. It never seems to occur to them that the other powers may not like the feel of a rope around their necks, and may even want to say something about their interests in China. It all sums up to this: we shall get no credit whatever we do; our friends will take it as a matter of course, and our critics will kick us all 'round the lot. Nothing was clearer than that the whole country would have risen in uproar if we had formed an alliance with England against Russia and Germany. And now that we seem to be agreeing with Russia, "following her lead" as the papers say, they are kicking like steers. If it turns out that we

are not led by Russia, we shall be abused as wobbling and vacillating. So there is nothing for it but to do as near right as we can, and leave the consequences to the newspapers.

The dilemma is clear enough. We want to get out at the earliest possible moment. We do not want to have the appearance of being forced out or frightened out, and we must not lose our proper influence in the final arrangement. If we leave Germany and England in Peking, and retire with Russia, who has unquestionably made her bargain already with China, we not only will *seem* to have been beaten, but we run a serious risk of being *really* frozen out. Germany and England will feel resentful and will take no care of our interests, and Russia will sell us out without winking. You have, it seems, grave suspicion of the attitude of Japan. There is, therefore, not a single power we can rely on, for our policy of abstention from plunder and the Open Door. If we try to deal separately with China, she will say to us, as she said last year, "We are not free agents. We are not able without the permission of the other powers, to fulfill any engagements we might make with you." When I tried to get them to agree not to grant any privileges to other powers which should not be equally granted to us, they said precisely that — "If they use force against us we cannot resist.

Will you guarantee us against them?" — a question which I had no authority to answer. The inherent weakness of our position is this: we do not want to rob China ourselves, and our public opinion will not permit us to interfere, with an army, to prevent others from robbing her. Besides, we have no army. The talk of the papers about "our preëminent moral position giving us the authority to dictate to the world" is mere flap-doodle.

Anxious, therefore, as I am, to get away from Peking, I cannot help fearing that if we retire with Russia, it will end in these unfortunate consequences: Russia will betray us. China will fall back on her *non possumus*, if we try to make separate terms with her. England and Germany being left in Peking, Germany by superior brute selfishness will have her way, and we shall be left out in the cold.

If it were not for our domestic politics, we could and should join with England, whose interests are identical with ours, and make our ideas prevail. But in the present morbid state of the public mind towards England, that is not to be thought of — and we must look idly on, and see her making terms with Germany instead of with us.

It seems to me, if we can get the Chinese Government, or its clearly authorized representatives, back to Peking, we ought at least to initiate our negotia-

tions there, even if, later on, we should transfer them to Shanghai or elsewhere. We ought to pay all possible civility to Li Hung Chang, to Prince Ching, and anybody whom we accept as negotiators. If we could send Li to Tientsin in a U.S. vessel, I should be inclined to do it. He is an unmitigated scoundrel, of course, thoroughly corrupt and treacherous. But he represents China and we must deal with him; and it is certain that it has been hitherto to our advantage to deal with him, with Liu-Kan-Yih, and with Chang-Chih-Tung, as if we trusted them.

Has the President come to any conclusion as to who shall represent us in negotiating with China? Conger, I take it for granted, will be one. Rockhill might help. If he is to send any one from here, I think very well of Low. I have thought that he might like to send John Barrett. Moore would be an admirable man if he could get away.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) JOHN HAY.

The Special Commissioner selected to act with Mr. Conger was Mr. W. W. Rockhill, who exerted a strong influence in favor of the humane methods advocated by his Government and succeeded in greatly modifying the demand for blood. The nine culprits were punished, as the United States, in

common with other powers, insisted they must be, but the punishment was meted out by Chinese authority, and in three cases, notably that of the chief instigator of the attacks on foreigners, Prince Tuan, execution was not insisted upon, but only banishment and degradation in rank. In three cases the guilty men were beheaded, while three others were graciously permitted to commit suicide.

The question of indemnity was not settled until the 30th of September, 1901, but it was in large measure due to the benevolent policy of President McKinley that the sum which was finally agreed upon, 450,000,000 taels (about \$334,000,000), was not double that amount; that China escaped dismemberment; and that the "door" was allowed to remain "open."

CHAPTER XXXII

RENOMINATION AND REELECTION

THE campaign year of 1900 found the American people in complacent mood. In marked contrast with 1896, when everybody wanted a change, the people were well content. In the former campaign the Republicans were urging, as a remedy for the hard times of that period, a change from a low to a high tariff; the Democrats wanted to remedy the same thing by a change from a gold to a silver standard; Sound-Money Democrats were changing their party allegiance; business men were changing from a position of apathy to one of intense eagerness for participation in political affairs; from East to West, from North to South, in every city, town and village and even on the farms, there was a bubbling and sizzling of doctrines and theories and "isms," a seething mass of contradictions all thrown into the political cauldron for the common purpose of an escape from conditions then existing. It was a period when restless discontent, confused by the clamor of discordant voices, was groping its way toward the light. The Democratic leaders pointed in the direction of Free Silver, as the path to salvation; the

Republicans pointed to Sound Money and Protection. The people accepted the lead of the latter, and by the very simple device of keeping its promises, the party demonstrated the wisdom of its advice.

The passage of the Dingley Bill caused no such party upset as did its predecessor of 1890. The leaders, learning by experience, wisely placed the law upon the statute books as quickly as possible after the election, thereby giving it an opportunity to prove its usefulness before the next contest. The ensuing prosperity was agreeable to everybody. No fine-spun arguments of theoretical economists could overcome the fact that prosperity had come, that it came in the wake of the Dingley Law, that this result had been predicted by the Republicans under the leadership of McKinley, and that the promise of the party had been fulfilled. Accordingly, with everybody satisfied except the theorists, the Tariff dropped out of sight as a bone of contention in 1900.

For a similar reason the currency question no longer absorbed the public mind. The Free-Silver wave had reached its crest and the craze was subsiding. To the masses it had made a certain appeal as a possible means of restoring good times. When they saw the reawakening of business, the reestablishment of confidence, the vindication of our national credit, the flow of money into the West, mak-

ing capitalists of the farmers and substituting bank balances for burdensome mortgages, and all the other evidences of prosperity, coming as the result, not of the adoption but of the repudiation of the theories of the Free-Silver orators, they began to wonder whether they had not been deceived. The bankers, it is true, kept watchful eyes lest the heresy were not dead, but the real danger was over.

For the first time since the Civil War, the old bitternesses of sectionalism seemed to have disappeared. The Spanish War brought into the service of the united Nation loyal volunteers from the South as well as from the North, who camped and marched and fought side by side under the flag of their common country. When the President called for volunteers, a little man with a gray beard appeared at the White House one day. "Well, General," said McKinley, "you want to go to war, do you?" "Yes, Mr. President," was the reply. "At one time I fought against the flag and I want a chance to fight for it before I die." The President responded to this sentiment by making the little man, who was General Joseph Wheeler, a major-general of volunteers. Another famous Confederate officer, General Fitzhugh Lee, was given a similar commission. Congress helped along the fraternal sentiment by passing a law removing the last vestige of a grievance left by

the Civil War. This was the act removing all disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment upon persons who had been engaged in rebellion against the United States. The amendment had originally prevented about eighteen thousand of the most prominent men of the South from holding civil or military office, but the greater portion of these disabilities had been removed by various special acts of Congress, so that the new law, which was approved by the President on June 6, 1898, really affected only a few hundred persons. Its moral effect, nevertheless, was important. From the date of his famous speech to the Georgia Legislature, in December, 1898, the President never failed to utilize every opportunity to emphasize the restoration of cordial feelings between the North and South.

Another contributing cause of this general tranquillity was the public sentiment toward President McKinley himself. Few American Presidents have won such universal esteem for their personal qualities. His uniform courtesy and fairness commanded the admiration of Democrats as well as Republicans. To those who applied for favors, particularly within his own party, he was obliged to say "no" many thousand times, but he did it so graciously that the disappointed applicant almost invariably remained a friend. Those who worked with him found him

ready to concede all credit to them, asking nothing for himself. The general public found him free from vanity or affectation. So far as the duties of his office would permit, he made himself accessible, in marked contrast with the growing exclusiveness of his predecessor. His vigorous conduct of the Spanish War, his quick and decisive victory, and his determination to perform every duty to the United States and its dependents which the war had imposed, made an appeal to their national pride, regardless of any differences of opinion upon the new questions that were involved.

Although McKinley maintained a dignified silence upon the question of a renomination, and even said confidentially to his most intimate friends that he would prefer to return to private life, yet it was generally taken for granted that he would be unanimously renominated. When the Republican Convention assembled in Philadelphia, in June, 1900, there were no "favorite sons" to be used as pawns in the great game of making a nomination; no bosses to struggle for prestige; and no acrimonious discussions over the various planks of the platform. The old-time leaders were there, to be sure, — Platt and Depew, of New York, Quay, of Pennsylvania, Hanna, Lodge, Allison, and the rest, — but they appeared not as fighters, but as distinguished gentle-

men to be applauded by the convention. There could be but one candidate for the presidential nomination and no platform was necessary save the record of his Administration. Never before in the history of the great political conventions had there been such unanimity of sentiment, self-congratulation, and general good-fellowship.

A curious feature about this remarkable convention was the fact that the nomination of a candidate for Vice-President, usually accomplished at the end of a long and weary session by agreement among a few leaders and without much interest on the part of anybody else, was in this case the only question upon which there was any occasion for excitement, beyond the usual demonstrations of enthusiasm. It is a still more interesting fact, in a retrospective view of political destinies, that the nomination of Theodore Roosevelt, in all probability, would never have been made, if President McKinley had not persistently refused to permit Senator Hanna to name an Administration candidate.

Five months before the convention the name of Elihu Root was tacitly agreed upon by the Republican leaders, but Mr Root firmly announced his decision that he did not wish the honor. As soon as this became known, the name of Governor Roosevelt came to the front. He also refused, and went so

far as to issue a public statement, saying, "It is proper for me to state definitely that under no circumstances could I, or would I, accept the nomination for the Vice-Presidency. Senator Allison, of Iowa, was urged to accept the position, but declined. Senator Hanna went to New York to induce Cornelius N. Bliss to accept, but without success. Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana, was favored by many. There is no doubt that he would have been acceptable to the President. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that he was the President's real choice. His sense of personal loyalty was so great that it is likely that he would have sacrificed his own preferences to gratify the President's wishes. But the latter gave no sign of preference, and Mr. Fairbanks, preferring to retain his seat in the Senate, refused to be drafted. John D. Long, the Secretary of the Navy, who had made an admirable record, was a receptive candidate, with the backing of a strong New England delegation. The President held him in high esteem, and Mr. Hanna wanted to support him. One word from McKinley would have made him the Administration candidate, and against the President's expressed wishes there would have been no contest. The latter, however, maintained the same dignity of silence as on the question of his own nomination, and refused to be put in a position of attempting to dictate to

his party. Among other candidates were Jonathan P. Dolliver, of Iowa, W. D. Washburn, of Minnesota, and Timothy L. Woodruff, of New York. None of these men was strong enough to rally a following outside his own State.

The two big "bosses" of the East, Senator Platt, of New York, and Senator Quay, of Pennsylvania, took advantage of this lack of agreement to enter upon a conspiracy. They suddenly became warmly enthusiastic for Governor Roosevelt. As governor of the State of New York he had favored and signed the Ford Franchise Bill, a measure for taxing the franchises of street-railway and other corporations. The representatives of these interests appealed to Platt to get the obstreperous governor out of the way. The Senator readily undertook the task and found a willing supporter in Quay. As a tail to the presidential kite, a vigorous young reformer could do no harm, but in New York politics he was not wanted — at least by the bosses. Mr. Roosevelt, at that time, would have liked nothing better than four more years as governor and a chance to demolish Platt. He was, of course, sincere in his feeling that an active career as governor would be preferable to the vice-presidential shelf; he would have enjoyed a fight with Platt and the bosses; and he was right in objecting to an uncereemonious ejection from New

York politics. Yet he seemed to have a kind of intuition, perhaps only vaguely realized, that something important was about to happen. If the call of Destiny was about to ring, he wished to be near enough to get his ear to the receiver. He seemed to know that the vice-presidential lightning was about to strike and that he was himself the most conspicuous target and almost certain to be hit, yet, contrary to the dictates of his best judgment, he did not seek safety in a flat refusal, as Root, Allison, Bliss, and Fairbanks had done. Perhaps he felt somewhat like the crowds in London, who go out into the streets and parks to watch the flight of hostile Zeppelins, knowing that the cellar would be a safer place. It was not in his nature to miss any of the excitement. Moreover, it must be said that he had a genuine desire to serve his country.

Whatever may have been his real feelings, Governor Roosevelt pushed aside the nomination, but at the same time so displayed his magnetic personality as to make it inevitable. He circulated actively through the hotel lobbies, appearing in the headquarters of the various state delegations, stirring up enthusiasm for himself in his own inimitable fashion, and always wearing his badge of picturesque military activity, the "Rough-Rider" hat. So much attention did he attract that when Wayne MacVeagh,

Garfield's Attorney-General, heard of it, he remarked, dryly, "Gentlemen, that's an acceptance hat."

All this carried consternation to the hearts of many delegates, who feared Roosevelt, but were unable to agree upon a candidate of their own. In despair Charles Dick, the secretary of the Republican National Committee, appealed to President McKinley to check the movement. He telephoned to Secretary Cortelyou at the White House on Sunday evening, June 17, at 10.30 P.M., as follows:—

"The Roosevelt boom is let loose and it has swept everything. It starts with the support of Pennsylvania and New York practically solid, and with California and Colorado back of it also. The feeling is that the thing is going pell-mell like a tidal wave. The Nebraska delegates are favorable. It is thought by some of our friends, Clayton, Fessenden, Manley, Scott, and Payne, that Roosevelt is as good as nominated now. The Dolliver boom has petered out. There is a great deal of friendly feeling for Mr. Bliss everywhere, but his own State is not behind him. This movement, of course, has been taken advantage of by the Senator from New York and the Senator from Pennsylvania, taking advantage of a popular feeling and a strong undercurrent of sentiment. I think up to this moment Roosevelt was against it, but they have turned his head. He

is now a candidate in the sense that he will accept the nomination, or rather will not decline it if it is made. Our friend, the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Lodge, is also doing what he can to promote it. Now the situation is peculiar. I had a talk with the junior Senator from my own State [Mr. Hanna], who was out at Mr. Griscom's home some eight or ten miles in the country. I have made a canvass of our friends so far as they are able to control our delegates, but it is very difficult to rally them to nothing; we have no candidate. We want to say that we are opposing this man. 'Don't be in a hurry, be deliberate and wise,' we say to them, but that is not going to do very long.

"The question arises whether it is wise even to attempt to check this spontaneous movement. The situation does not please the Senator [Hanna], and in my talk with him over the 'phone I found that he was quite unhappy about it. I think that you should let me know as early as you can, to-night if possible, what the sentiment is at that end of the line: whether we had better accept and make the most of this situation and let it drift, or resort to some strong expedient to stop it. I think, too, this is a situation that would warrant a conference over the telephone between your end of the line and the Senator out at Mr. Griscom's country home. If it is not

checked shortly it cannot be checked at all. It may not have got to that point now; some of our friends think it has, but if we are going to check it and not let the credit go to others who are not our true friends, then some favorable announcement ought to be made very early. Will you get me some information to Hotel Walton, Room 125? You understand the Governor of the Empire State is entirely in it now and is what you might call a full-fledged candidate; he will be by to-morrow; he is sounding sentiment to-day and will be after it to-morrow, and while he still protests that he does not want it, he says that to decline it if nominated would be his political death and he looks upon it as a call to duty which he cannot afford to decline or refuse; it is not his inclination, at least it was not, but I think he has given assurances to those who have appealed to him, and can now be considered in the sense of an avowed candidate.

“We cannot afford to have it said that something was done in spite of ourselves. The judgment of our friends is that it is inevitable. Most of our friends think there is only one thing to do, and that is to make it appear that this is in entire harmony with our desires; that the present Governor was in a place of great responsibility, was in favor in many ways, and already there has been talk about it in a friendly

spirit; opened the campaign in the President's State last fall; that the candidacy is entirely agreeable to the Administration and to its friends. I think the situation is sufficiently important and critical to warrant the conference suggested."

At midnight Mr. Cortelyou telephoned the President's reply and asked Major Dick to communicate the message to Senator Hanna in the strictest confidence. The President said: —

"The President has no choice for Vice-President. Any of the distinguished names suggested would be satisfactory to him. The choice of the convention will be his choice; he has no advice to give. The convention is the lawfully constituted body to make nominations, and instead of giving advice he awaits its advice, confident now as always that it will act wisely and for the highest interest of the country and of the party."

In the afternoon of the same Sunday, Senator Hanna had a heart-to-heart talk with Mr. Roosevelt, which he reported immediately afterward to a personal friend, who in turn thus recorded the story in his diary: —

"He then proceeded to say that Governor Roosevelt wanted the nomination, but 'we do not want him to have it. I have just come from a conference with him; there was some very plain talk. I had been

wanting to see him, but it was difficult for me to do so. At last I got hold of him and said: "Teddy, I think you owe something to President McKinley, and that you should consider his wishes. Under the circumstances I feel that I have a right to talk to you and talk to you plainly." Governor Roosevelt replied that he was under obligations to Mr. McKinley and that the Senator could frankly talk to him. Said he: 'Senator, I am not a candidate for Vice-President, and I don't want the nomination. What I want is to be Governor of New York.' 'Then,' said Senator Hanna, 'by G——, Teddy, if that is so, why do you allow Platt and others to continue to organize for your nomination?' The Governor replied that he had told them that they must not do so, and reiterated his opposition to the nomination. 'Then you are not a candidate?' inquired Senator Hanna. 'No,' said Governor Roosevelt, 'I am not.' 'Then you will not be a candidate, will you?' 'No; I will not. But, Senator, if they nominate me notwithstanding, what shall I do? How could I help it?' 'By G——, Teddy, you know,' said Senator Hanna 'that there is nothing in this country which can compel a man to run for an office who does n't want it. You know that nobody can compel you or me to be a candidate for anything if we are determined we shall not be. If you are nominated all that you will

have to do will be to rise in your place and decline the nomination. If you tell the convention that you will not have it, they will not try to nominate you; and if it should nominate you and you tell them that you will not accept, there will be no danger of your being forced into the race.' Then the Senator added: 'Teddy, if you are nominated will you rise in your place and flatly decline?' 'I will, Senator,' he replied. They then shook hands cordially and Senator Hanna withdrew."

Another delegate who kept a diary was Mr. Charles G. Dawes, of Chicago, and among the events of Tuesday, June 19, is this entry: —

"Spent the morning at hotel. At about noon was in Hanna's rooms with H. C. Payne, Senator Burrows and others. Hanna was much enraged at the fact that Quay had started a stampede for Roosevelt and seemed about to line up the Administration forces for Long. He said that if Roosevelt was nominated by Quay and Platt, he would refuse to be chairman of the National Committee, etc. Hanna and I had almost an altercation, since I insisted with all my power that any interference on his part for Long or anybody else would start a stampede in the West for Roosevelt, and thus he (Hanna) would be playing into Quay's hands. That it was simply a trick of Quay's to take advantage of the Roosevelt

sentiment, and make it appear that he was a factor in it. Hanna was in such a state of mind that I arranged to have Cortelyou at one telephone and the President at another (at the White House), so that I could talk with Cortelyou and have the President hear what I said. Outlined the situation to them, and received an ultimatum from the President for Hanna which at his dictation I copied and took to Hanna."

The conversation here referred to, which began at 8.40 P.M., and was taken down in shorthand by Mr. Cortelyou, was as follows:—

Mr. Dawes: In the matter of the Vice-Presidency I think there should be non-interference. That has been understood to be the attitude thus far in all matters about the Vice-Presidency; and as a result of that the Western delegations are rather getting behind their candidates and some of the Eastern delegations behind their candidates, and the lines are drawn with the idea that Roosevelt's declination is final.

There is an inclination now for the Administration to step in along later in the night and announce that perhaps it is best for Mr. Long to be the candidate. I think that is based on a wrong diagnosis of the situation. I think as soon as that is announced that the

delegations of the West will say, — “That’s dictation,” — and will change their votes to Roosevelt, which is n’t desired. I have been with the Western people repeatedly. When I last talked with Senator Hanna that was his idea, to keep his hands off. Yesterday he was in a state of mind about it; he has changed his mind again and now holds off. Michigan is going to be for Dolliver, 24 votes; the Kansas fellows ask, — “What is this we hear about the Administration, what is the Administration going to do?” Some of the delegations, Illinois, Michigan, Kansas, and Iowa, will put their votes in for Roosevelt and the very thing will be accomplished that nobody seems to want. Mr. Hanna wanted me to telephone you and give you the situation. It is not a question of any man. It is very doubtful whether Long can be nominated anyway, and to make the effort you have got to face what is even more than a probable stampede from the West for Roosevelt. The wise thing and the altogether best thing in my judgment is just to let the Administration continue in its present position: that it is the duty of the convention to select the candidate, especially now under the present peculiar situation. If nothing is said the probabilities are that about 10 o’clock the word will go out that the Administration wants Long. I think I give the true feeling of some of the Western dele-

gates because I have been looked upon as friendly to Dolliver. This afternoon Hanna said he had done some long talking with the Eastern people, but not with the Western people.

Secretary Cortelyou : What is the feeling about the New York man, is there any ugly feeling?

Mr. Dawes : Yesterday there was a great deal of ugly feeling. He does not want the nomination, and Hanna in trying to get some other man is doing what he — Roosevelt — wants and what his best friends want, but there is quite a feeling over it. George Perkins is here and thinks that it is wrong to allow Roosevelt to go on the ticket.

The President immediately replied: —

“The President’s close friends must not undertake to commit the Administration to any candidate. It has no candidate. The convention must make the nomination; the Administration would not if it could. The President’s close friends should be satisfied with his unanimous nomination and not interfere with the vice-presidential nomination. The Administration wants the choice of the convention, and the President’s friends must not dictate to the convention.”

At 1 A.M., the same night, Mr. Dawes again telephoned to Mr. Cortelyou, saying: —

“I was over to see Mr. Hanna and read him the statement and talked it over. He was a little perplexed about it, but, of course, accepted it. Then I have been representing Dolliver in a sense. I am a Dolliver man. I went and saw Dolliver and Senator Allison, and told them the situation. They said their man should have his chance, and conference had already been called at Mr. Bliss’s room, to which Mr. Hanna asked me, as representing Dolliver. I have just come from that conference. Mr. Bliss, Mr. Hanna, Senator Spooner, Mr. Plunkett, Henry C. Payne, and Senator Lodge were there. I made a statement. The New York delegation has just met and Mr. Bliss came in from it. The New York delegation has decided to support and present Woodruff. The question came up as to what would be done and Senator Lodge believes and all of them insist that the Administration should indicate a preference for Secretary Long. I waited until they had discussed it some. I said I came representing Mr. Dolliver, and after consultation with Mr. Dolliver and Senator Allison I was to say that they would insist that Mr. Dolliver should have a chance in connection with the nomination. The decision before that had been that the Administration — Mr. Hanna saying nothing during all this time — would name Long on the first ballot, afterwards

Roosevelt. Somebody said, 'Well, that settles it, it will be Roosevelt.' The matter was then settled that Senator Hanna announce that the only thing for him to do under those circumstances was to keep clear of it. They then discussed as to whether the Administration should not for the sake of appearances turn in and nominate Roosevelt. They determined that would be unwise.

"Each man pledged himself not to say anything about what was said up there, or any conclusion that was reached, but there will be none reached there. I simply got up and said I was through; that my presence there was simply to state the position of Mr. Dolliver's friends. They are up there yet. Senator Hanna told me before I went away that he was going to do just as he was told to do from Washington to-day."

Mr. Dawes's prediction that no conclusion would be reached at this anti-Roosevelt conference proved to be true. The morning of June 20 found the opposition no more agreed than before, and before the day was over everybody realized that the nomination of Roosevelt was practically certain. In the early morning hours of Thursday, June 21, Mr. George W. Perkins, of New York, telephoned to the White House as follows:—

"I saw Governor R. when I got here; talked with

him on the subject of the great responsibility; also said there were other States besides New York, and also emphasized the fact of the statement made that great responsibility and honor had been added to the office of Vice-President and that it had been very much elevated, and it was well known that it should be occupied by some one who was high-minded, of great statesmanship and ability. He seemed very much pleased, indeed, to have me call and said that he saw the wisdom of the friend in Washington, and highly appreciated the message, and felt the responsibility as to what ought to be done here at this time; was very glad, and felt personally that he was going into it with his whole heart, and I am sure he is very glad indeed to have assurances from that end [Washington]. He requested that I telephone to Washington first opportunity his appreciation and he again sent word to me this morning that I was not to forget to telephone. The other messages I did not deliver, as when I got back the atmosphere was clear, as the statement had been made as to the attitude of the friend here.

“Every one feels very happy this morning over the situation.”

The convention reassembled on the 21st, and after McKinley had been unanimously nominated for the Presidency, Mr. Lafayette Young, of Iowa, placed

the name of Governor Roosevelt before the convention as a candidate for Vice-President, first withdrawing the name of Mr. Dolliver and then delivering an eloquent eulogy of the New York Governor. Consistently with all that had gone before in this convention, where the keynote was harmony and the watchword unanimity, there was no dissenting vote except that of the governor himself.

Few of those who have read the history of the Republican Convention at Philadelphia realize to what an extent Mr. Roosevelt owed his nomination to President McKinley. Not only did the President refuse to interfere with the nomination, but he made it easier for Mr. Roosevelt to accept the Vice-Presidency because he had previously added dignity to the office itself.

At the time of the campaign of 1896 Mr. McKinley and Mr. Hobart were not personally acquainted. Soon after coming to live in Washington, the Vice-President took a residence near the White House, and the two men soon became neighborly. The President took the Vice-President into his confidence and made him a valued adviser. Although not constitutionally either a member of the Cabinet or of the Senate, Mr. Hobart was treated by the President as though he were both. He achieved an influence both at the White House and the Capitol,

and for the first time since the earliest days of the Republic, the office of Vice-President was clothed with an appropriate dignity. There is no doubt that Mr. McKinley meant to extend the same courtesy to Mr. Hobart's successor.

On the Democratic side there was equal unanimity as to the presidential candidate, though less harmony regarding the platform. From the moment when Mr. Bryan first blossomed into the leadership of his party he began to develop the qualities of a perennial candidate. The brilliancy of his first campaign gave him such an influence in party affairs that for the four ensuing years, in spite of his defeat, no other candidate was seriously considered. The Democratic leaders of the East, who had little sympathy with the Free-Silver heresy, were compelled to concede his supremacy. He possessed a certain magnetic quality that appealed to the masses, — an invaluable asset in the game of politics, — and as no other Democrat could be found who could match this rare ability, the hold of Mr. Bryan upon his party remained undisputed.

Nevertheless, those who felt that Free Silver was a dead issue made strenuous efforts to convert their leader to that point of view. Senator David B. Hill, of New York, made a journey to Lincoln, Nebraska, for this express purpose, but without avail. Mr.

Bryan insisted that his supporters of 1896 still regarded the Silver issue as important and his position as correct. The fight was carried into the Committee on Resolutions, at the Kansas City Convention, and after a sharp struggle Mr. Bryan was sustained. The platform repeated the former demand for the free coinage of silver at 16 to 1, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. This palpable effort to retain the support of the States that were still supposed to be pro-silver, was made at the risk of again repelling the Sound-Money Democrats who had revolted in 1896.

To offset this probable loss, the astute leader endeavored to split the Republican Party by raising the cry of "Imperialism" as the "paramount issue" of the campaign. Both in the platform and on the stump he assailed the President and the Republican Party, seeking to convey the impression that they wished to inaugurate an era of monarchical expansion, of domination and oppression, of vast colonial possessions to be acquired solely for the benefit of a few traders, taskmasters, and officeholders, a period of sordid commercialism, profitable only to army contractors and shipowners, and maintained at the cost of an enormous military establishment which would threaten the very existence of American liberty. He even insinuated that the Govern-

ment would not dare to educate the Filipinos, lest they learn to read the Declaration of Independence! His argument, if intended to appeal to the intelligence of the American people, was a singular reflection upon their morality. It was based upon a strong distrust of the purpose and ability of the American Government to exercise the same humanitarian principles toward the Filipinos that had already been shown to such a remarkable extent toward the Cubans. It was based upon the assumption that the people of the Philippine Islands were precisely the same in intellect, education, and the antecedents of self-government as were the colonists of America, though nothing could be farther from the truth. It assumed, also, that the population of the Philippines were a united people, crying with a single voice for independence, whereas the Tagalogs, to whom he would have given the entire government of the archipelago, were only one of many tribes, variously estimated at from twenty-five to eighty. To have handed them the sovereignty would have been to establish a bad government, without the consent of the governed, over all the other peoples of the islands, and to set up a reign of anarchy that would have plunged the people into more misery than the Spanish oppression which they had just escaped.

The ringing tones of McKinley's Speech of Ac-

ceptance and the calm, dispassionate logic of his formal Letter which followed, exposed the fallacies of his opponents and the shamefulness of their sinister expressions of distrust. The courage, the sincerity, and the common sense of both Speech and Letter made an irresistible appeal to the intelligence and patriotism of the people. When he declared, in the former, "There must be no scuttle policy," the applause was tremendous and long continued, and was renewed again and again when he said it is "the high purpose of this nation to restore order in the islands and establish a just and generous government, in which the inhabitants shall have the largest participation for which they are capable." The enthusiasm continued to grow with each succeeding sentence — "There will be no turning aside, no wavering, no retreat"; "No blow has been struck except for liberty and humanity and none will be"; "We will perform without fear every national and international obligation"; and the climax came when he said, "The Republican Party . . . broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves and made them free and to the party of Lincoln has come another supreme opportunity which it has bravely met in the liberation of 10,000,000 of the human family from the yoke of imperialism."

The following from the diary of Mr. Cortelyou

shows more intimately the trend of the President's mind. He was willing to guarantee self-government when the proper time came, but was wise enough to refrain from making any definite promise about independence: —

"Friday, Sept. 7, 1900. This statement in the Letter of Acceptance is likely to cause comment: 'It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants and to prepare them for self-government, and to give them self-government when they are ready for it and as rapidly as they are ready for it.'

"This was inserted in the Letter on Wednesday, the 5th. It is most important.

"The President has now on his desk a letter from Senator Hoar bearing upon this matter, saying in effect that if the President would make a statement in his Letter of Acceptance that we would give the Filipinos independence as soon as they were capable of it, such an announcement would absolutely assure Mr. Bryan's defeat. Wednesday afternoon the President dictated a page, based largely on the lines of Senator Hoar's suggestion. These circumstances show the drift of his mind. While the page referred to was not incorporated in the Letter, they furnish significant testimony to what the President feels on this subject."

McKinley was never an "imperialist." There was not the slightest trace of Cæsarism in his mental or moral make-up. Bonapartism was as far removed as the poles from his gentle nature. Even Senator Hoar, his strongest opponent on the Philippines question, does him the justice to admit this. Referring to the annexation of Hawaii and the fact that many senators were urging it upon the ground that we must have Hawaii in order to help us get our share of China, Mr. Hoar says: —

"President McKinley disclaimed any such purpose. He expressed his earnest and emphatic dissent from the opinions imputed to several leading Republicans, whom he named.

"I never, at any time during the discussions of the Philippines question, expressed a more emphatic disapproval of the acquisition of dependencies or Oriental Empire by military strength, than he expressed on that occasion. I am justified in putting this on record, not only because I am confirmed by several gentlemen in public life, who had interviews with him, but because he made in substance the same declarations in public.

"He declared, speaking of this very matter of acquiring sovereignty over Spanish territory by conquest: 'Forcible annexation, according to our American code of morals, would be criminal aggression.'

“He said at another time: ‘Human rights and constitutional privileges must not be forgotten in the race for wealth and commercial supremacy. The Government of the people must be by the people and not by a few of the people. It must rest upon the free consent of the governed and all of the governed. Power, it must be remembered, which is secured by oppressions or usurpation or by any form of injustice is soon dethroned. We have no right in law or morals to usurp that which belongs to another, whether it is property or power.’ ”¹

If further argument were needed, President McKinley’s conduct of the diplomacy of the United States during the Boxer movement would furnish a complete answer to the charge of “imperialism.” Congress was not in session at the time and he took the sole responsibility for a policy in which the United States squarely opposed the greed of Europe and insisted upon preserving the integrity of China, demanding no concessions except the privilege of an “open-door” competition in trade, on equal terms with other nations. His attitude on this subject was nowhere more eloquently expressed than in a speech before the Ohio Society of New York, March 3, 1900: —

“There can be no imperialism. Those who fear it

¹ George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years*.

are against it. Those who have faith in the Republic are against it. [*Applause.*] So that there is universal abhorrence for it and unanimous opposition to it. [*Enthusiastic applause.*] Our only difference is that those who do not agree with us have no confidence in the virtue or capacity or high purpose or good faith of this free people as a civilizing agency, while we believe that the century of free government which the American people have enjoyed has not rendered them irresolute and faithless, but has fitted them for the great task of lifting up and assisting to better conditions and larger liberty those distant peoples who, through the issue of battle, have become our wards. [*Great applause.*] Let us fear not! There is no occasion for faint hearts, no excuse for regrets. Nations do not grow in strength, and the cause of liberty and law is not advanced, by the doing of easy things. [*Applause.*] The harder the task the greater will be the result, the benefit, and the honor. To doubt our power to accomplish it is to lose faith in the soundness and strength of our popular institutions. [*Applause.*]

“The liberators will never become the oppressors. A self-governed people will never permit despotism in any government which they foster and defend. [*Great applause.*]

“Gentlemen, we have the new care and cannot shift

it. And, breaking up the camp of ease and isolation, let us bravely and hopefully and soberly continue the march of faithful service, and falter not until the work is done. [*Great applause.*] It is not possible that seventy-five millions of American freemen are unable to establish liberty and justice and good government in our new possessions. [*Continued applause.*] The burden is our opportunity. The opportunity is greater than the burden. [*Applause.*] May God give us strength to bear the one, and wisdom so to embrace the other that we may carry to our new acquisitions the guarantees of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." [*Enthusiastic and long-continued applause.*]

The people of the East were more influenced by the cry of Imperialism than those of the West, and were not so much afraid of Free Silver as they had been in 1896. In New England and several of the Atlantic States, accordingly, the vote of Bryan increased, though not enough to change the electoral vote. In the Western States the new issue made little appeal to the people, or if it did, McKinley's answer was accepted as conclusive. The sentiment for Free Silver had subsided, and therefore the Republicans showed substantial gains. McKinley's total vote was 7,219,525, an increase of 107,918 over 1896. His electoral vote was 292, an increase of 21. He lost

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STATES	THE POPULAR VOTE, 1900								ELECTORAL VOTE	
	<i>McKinley and Roosevelt Republican</i>	<i>Bryan and Stevenson Democratic</i>	<i>Wooley and Metcalf Prohibition</i>	<i>Debs and Harriman Social Democratic</i>	<i>Malloney and Pammel Socialist Labor</i>	<i>Barker and Donnelly Mid-Road Populist</i>	<i>Ellis and Nicholson Union Reform</i>	<i>Leonard and Martin United Christian</i>	<i>McKinley and Roosevelt</i>	<i>Bryan and Stevenson</i>
Ala.....	55,512	97,131	2,762	4,178	11
Ark.....	44,800	81,142	584	27	..	972	341	8
Cal.....	164,755	124,985	5,087	7,572	9	..
Col.....	93,072	122,733	3,790	714	684	389	4
Conn....	102,572	74,014	1,617	1,029	908	6	..
Del.....	22,535	18,863	546	57	3	..
Fla.....	7,420	28,007	2,234	601	..	1,070	4
Ga.....	35,056	81,700	1,396	4,584	13
Idaho....	27,198	29,414	857	232	3
Ill.....	597,985	503,061	17,626	9,687	1,373	1,141	572	352	24	..
Ind.....	336,063	309,584	13,718	2,374	663	1,438	254	..	15	..
Iowa....	307,808	209,265	9,502	2,742	259	613	..	707	13	..
Kan.....	185,955	162,601	3,605	1,605	10	..
Ky.....	226,801	234,899	2,814	770	299	2,017	13
La.....	14,233	53,671	8
Maine....	65,412	36,822	2,585	878	6	..
Md.....	136,185	122,238	4,574	904	388	..	147	..	8	..
Mass....	239,147	157,016	6,208	9,716	2,610	15	..
Mich....	316,269	211,685	11,859	2,826	903	837	14	..
Minn....	190,461	112,901	8,555	3,065	1,329	9	..
Miss....	5,753	51,706	1,644	9
Mo.....	314,092	351,922	5,965	6,139	1,294	4,244	17
Mont....	25,373	37,145	298	708	169	3
Neb.....	121,835	114,013	3,655	823	..	1,104	8	..
Nev.....	3,849	6,347	3
N.H.....	54,799	35,489	1,279	790	4	..
N.J.....	221,754	164,879	7,190	4,611	2,081	691	10	..
N.Y.....	822,013	678,462	22,077	12,869	12,621	36	..
N.C.....	132,997	157,733	1,006	830	11
N.D.....	35,898	20,531	731	520	..	111	3	..
Ohio....	543,918	474,882	10,203	4,847	1,588	251	4284	..	23	..
Or.....	46,526	33,385	2,536	1,494	..	275	4	..
Penn....	712,665	424,232	27,908	4,831	2,936	638	32	..
R.I.....	33,784	19,812	1,529	..	1,423	4	..
S.C.....	3,579	47,233	9
S.D.....	54,530	39,544	1,542	169	..	339	4	..
Tenn....	123,180	145,356	3,860	413	..	1,322	12
Texas....	130,641	267,432	2,644	1,846	162	20,981	15
Utah....	47,139	45,006	209	720	106	3	..
Vt.....	42,569	12,849	383	39	..	367	4	..
Va.....	115,865	146,080	2,150	145	167	63	12
Wash....	57,756	44,833	2,363	2,066	866	4	..
W.Va....	119,829	98,807	1,692	219	..	268	6	..
Wis.....	265,760	159,163	10,027	7,048	503	12	..
Wyo.....	14,482	10,164	3	..
	7,219,525	6,358,737	209,157	94,864	33,432	50,599	5698	1059	292	155

the State of Kentucky but gained Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.

It was a complete vindication of his policies and a well-earned triumph, gained in spite of the fact that much had been said in the campaign to confuse the voters. The majority, however, felt satisfied with conditions as they were. The President and his party had "made good" and the people desired no change. Even his opponents, who had voted according to the dictates of party regularity, accepted the result in complacent spirit, and for a time the country seemed to have entered upon a new "era of good feeling."

CHAPTER XXXIII

LOOKING FORWARD

IT was a distinctly new McKinley who faced the cheering crowd before the Capitol on Inauguration Day, March 4, 1901. Four years before, the man who took the oath of office was McKinley the Republican, the triumphant leader of his party, untried in the responsibilities of the great position of trust then conferred upon him, anxious for the future, but confident that the principles for which he stood would save the country from its distress. Now it was McKinley the national President, standing before a reunited nation from which sectionalism had been driven away; a President whose judgment had been vindicated and his principles approved; a President returned to power with the confidence and goodwill of the wise and patriotic men of all parties. The great problem of the Currency had been solved and the national credit reëstablished on a satisfactory basis. Idle mills had resumed their functions, labor was employed, exports had reached a volume in excess of those of any other nation, and the whole country teemed with active productivity. The promises of the party leader had been more than

fulfilled. But these had been overshadowed by new responsibilities. The nation had become a world-power. International questions, which in previous administrations had rarely come to perplex the occupant of the White House, were now matters of almost weekly occurrence. These were questions, not of party politics, but of national policy. The changed condition was profoundly realized by the President, who said to his Secretary with deep emotion, "I can no longer be called the President of a party; I am now the President of the whole people."

In his first Administration McKinley was busy with the working-out of the new tariff and currency laws, with the trying difficulties of the Spanish War and the delicate negotiations with Spain before and after the war, with the new and complicated problems of insular government, and with the diplomacy which the new position of the United States among the nations had imposed upon him. The work in the White House trebled and quadrupled and the office force had to be greatly increased merely to handle the clerical labor incident to the changed conditions.

Indeed, the President himself had changed. He had grown with each new responsibility. He was a broader, deeper, greater statesman than he had been before. Like Lincoln, he rose to meet every emer-

gency that confronted him. The strain of complex situations seemed only to clarify his vision. Thus it was that, at the beginning of his second Administration, McKinley seemed to face the future with the eyes of a prophet. He had marked out the lines of a new political development, the necessary corollary of the entrance of the United States upon the responsibilities of a world-power. He foresaw that the nation must anticipate new and possibly complex relations with other powers. The government of dependent peoples in the Philippines and in the Antilles was to be worked out upon definite plans which he had laid down. The peace of China and its integrity as a Nation remained to be secured, with that consideration for the welfare and happiness of its people upon which the President had insisted. The close relations with Europe and Japan, which the Boxer incident had accentuated, indicated that the United States must hold itself in readiness for future emergencies of an international character. McKinley realized that the country, in facing new duties and possibly new perils, must first safeguard its own stability, provide against lurking dangers, and by a broad and enlightened policy preserve and strengthen the unparalleled prosperity that had come to its industrial, agricultural, and commercial interests.

With the view of accomplishing this purpose he now began to give anxious thought to two great problems. The first was the conservation of prosperity. He realized that the diversified production made possible by the rapid growth of the industries of the country had outstripped the capacity of the home market to absorb it, and that the foreign markets must be enlarged by broader commercial relations. Reciprocity arrangements had already been negotiated with France, Portugal, Italy, and Germany, and with Great Britain for her West-Indian possessions; also with Nicaragua, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, and with Denmark in behalf of the Island of St. Croix. These conventions were then pending in the Senate, and it was the intention of the President to secure their ratification, if possible, and then to arrange new treaties with other nations. This policy, in his judgment, would preserve the principles of Protection at home and at the same time secure an outlet for the surplus products in foreign markets. He saw in the idea the supreme development of the theory to which he had given so many years of his life. During his vacation in Canton in the preceding summer he had outlined a series of speeches through which he expected to bring the country to the support of his plans.

The second of the great problems was the control

of the trusts. No critic of the Administration saw more clearly than President McKinley that the unprecedented wave of prosperity was fraught with danger. He was not blind to the growing tendency of large business interests to consolidate their capital, either for greater economy of production and operation, or for the purpose of buying out or ruining their small competitors. Nor was he indifferent to the enormous industrial advantages of such combinations, provided they were conducted honestly and without detriment to the interests of the people. The rapid organization of trusts was both a good and a bad movement; with advantages as well as dangers, neither of which could be disregarded. To control these vast corporations, so that the people of the country should share in their benefits and be protected against their vicious tendencies, to weld them into an element of strength in the industrial structure without temporizing with their evils, was a problem to which the statesman who had done so much for the business interests of his country might well give a large share of his attention. The question so absorbed his mind that even before his second inauguration President McKinley had begun the collection of data for a series of speeches and had reached the firm determination to deal seriously with the evils inseparable from the rapid multipli-

cation of the so-called trusts. It weighed upon him and he spoke of the conditions plainly, and very often, to his nearest friends. His resolution to take up this great question as one of the most important duties of his second Administration is all the more significant in view of President Roosevelt's relentless vigor in attacking the trusts, thus redeeming, in his own way, this part of his promise to "continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley."

Immediately after the inauguration an extensive trip to the South and West was planned, and it was the intention of the President to utilize the return across the continent for a number of speeches in which he would present to the public his two great projects of Reciprocity and the Control of the Trusts. "I never saw him more determined on anything than on this," said Mr. Cortelyou. The illness of Mrs. McKinley interfered with these plans and it was not until he reached Buffalo in September that the opportunity came for the first speech, which also proved to be the last.

The presidential train, carrying Mr. and Mrs. McKinley, the members of the Cabinet and their wives, and other invited guests, including many newspaper men, left for the Pacific Coast on April 29, 1901. Of all the trips made by McKinley during his Presidency, this last one aroused more genuine

interest throughout the country, yet possessed less political significance, than any of the others. It was a continuous demonstration of the firm hold which the President had gained upon the affection of the people. He had won the hearts of the South two years before, on his visit to Atlanta, Georgia. On that occasion the State Capitol was packed with ex-Confederates. They listened to the opening words of the speech with intense silence, but quickly broke into applause when the speaker said that "sectional lines no longer mar the map of the United States." As sentence followed sentence, breathing words of fraternity, patriotism, and loving reverence for the dead soldiers of both sides, the grizzled veterans edged toward the front, half of them off their seats, applauding and shouting their approval. At length when the President of the United States declared in their hearing that the time had come when the North should share with the South in the care of the graves of the Confederate soldiers, they burst into a wild yell of enthusiasm which was repeated over and over again. It was the first time that the South had ever fallen in love with a Republican President.

When, therefore, on this latest trip, Mr. McKinley appeared in the principal cities of the South, notably in Memphis, New Orleans, Houston, San Antonio,

and El Paso, there was a cordiality in the reception that marked the new spirit of fraternity. In Vicksburg an arch of cotton bales, with the word "Expansion," typified the appreciation of McKinley's efforts to open for them new markets in the Orient. Throughout the journey the train was met by crowds of people, at all hours of the day and night, anxious to catch a glimpse of the President if they could not hear his voice, and content to see the train that carried him if they could do no more. When California was reached, the ovation took the form of a marvelous floral display, accompanied by generous hospitality.

Mrs. McKinley's illness began in El Paso and grew worse as the journey continued. At Monterey, California, the President was forced to give up all further plans and to take his wife to San Francisco, where they were cared for at the home of Mr. Henry T. Scott. For two weeks she hovered between life and death, her husband remaining constantly at her bedside, and doing all in his power to assist the physicians. Meanwhile all engagements for the President were canceled, Mr. Hay taking his place as the head of the party.

During these trying days the heart of the country beat in sympathy with the patient, loving husband. His closest friends had known how, when a Con-

gressman at Washington, he seldom joined his associates in the clubs, hotels, or places of amusement, but, when not engaged in public duties, devoted himself to his invalid wife, preferring a quiet evening in his rooms to any of the ordinary social diversions. They alone knew how tenderly he had always cared for her, but now the whole country knew it. The veil, which for a quarter of a century had sacredly shielded from public view the sweet domesticity of his private life, seemed for a moment to be lifted, and the people saw, not the great statesman, moving in a sphere above and beyond their daily affairs, but one of themselves, living the ideal home life, which the truest and best type of American citizenship has always honored. The head of the nation, with hundreds of thousands waiting to do him honor, gave not a thought to the gratification of selfish pride, as many a man might have done, but unreservedly devoted his whole mind to the single task of nursing his wife back to health. And as he prayed for her recovery, the people prayed with him.

At last the crisis passed, and Mrs. McKinley began to regain her strength. As soon as she was able to travel, all plans for the return having been canceled, the train sped across the continent without the scheduled stops and the party went directly to Washington. The President and his wife remained

at the Capitol for rest until July 6, when they went to Canton for the summer. The original itinerary was to have ended at Buffalo on June 12, after a journey of eleven thousand miles, but the change of plans necessitated a postponement of the visit to Buffalo until September.

The two months at Canton were happy ones. Mrs. McKinley had fully recovered and the President was apparently in excellent health. He found pleasure in meeting his old friends and neighbors, in visiting his farm near Canton, and perhaps more than anything else, in the return to the old home on Market Street, which he had remodeled with the fond expectation of living there a quiet life, after the toil of the next four years was ended. Two years before, Mr. Cortelyou had made this note in his diary: —

“Wednesday, July 5, 1899. The President talked this evening of his purchase of the Harter property in Canton — his old home. He directed me to draw a check for the full amount of the purchase, \$14,500, to the order of Austin Lynch, his attorney.

“I could easily see the extreme satisfaction it gave the President to get back his old place. He said, pathetically: ‘We began our married life in that house; our children were born there; one of them died and was buried from there. Some of the ten-

derest memories of my life are centered there, and some of the saddest. I am as happy as a child to have it back. It's a fine old place.'

"He sat at the end of the Cabinet table, almost musing to himself, tapping on the desk as he talked. As he touched first upon one feature and then another of the desirability of the purchase, his eyes filled and his voice became soft and low. He was evidently much affected. Taking a telegram — it happened to be one from President Schurman of the Philippine Commission just received — he drew hastily an outline of certain improvements he would make; extending the hall, adding to this room, enlarging here and there, and he said, 'Now, I shall have a home, what I have wanted so long; a home I can go to. If I have a place like that, I can get away any time, and could take you with all the help we need, and we could transact all the Executive business there.'"

Shortly after this purchase, Mrs. Hanna chanced to be visiting at Canton. The President insisted upon showing her through the house and did so with enthusiasm, pointing proudly to the various rooms, unmindful of the fact that Mrs. Hanna was probably not very much impressed with the modestly furnished house. When he had shown it off to his satisfaction, he remarked in his simple way,

"And the best thing about it is that it's all paid for."

Another cause for contentment was the fact that the President had definitely made known to the country that he would not accept a third nomination. Two extracts from the diary of Mr. Cortelyou, one written in 1899 and the other in 1901, show the state of McKinley's mind, not only on the subject of a third term, but on a second as well: —

"*Sunday, September 17, 1899.* In a conversation this evening with Hon. James Boyle,¹ Hon. Charles G. Dawes, and myself, the President made a number of very important and significant statements.

"Mr. Boyle related to him his views on some features of the Ohio situation, notably the newspaper aspect of the campaign. Boyle was formerly connected with the Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*. He is a trained newspaper man, looks at politics through the spectacles of a news-gatherer and . . . is evidently profiting by his life abroad to such an extent as to make his views interesting. He told of the attitude of the several leading papers of Ohio toward the Administration and the coming campaign. Mr. Dawes occasionally joined in the conversation, and as it led to the relation of present conditions to those likely to confront the party and the Administration

¹ McKinley's Secretary while Governor of Ohio.

in the coming national campaign, the President became interested and expressed himself quite forcibly. Both Dawes and Boyle dropped remarks which showed their acceptance of the generally advanced belief that the President would be renominated. Apparently not noting this drift of the talk for some little time, the President suddenly straightened himself in his chair, as though its tendency had just become apparent to him, and, looking squarely at Boyle, said with great emphasis: —

“If what you gentlemen are saying implies that I am a candidate for renomination next year, I want to say to you that I would be the happiest man in America if I could go out of office in 1901, of course with the feeling that I had reasonably met the expectations of the people. I have had enough of it, Heaven knows! I have had all the honor there is in the place, and have had responsibilities enough to kill any man. You [turning to Mr. Dawes] have heard me say this repeatedly, as have you [turning to me]. There is only one condition upon which I would listen to such a suggestion, and that is, a perfectly clear and imperative call of duty; and it is only upon that condition that I will listen to any suggestion of my renomination. I would be perfectly willing to have any good Republican, holding, of course, my views on the great questions that have

come before the Administration, — for I would not want any one in this office hostile to them in the main, — to occupy this place; and I repeat that when the time comes the question of my acquiescence will be based absolutely upon whether the call of duty appears to me clear and well defined.’

“Mr. Boyle assured the President that during his recent trip through Ohio and other States he found everywhere the most cordial feeling for the President, and many Democrats gratified at the manner in which the country’s interests were being guarded.

“Mr. Boyle also said that probably the most gratifying thing to an American nowadays, particularly abroad, was the fact that the nations of the world had most wholesome respect and admiration for this country. The Spanish War had placed the United States in a new light. The President joined in this part of the conversation, and said: —

““Yes. From the time of the Mexican War up to 1898 we had lived by ourselves in a spirit of isolation. When the war was threatened the old nations believed we were illy prepared — as we were to a certain extent. They believed that Spain was better prepared — which proved to be untrue. At the outset we were wise in not recognizing the independence of Cuba. War declared, we at once instituted what proved to be an exceedingly effective blockade,

and each of those Old-World nations felt its force. We sent Mr. Dewey to Manila with orders from here that he capture or destroy the Spanish fleet. He smashed it. And then a little while after, we repeated the operation at Santiago. And then came the protocol; and then the Peace Commission; and then the ratification of the treaty — and one of the best things we ever did was to insist upon taking the Philippines and not a coaling-station or an island, for if we had done the latter we would have been the laughing-stock of the world. And so it has come to pass that in a few short months we have become a world-power; and I know, sitting here in this chair, with what added respect the nations of the world now deal with the United States, and it is vastly different from the conditions I found when I was inaugurated.’”

“*Monday, 11.30 P.M. June 10, 1901.* The President asked me at 6.15 P.M. to send a note to each member of the Cabinet who was in the city to call on him this evening after dinner. Mr. Root is away. Mr. Hay had seen the President this afternoon. Mr. Long went driving with him at four o’clock. At ten-twenty when I went into the red bedroom, now fitted up as a sitting-room, the President without a word handed me a paper in his own handwriting. It was an emphatic statement that under no consider-

ation would he accept a nomination for a third term — drawn out by the repeated statements in the public press bearing on this matter, culminating in General Grosvenor's statement of a day or two ago. I read the document, and then the President said he had written it yesterday — Sunday. I asked him if it was submitted to the Cabinet gentlemen who had called this evening. He said it was; that he had talked with Mr. Long about it this afternoon and with Mr. Hay. The former was heartily in favor of it; the latter at first against it, rather questioning the wisdom or necessity of it. The President said Mr. Hay was a third-termers, at least so far as he — the President — was concerned. The President added that the only doubt he himself had as to issuing such a statement was as to whether it would appear strange or ridiculous, but he had concluded it was better, from every point of view, to issue such a statement."

In a peaceful frame of mind, firmly entrenched in the confidence of the people, with nothing more to ask except the privilege of continuing to serve them, gratified with the splendid results of his policies, filled with plans for further development, and strong in the hope of future peace and prosperity for his country, President McKinley went to Buffalo,

to pay his long-deferred visit to the Pan-American Exposition. Here he was greeted by multitudes of people, with all the manifestations of popular joy and pride. On the 5th of September, the day after his arrival, before an immense throng on the Esplanade, surrounded by high officials of the United States and representatives of foreign countries, the President made the address which will ever be remembered as a revelation of his mind and character and a proof that he stood that day, in the expressive phrase of John Hay, a "past-master in the art of statesmanship." It has been compared with Washington's Farewell Address, for its wisdom, foresight, and breadth of view. Yet it was not a farewell. It was the inspiring speech of a leader with his face to the front. It was the voice of a prophet, pointing out that "God and man have linked the nations together," and that "no nation can longer be indifferent to any other." It was the voice of a patriot, who wished comfort and happiness in every American home. It was the voice of a statesman, declaring that "no narrow, sordid policy" would subserve the interests of the "vast and intricate business" of the country. It was the dictum of the great champion of Protection that the "period of exclusiveness is past," proclaiming that the purposes of his policy had been accomplished so far as certain industries

were concerned, and that if some of the tariffs were no longer needed, they should be "employed to extend and promote our markets abroad." It was the expression of the spirit of progress demanding the upbuilding of the American merchant marine, the establishment of new steamship lines, the construction of an Isthmian canal, the laying of a Pacific cable, and the extension of our commercial interests along broad and substantial lines. It was the message of an apostle of peace, saying, "Let us ever remember that our interest is in concord, not conflict; and that our real eminence rests in the victories of peace, not those of war." And finally, it was the earnest supplication of one who believed in Divine guidance and devoutly wished for "Peace on Earth, Good-Will to Men":—"Our earnest prayer is that God will graciously vouchsafe prosperity, happiness, and peace to all our neighbors, and like blessings to all the peoples and powers of earth."

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE TRAGEDY AT BUFFALO

SUNSHINE in the sky above and gladness in the heart of the President brightened the morning of the 6th day of September, 1901. It was to be a holiday: a visit to Niagara Falls in the forenoon, a reception to the people in the afternoon. In joyous mood McKinley passed the hours of the excursion, his nature never more serene. He looked forward with pleasure to the plans of the afternoon, when he was to meet the people face to face. He must have realized his hold upon their affection, for he never sought to avoid such occasions, though many public men have found a few hours of handshaking a severe physical ordeal. Many a time had Mr. Cortelyou sought to save his strength, and avoid possible danger, by suggesting that public receptions be omitted. To the Secretary and to other close friends, the risk seemed too great to be ventured. Only a little more than a year before, a plot to assassinate the President had been discovered. It was part of a scheme, originating in a group of anarchists in Paterson, New Jersey, to kill, in regular order, six of the rulers of the world. The first two on the list had already

been murdered, and the President of the United States was the fifth in turn. Mr. Cortelyou conferred with the Chief of the Secret Service and the guard was increased. Immediately before the visit to Buffalo he made every effort to have the President omit the reception. The only reply was, "Why should I? No one would wish to hurt me." To the argument that there would be a crowd of a hundred thousand people present and that it would be physically impossible to shake hands with more than a small part of that number, he replied, "Well, they'll know that I tried, anyhow." The Secretary then telegraphed to the Chief of Police to take every possible precaution, and this was done.

At 3.30 in the afternoon the party arrived at the Exposition grounds from Niagara Falls. Mrs. McKinley was sent in a carriage to the house of Mr. John G. Milburn, president of the Exposition, while the President, Mr. Cortelyou, and Mr. Milburn drove to the Temple of Music, where the reception was to be held. The dense crowd which had assembled gave a mighty cheer of welcome and the great organ in the temple pealed forth the national anthem as the party arrived. Passing into the building, the President took his place at one end of the room. At his left stood Mr. Milburn and at his right Mr. Cortelyou. Close by were the Secret Service officers,

local detectives and the detail, of a corporal and ten men, from the regular army, instructed "to keep their eyes open and to watch every man approaching the President." The people were permitted to enter from one door and pass out through another on the opposite side. The President was smiling pleasantly as he greeted all who passed, bestowing especial graciousness upon the timid ones and the little children. The procession was very much like others of its kind. The line was a long one, and it was not possible for all to be received by the President. Secretary Cortelyou had just stepped aside to give orders for the closing of the doors. As the line moved rapidly along and as the people in close order hurried past the President, there came a young man, of smooth face and slender figure, whose actions indicated no sinister purpose, and whose appearance was not greatly different from that of others except that his right hand appeared to be injured, for a handkerchief was wrapped about it. This fact, however, was unnoticed at the moment because he followed so closely the person ahead of him. As he approached, the President extended his hand; — but the proffered friendliness was met by two pistol shots which rang out from the revolver concealed in the seemingly bandaged hand. Instantly several of the guards seized the assailant and bore him to the

ground. As they did so, one of them, kneeling by the head of the prisoner, glanced upward and saw the President, still standing, supported by friends, and gazing with an indescribable look of wonder and reproach. While he was being helped to a chair the Secret Service men dragged the prisoner to the center of the temple and there some one struck him squarely in the face. Seeing this, the spirit of the Master, whom he had served all his life, came upon the stricken President, and he cried in a tone of pity, "Don't let them hurt him."

The friends now gathered about the wounded man were fanning him with their hats and watching anxiously to discern if possible the full extent of his injury. But the President's mind was not upon himself. He was thinking of the beloved wife, who had leaned upon him so many years and whom he had always shielded so tenderly against the slightest care. As the Secretary bent over him, he whispered, tremblingly, "My wife—be careful, Cortelyou, how you tell her — oh, be careful!"

The hall was quickly cleared, and the crowd was kept back by a cordon of soldiers and policemen, while the prisoner was placed in a carriage and hurried away. A wave of anger swept over the multitude; the more daring broke through the lines and were prevented from seizing the assassin only by the use

of bayonets and the determination of the sergeant in charge, who said he would be compelled to shoot if they did not let go their hold upon the wheels of the vehicle. Meanwhile the President waited patiently for the ambulance, not a word of resentment escaping his lips.

The fatal shots were fired at seven minutes past four. Eleven minutes later the motor ambulance bearing the President arrived at the Emergency Hospital on the Exposition grounds. As he was being carried into the little building he turned to Mr. Cortelyou and said, "It must have been some poor misguided fellow." Dr. Herman Mynter, accompanied by Dr. Eugene Wasdin, of the United States Marine Hospital Service, was the first surgeon to arrive. He examined the wounds¹ and at once saw their serious nature. He informed the President that an immediate operation would be necessary, and set about making preparations. Dr. Matthew D.

¹ "Inspection showed two wounds made by the bullets. The upper one was between the second and third ribs, a little to the right of the sternum. The use of a probe showed that the skin had not been penetrated, but that the bullet had probably struck a button or some object in the clothing which had deflected it. The lower wound made by the other bullet—a thirty-two calibre—was on a line drawn from the nipple to the umbilicus. It was about half-way between these points and about 5cm. to the left of the median line. A probe showed that this wound extended deeply into the abdominal walls, and that the direction was somewhat downward and outward." (From the official report of the Medical Staff.)

Mann, who had been telephoned for by Mr. Milburn, arrived at 5.10. By agreement of Mr. Cortelyou, Mr. Milburn, and the physicians who were present, Dr. Mann was selected to perform the operation, with Dr. Mynter as his associate, and Dr. Edward Wallace Lee, of St. Louis, and Dr. John Parmenter, of Buffalo, as assistants. The President gave his full consent, after an explanation of the necessity of the operation, saying, "I am in your hands," and at 5.20 the administration of ether was commenced.

At such a time at this, the very essence of the human spirit, which may have shrunk for a lifetime from exposure to the eyes of men, is likely to assert its presence. From the time he was ten years old, President McKinley had unreservedly, but without ostentation, put his trust in God. It was the richest, deepest thought of his inner soul, and now, as he closed his eyes, realizing that he was about to sleep, perhaps to wake no more, his lips began to move and his wan face lighted with a smile. It was the same trust that now supported him. "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done," he murmured. The surgeons paused. Tears came into the eyes of those about the table. "For thine is the kingdom, and the power and the glory, forever, Amen." With these words he passed into unconsciousness, while the earnest surgeons sought with all their skill to prolong his life.

Dr. Roswell Park, the Medical Director of the Exposition, who was absent in Niagara Falls at the time of the shooting, hastened to Buffalo and arrived just as the operation was completed. Dr. P. M. Rixey, of the United States Navy, the President's family physician, had left the party earlier in the afternoon to accompany Mrs. McKinley to the Milburn home, but arrived at the hospital in time to render efficient aid. These two, with Drs. Mann, Mynter, and Wasdin, made up the medical staff to whom the case was committed. Drs. Charles McBurney, of New York, and Charles G. Stockton, of Buffalo, were later called into consultation. During the week that followed they all worked together with unity of purpose and unremitting faithfulness, doing all that the best professional skill of the country could do, and for a time it seemed as though their efforts must be successful.¹

The President bore the operation well. While he was still under the influence of the ether, he was taken in the motor ambulance to the home of Mr. Milburn, where he and Mrs. McKinley were guests and from which he had departed so light-heartedly in the morning. During the night his pulse improved, he was free from pain, and on the whole quite comfortable. On Saturday the conditions continued to be

¹ Drs. E. J. Janeway and W. W. Johnston were called into consultation on the last day, but arrived too late to be of service.

satisfactory, and Mrs. McKinley was permitted to see her husband. She had resolved to be brave for his sake and the strength of will which she exerted astonished everybody. The invalid of years became the comforter and nurse, with the strong hands that had supported her now lying feebly in her own.

With the passing of the first shock of the attack, the President resumed his wonted calm. He sent for his Secretary and when Mr. Cortelyou entered the room, greeted him, as usual in his friendly way. "It's mighty lonesome in here," he said, with the old familiar smile. Then his mind reverted to the address which he had intended to make the beginning of a new campaign for the welfare of his country, and he asked with brightening eyes and eager look, "How did they like my speech?" It was a sign of the importance he attached to it. A man who had made thousands of speeches might be expected to forget an event so common, even if not lying on a bed of pain. But the Buffalo speech was an epoch-making occasion to which he had devoted earnest thought for many weeks. It was to be the test of popular feeling upon a new question of far-reaching significance. He was anxious to know what the people would think of his proposition. The Secretary assured him that the speech was generally regarded as one of the greatest he had ever made and had attracted the

profound attention of the public. "How was it received abroad?" was the next query. Upon being told that the comment was universally favorable, a smile of gratification overspread his face as he said, "Is n't that good?"

The awful sound of the assassin's bullets seemed to reverberate throughout the world. To every American home the news brought a sense of personal bereavement. To the royal palaces of Europe it brought a shock of horror and amazement. To the close personal friends, members of the Cabinet and intimate associates in official circles, who with a single mind had come to revere their chief, it brought an anguish of spirit and poignancy of grief which no words could describe. Senator Hanna, overwhelmed with sorrow, lost not a moment in boarding the first train from Cleveland. Colonel Myron T. Herrick, engaged at the moment in preparing to entertain the President in his Cleveland home, heard the sad news and started at once for Buffalo. Judge Day rushed to the scene from Canton, Mr. Fairbanks from Indianapolis, Mr. Dawes and members of the Cabinet from Washington and Vice-President Roosevelt from Vermont. The State Department was flooded with cable messages of anxious inquiry and sincere sympathy from the King of England, the Emperor of Germany, and the governments of all

parts of the world. The Milburn residence on Delaware Avenue seemed like the headquarters of some military chief. A tent for telegraph operators was installed on the lawn, and day and night newspaper correspondents thronged in and out, eager for the slightest ray of hope which they might send to the anxious world.

For a time the bulletins continued to gain in hopefulness. On Monday, they said, "More and more satisfactory"; on Tuesday, "The most comfortable night since the attempt on his life"; on Wednesday, "Continues to gain." Senator Hanna received the word of two surgeons that without doubt the patient was convalescing and that his recovery was only a question of time. The whole country became optimistic. Mr. Roosevelt left for his camp in the Adirondacks, the Cabinet officers went back to Washington, and Senators Hanna and Fairbanks and Judge Day left for Cleveland to attend a meeting of the National Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic. The President had been expected to hold a reception there on the Thursday following his visit to Buffalo. In view of the assurances of his recovery it was determined to change the meeting into a service of thanksgiving. Thursday morning came and the surgeons announced that the President had slept well and was feeling better. The time for peritonitis and sepsis

had passed. He seemed able to digest his food. There was no pain, his spirits were good, his mind clear, his pulse strong and of good quality, and the temperature low. Dr. McBurney left for New York confident that the case no longer required his services. The news was telegraphed to the party in Cleveland and the praise service was held.

The armory was filled with a great crowd. Senator Hanna presided and delivered a speech, full of deep feeling, mingled with hopefulness, and was followed by Judge Day and Senator Fairbanks. It was an impressive meeting, typical of the sense of awful foreboding and the longing for a favorable outcome that pervaded at the moment the homes of the people throughout the land. That night the little party of friends at the house of Senator Hanna were awakened by a neighbor who called from the outside that Mr. Herrick had just learned by telephone from Buffalo that the President was worse. Instantly a special train was arranged for and the party left for the Milburn house at 5 A.M. When they arrived the last ray of hope had all but disappeared. The President's heart did not respond to stimulants and he was slowly sinking.

In the afternoon of Friday the President knew that the time had come for him to bid farewell to the world. He called the surgeons to his bedside and

said, "It is useless, gentlemen, I think we ought to have prayer." His eyes were half closed and again the smile of sublime faith in the future illuminated his features. A solemn silence fell upon the assembled doctors and nurses and tears could not be restrained. The dying President moved his lips and again it was the Lord's Prayer that welled from his overflowing heart. The twilight descended and the room grew dark. He asked for his wife and in a moment she was led into the room, leaning heavily on the arm of Mr. Cortelyou. The group of friends drew back from the sacred scene as the husband and lover held the hands, and for the last time, pressed the lips of her for whom he had so tenderly cared in the days of his strength. Then, looking up, he said faintly, "Good-bye — Good-bye, all."

Perhaps he wondered for a moment why he should be compelled to say "good-bye." He did not know, but, as if the question were in his mind and in the minds of those present, he answered it in his next words, — "It is God's way. His will, not ours, be done."

The room was silent. The President put his arm around his wife and smiled at her. The family group and intimate friends about the bedside watched and waited. Then the lips moved again and the worn face became radiant. The inner soul was speaking once

more and was voiced in the lines of his favorite hymn: —

“Nearer, my God, to Thee,
Nearer to Thee!
E'en though it be a cross —”

Fainter and fainter came the words until the whisper could scarcely be heard. Then a moment of silence. “That has been my inextinguishable prayer,” he murmured, almost inaudibly.

“It is God’s way.”

In the room below sat a group of Cabinet officers, Senators, and other friends, anxiously scanning the faces of the surgeons and nurses who had access to the sick-room, in the faint hope of discerning some look of encouragement. The hours dragged wearily; each moment seemed an age. About midnight these friends were permitted to enter the upper chamber for a farewell look. Senators Fairbanks and Burrows, when an opportunity came, were asked by a surgeon to enter. They paused in an ante-chamber while the surgeon ascertained whether Mrs. McKinley had retired. He soon returned, saying that she was still beside her husband, and asked them to tarry a moment longer. Her pathetic voice could be heard and the President’s moaning mingled with it. The doctor motioned to the Senators to enter. Mrs. McKinley was standing by the bedside supported by her

sister, Mrs. Barber. As she watched the suffering of her husband, who was still conscious, she was heard to say, in a low feeble voice, "I want to go too; I want to go too." The President lay on his back, his head moving uneasily from side to side, but he heard the plaintive voice and answered, "We are all going; we are all going; we are all going." Gently the Senators withdrew, and rejoined the group in the parlor, where every man sat in silence and where many a silent prayer was breathed.

Mrs. McKinley made no outcry. Her grief was of the kind that "whispers the o'er-fraught heart and bids it break." At last she was led away, and told that her beloved would soon fall into the sleep of Eternity. From time to time the President would reach out into the darkness and seem satisfied when he could grasp the hand of Dr. Rixey. Once he said, "Oh, dear," as if in distress. Finally at 2.15 the end came. Those present were Dr. Rixey, Mrs. Duncan and Miss Helen McKinley, the President's sisters, several of his nephews and nieces, Mr. Cortelyou, Mr. Webb Hayes, Colonel Brown, and Mr. Dawes. The breathing seemed to cease. Then it was resumed for an instant. At last Dr. Rixey placed a stethoscope on the patient's chest, and in a short time arose and said simply, "The President is dead." In the parlor below not a sound was heard, no message came to

announce the news, but in some mysterious way all knew that the spirit of the gentle President had gone to accept a reward higher than any his countrymen had to offer.

Not since the death of Lincoln had the anguish of personal grief so penetrated every household of the nation. Indeed, the sense of loss was even more universal, for in Lincoln's time the bitterness of the long war was intense and the South did not at first realize that they had lost their truest and most powerful friend. McKinley had done more than any other statesman to heal the rancor and in no other part of the country was his death more sincerely mourned than in the Southern States.

The funeral services began on Sunday, September 15, and continued until the interment on the following Thursday. A religious service was held at the home of Mr. Milburn, attended by President Roosevelt, who had arrived the day before and taken the oath of office, and by members of the Cabinet, relatives, and personal friends. The body was then taken to the City Hall where it lay in state until 10.30 P.M. On Monday morning the funeral train left for Washington and that night the form of the departed President reposed in the White House. On Tuesday morning, while the Marine Band, stationed on Pennsylvania Avenue, softly played the notes of "Nearer,

my God, to Thee," an impressive procession moved to the Capitol, through a dense multitude, who stood in profound silence, many unable to restrain their tears. There the funeral services were simple and beautiful, beginning with the anthem of Cardinal Newman, "Lead, Kindly Light," sung by the choir and closing with "Nearer, my God, to Thee." The funeral oration was delivered by Bishop Edward G. Andrews, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, a life-long friend of the President. After lying in state in the great rotunda, the body was taken to Canton, Ohio, where the funeral train arrived at noon on Wednesday. The formal funeral service was held on Thursday afternoon in the First Methodist Episcopal Church of which President McKinley was a member, his pastor, the Reverend C. E. Manchester, preaching the sermon.

Solemn and impressive as were these various services, the spontaneous expression of sorrow by 70,000,000 Americans was far more touching and significant. As the funeral train moved from Buffalo to Washington and thence to Canton, it passed through avenues of bared heads in every city, town, and village of its course. The President's fondness for the old familiar hymn, "Nearer, my God, to Thee," had profoundly touched the popular heart. The village bands, the church organs, the voices of the

multitudes, joined in its music, not by prearrangement, but by common acceptance of it as the deepest expression of their grief. Wherever the train passed, its strains could be heard, and from Washington to Canton the song never died out. More remarkable still was the total cessation of business throughout the country during the moments when the casket was being carried out of the house at Canton. At 3.30 P.M. the trains, the steamboats, the ferry-boats and tugs in the harbors, the trolley cars, and even the cabs and trucks in the streets of all the large cities and towns, paused, while men and women reverently bowed their heads and stood in silence for five minutes. Intense stillness settled upon the cities, unbroken save by the occasional prattling of a child who could not understand, or by the music of the favorite hymn, sung by some chance gathering in a public square. This silent demonstration of universal reverence, more eloquent than any eulogy, came direct from the hearts of the people and was without precedent in the history of the country and perhaps of the world.

Both national and international sympathy found wide expression. Messages of condolence came from every quarter of the globe. Every foreign newspaper of importance printed sympathetic and in most instances appreciative editorials. Memorial sermons

were preached in churches of all denominations in every section of the country. Throughout the British Empire there were demonstrations of sincere respect for the memory of the American President. King Edward ordered his court into mourning and commanded that a memorial service be held in Westminster Abbey, where he was personally represented by the highest dignitary of his court. In St. Paul's Cathedral the service was almost the same as that for Queen Victoria. In the City Temple an immense throng sang the President's favorite hymns. The great Cathedrals of Canterbury, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dublin, and other cities, and the churches of all denominations, Catholic and Protestant, Established Church and Nonconformist, throughout the Kingdom, were filled with large congregations, generally headed by the mayors and other officials, and including members of the royal family, Cabinet Ministers, naval and military officers, and other distinguished representatives of the Government. The stock exchanges were closed, flags were displayed at half-staff on the public buildings, and people in all walks of life went about the streets in the garb of mourning. Even the drivers of cabs and omnibuses tied little bunches of crape to their whips. The guns of Gibraltar fired a salute, the British Embassy at Constantinople held a memorial service, the banks and

exchanges of Bombay closed their doors, and the Dominion of Canada suspended their welcome to the heir apparent, the Duke of Cornwall and York, who with his Duchess had just arrived on a visit, in order that all might join with the Republic in her day of mourning. Never before had the British Government paid such marked homage to any foreigner.

In Germany the sorrow and friendship were no less marked. A memorial service was held by imperial command in Berlin, at which the Emperor was personally represented by Prince Leopold of Salms-Baruth. Services were also held in Dresden, Munich, Stuttgart, Cologne, and other cities, at which the highest official society was present. Emperor William ordered the flags to be displayed at half-mast on all the ships of the fleet and the Stars and Stripes to be hoisted at their maintops.

In St. Petersburg, Vienna, Paris, Brussels, Copenhagen, Rome, and many other European cities similar honors were given. The Empress Dowager of China published an edict recognizing the service of friendship which the American President had rendered to her country. Cuba and Porto Rico joined sincerely in the general mourning. From the Philippines came a great sheaf of telegrams, resolutions of public bodies, and newspaper editorials, some from friends and some from enemies of annex-

ation, including Aguinaldo himself, all expressing their deep sorrow and sense of personal loss. One orator characterized Mr. McKinley as "a man who was an enemy to the tyranny in the Philippines, and who, as a ruler, by his knowledge and tact has convinced the people that the country where the American flag floats is a country where slavery and tyranny is an impossibility." A newspaper said: "America has lost in the person of McKinley the first of her sons, and the Philippines a friend who would have opened for this country the doors of life"; and another closed its editorial with the significant words: "We, the Filipinos, as the best offering, lay upon the tomb of President McKinley, faith in America, trust in the republican doctrine."

The silent reverence of the multitudes, the spontaneous singing of the favorite hymn, the solemn services in churches and cathedrals, the eulogies of orators and preachers, the half-masting of flags, and the condolences of kings and emperors all meant the same tribute of respect to the memory of a man worthy to be loved. There is in every human soul a window to the light. It may be darkened in the daily pursuit of wealth, fame, or pleasure. It may at times be nearly obscured by sordidness, cynicism, and despair. Yet there is no heart so mean that the rays from a pure life will not stream into it and find

response. "Men, in all ways," says Emerson, "are better than they seem." A brave act brings plaudits from thousands who would not themselves be equal to it. True worth is visible even to the worthless. The world approves noble deeds and lofty character, even though at times the trend of events seems to indicate the contrary. At rare intervals, as the result of some momentous happening, the windows in the souls of men seem to open as by common impulse, and to let in the clear light of truth and goodness. So it was that the shock of McKinley's death seemed to illuminate with the vision of a blameless life the hidden recesses of human hearts throughout the world. Political differences and international jealousies were forgotten. In the manner of his death McKinley had revealed the quality of his life, and the world saw its truth and beauty.

CHAPTER XXXV

CONCLUSION

"Magistratus indicat virum"

And if the Motto on thy 'scutcheon teach
With truth "THE MAGISTRACY SHOWS THE MAN,"
That searching test thy public course has stood;
As will be owned alike by bad and good,
Soon as the measuring of life's little span
Shall place thy virtues out of Envy's reach."

THE lines of Wordsworth to the Earl of Lonsdale might be addressed to President McKinley, for it was as Chief Magistrate of the nation that the full measure of his greatness as a man stood revealed. Yet not Envy, but rather Prejudice and Misrepresentation, have in a measure obscured the public vision. No one envied McKinley except, perhaps, a few disappointed presidential candidates. His task was too arduous for that. The vilification of public men, however, is unfortunately a part of our political system. Purely intellectual appeals to reason on party questions, so far as real issues exist, fail to reach a large proportion of the electorate. Those who vote the party ticket from habit are too willing to help in the dissemination of any calumny that will hurt the opposing candidate, and politicians well know that personal abuse, industriously circulated by

the rank and file, will reach and influence thousands who know nothing of party platforms or political doctrines. They have only to start a vicious lie and thousands will repeat it regardless of the truth. The "Crédit Mobilier" scandal was fruitlessly urged against Garfield, and the "Mulligan Letters" more effectively against Blaine. Cleveland's moral character was grossly maligned. The malicious charge of a corrupt bargain with John Quincy Adams, though vigorously denied and sufficiently disproved, persisted long enough to keep Henry Clay permanently out of the Presidency. Lincoln was denounced as "imbecile and vacillating"; Wendell Phillips proclaimed him a "civil and military failure" and thought his reelection would mean the reconstruction of the Union on "terms worse than disunion"; and his own Secretary of the Treasury had the notion that he was "fatally inefficient, laggard, and unequal to the occasion."¹ Even Washington fared no better. He was "abused and intrigued against, thwarted and belittled" during the Revolution, and attacked again during his Presidency. Pickering thought him "commonplace," "not original in his thoughts," and "vastly inferior to Hamilton,"² while Jefferson sneered at him as mentally weak and easily deceived.

¹ John T. Morse, Jr., *Abraham Lincoln*, vol. I, pp. 104 and 255.

² Henry Cabot Lodge, *George Washington*, vol. II, pp. 306, 307.

McKinley's private life was so pure, his personal integrity so well known, and his political conduct so far above suspicion that not a word of reproach in any of these directions was ever uttered. But on one point he was vulnerable. He was "amiable." It therefore came about that his opponents, finding nothing in his personality upon which to base a plausible assault, began to "damn him with faint praise." They admitted him to be a very "agreeable person," "a courteous gentleman," a man of "beautiful disposition," and did it in a tone to imply that he was nothing else. The inference remained that because he was "amiable" he was weak, and because he was "friendly" he was dominated by other men. Thus one of the strongest elements in his character became, paradoxically, his greatest fault. Amiability was not only a trait of his nature: it was a part of his creed. He was kindly by nature, but he had a rare sense of the value of treating men well. It was a part of his plan of life. It had its dangers, for sometimes men who sought office or other favors would infer from his pleasant manner of receiving them that he intended to comply with their wishes, even when he had given no indication of doing so. He was scrupulous about keeping any promise he made. While he treated every one with consideration, he was nevertheless cool, calm, and calculating in his


handling of men. He always appointed the men he wanted, but did so without giving offense. It was one of the secrets of his strength that he could carry out his plans, based upon his own ideas of right, and yet retain the friendship of those who pressed him with contrary wishes.

John Hay, in his eloquent memorial address, delivered in the Capitol by invitation of Congress, said, "Probably no other President has been in such full and cordial communion with Congress, if we may except Lincoln alone." But Senator Cullom, who had known Congress thoroughly from Lincoln's time to McKinley's, makes no exception. He says: "Even President Lincoln had difficulties with the leaders of Congress in his day, but I have never heard of even the slightest friction between Mr. McKinley and the party leaders in Senate and House." Of course Cullom's statement is overdrawn, since McKinley did have friction with some of the party leaders, even including Cullom himself, though in the case of the latter, as with nearly all others, it was later replaced with genuine friendliness.

The unanimous appropriation of \$50,000,000 prior to the Spanish War, to be used by the President at his discretion, was sufficient proof of this confidence. To win, in the first year of his Administration, the esteem of his political opponents, to such an ex-

tent that not a single man of the Opposition should hesitate to trust him, unreservedly, in all matters pertaining to the national defense, was an achievement that may be fairly credited to the unswerving patriotism, honesty, and devotion to duty which had characterized Mr. McKinley since his first entrance into public life. However great may have been the political differences, however much the distrust of his motives by those who did not know him, few if any Presidents of the United States have ever commanded in such measure the sincere respect and cordial good-will of his opponents as did William McKinley. The vote of the Senate and House on March 8 and 9, 1898, was only one of many indications of esteem, freely accorded him when partisan questions were not involved.

It was the unfailing tact of the President that enabled him to maintain harmonious relations with the party leaders and others upon whose support he must depend, even when obliged to refuse their demands or to disagree with them upon questions of policy. How he often managed to accomplish this may be shown by a story. The Senate once grew restive because so many members of that body were being appointed to serve on various public commissions. Senator Fairbanks was chairman of the Joint High Commission for the settlement of various ques-



Charles W. Fairbanks

tions with Canada. Senators Frye, Gray, and Davis, at the close of the Spanish War had served on the Peace Commission, and there were other assignments. Senator Chandler introduced a resolution forbidding the practice. The President regarded this as something of a reflection upon himself. He felt that he needed the best men in public life for these services and that often Congressmen, because of their large experience, could handle the business better than others. The resolution was therefore clearly a curtailment of the executive power. Accordingly he said to a Senator one day, "Bring Chandler down sometime." Senator Chandler came as requested. They talked the question over in the library of the White House for a while, when the President said, "Let us take a walk in the garden." The resolution was never heard of again. It was lost in the White House grounds, where many another piece of legislation which the President did not favor silently disappeared. It was in this way that McKinley often chose to exercise the power of veto, in preference to the more formal method of a message to Congress.

Mr. Hanna tells¹ how McKinley once desired to appoint an old school friend to a small post-office in one of the Western States. The applicant

¹ In the *National Magazine*.

was a widow who needed the income for her support and that of her family. The local Congressman wanted the office for a constituent as a reward for political services to himself. For a time it seemed as though considerable feeling might grow out of the incident, but when the Congressman held a conference with the President the problem was quickly solved. "The President had made an effective plea with the irritated and annoyed member, who resented interference with his absolute prerogative when fanned into temper by outsiders, but the President won his point for the old school friend and none were more cheerful parties to the plan than the Congressman and the disappointed candidate for the post-office. They had felt the touch of human sympathy such as William McKinley could always inspire."

Senator Cullom relates a similar story.¹ The President selected Christian C. Kohlsaat, of Chicago, for a federal judgeship, Cullom favoring another man. "The President and I debated the question frequently, he always listening to me and seeming impressed with what I had to say, at the same time remaining fully determined to have his own way in the end. Finally, when I was in the executive office one day, he came over to where I was, and,

¹ Cullom, *Fifty Years of Public Service*.

putting his arm on my shoulder, said: 'Senator, you won't get mad at me if I appoint Judge Kohlsaas, will you?' I replied: 'Mr. President, I could not get mad at you if I were to try.'"

One day McKinley was seated in the cabinet room when a delegation called to protest against the appointment of a certain internal revenue agent. The leader was a Congressman, six feet two inches tall and pugnacious in proportion. He chastised the President in an angry tone, using language that was almost insulting. The latter remained silent and let him spend his force. Then the President calmly remarked, "Now you feel lots better, don't you?" He added, "In view of the language you have used, you are not entitled to know why I made that appointment, but I'm going to tell you." The Congressman's face flushed and he began to apologize, but the President interrupted and said, with a quiet smile of irony, "Any man has a right to get mad when he does n't know the facts"; and continued his explanation. The irate leader's wrath was so far forgotten that he concluded the interview with a story. He said: "Mr. President, many of us, before the war, thought you were too weak. I was appointed a committee of one to tell you what we thought. I called and you received me. When I went back to report, all I could say was, 'I don't know a damn

word he said, but it's all right, boys.' You took it all out of me."

There were many times during those *ante-bellum* days when Congressmen and others came to "tell the President what they thought of him." On one occasion a large delegation, headed by Congressman Hull, chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, called at the White House. For some weeks they had been fulminating vigorously, threatening to "unhorse" the President. McKinley listened to them and then patiently explained why he was waiting and stated that he hoped to avert the war. A member of the party angrily exclaimed: "I don't believe a word of it. Wall Street does n't want a war and you are doing their bidding." The President very quietly replied, with dignity, "My whole life is an answer to that statement." As the Congressmen filed out, they felt impressed with the sincerity of the man in the presidential chair and instinctively drew away from the offending member. Mr. Hull afterwards remarked that the incident saved him from making a fool of himself. Mr. Dawes,¹ who heard the story from Mr. Hull, later asked the President how he could stand such an insult without losing his temper. The latter replied,

¹ Mr. Charles G. Dawes, of Chicago, who related the story to the writer.

"I have too often seen the results of losing patience." He said he always thought how much trouble it would make to lose his temper, so bit his tongue and quit. "I never saw him lose his self-control but twice," said Mr. Dawes, "and both instances revealed his depth of feeling. A certain Senator called and spent some time telling the President how much he had served him, how loyal he was, and so forth. When he had gone, McKinley, who knew all about the Senator's conduct, denounced him savagely for the lies he had been telling and pounded the table with his fist so fiercely that I jumped from my chair, startled. He seemed then like a lion roused to fury. The other time was when he returned after the funeral of his mother. In telling of it he over-estimated his power of control and suddenly burst into tears."

There were times, too, when a stiff dignity took the place of amiability. When McKinley was a Congressman, he was promised by President Harrison the appointment of an old-time friend as Judge of the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia. McKinley was persuaded, however, to "let it go until after the election." He complied with Harrison's wishes, and when the election was over learned that another man had been appointed without notice. McKinley's father was ill and dying at the time, so

he made no protest. Soon after, learning of another vacancy, he telegraphed the President asking him to await his return. On reaching Washington he called at the White House and to his great chagrin the promised appointment was flatly refused. McKinley was angry, but, controlling himself, said with dignified severity: "Mr. President, if you were in my place and I in yours, and you had made the sacrifice for me that I have made for you, you would n't leave this room without that appointment. Good-day, sir." He left the room and never returned during the Harrison Administration.

Those of McKinley's detractors, who aver that he was "dominated by other men," base their statement upon inference rather than evidence. On the other hand, his career affords countless proofs to the contrary. When his Tariff Act went down in defeat and carried the Republican Party with it, he steadfastly maintained his faith in the principle of Protection, though earnestly advised by prominent leaders that he had gone too far. Twice he refused the Presidential nomination when some of the most influential men in the party were urging him to accept. He refused to let Mr. Hanna enlist the support of the "bosses" for his nomination at a time when the refusal might have cost him the Presidency. Again, in 1900, he refused to permit Hanna to dictate the

vice-presidential nomination, though strongly urged to do so by party chiefs. He refused to allow war to be declared against Spain until he was sure the proper time had come, meanwhile holding Congress at arm's length. He insisted that Cuba should not be freed until permanent self-government could be guaranteed and did this against the advice of many ardent Congressmen who would have granted a premature and ineffective independence. He would not permit the Spanish evacuation of Santiago on any other terms than unconditional surrender, although Generals Miles and Shafter, and some of the Cabinet, urged more lenient terms. He took upon himself the sole responsibility of holding the Philippines, though bitterly denounced within his own party. He dictated the Chinese policy, sent troops from the Philippines against the recommendation of the commanding general, and promptly took part in the rescue of the legations in Peking without waiting to call Congress in session to ask its consent to an act unprecedented in the history of the country. These are not the actions of a weak man, nor of one who is "dominated" by others. Well might M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, who sought to obtain too liberal terms of peace for Spain, exclaim in despair, "Mr. President, you are as firm as a rock."

To get the direct testimony of a former member of

the Cabinet who possessed the unbounded confidence of the President, I asked Senator Root: "Why do people say that McKinley was a charming man, but not a strong character?" "That is a *great* mistake," the Senator replied with emphasis. "Sometimes people may have thought so because of his unselfish self-effacement. He had a way of handling men so that they thought his ideas were their own. I have talked with him again and again before a cabinet meeting and found that his ideas were fixed and his mind firmly made up. He would then present the subject to the Cabinet in such a way as not to express his own decision, but yet bring about an agreement exactly along the lines of his own original ideas, while the members often thought the ideas were theirs. He was a man of great power because he was absolutely indifferent to credit. His great desire was to 'get it done.' He cared nothing about the credit, but McKinley *always had his way*. He understood the art of administration with a minimum of interference. The cabinet meetings were delightful, there was never any jealousy, always perfect harmony — and McKinley always controlled. He had vast influence with Congress. He led them by the power of affectionate esteem, not by fear. He never bullied Congress. He never threatened compulsion. Both Democrats and Republicans re-

spected his judgment. Hanna was a strong and vigorous man, but McKinley was the controlling spirit of the two."

A fine example of the "self-effacement" to which Senator Root referred was seen in the handling of the Platt Amendment to which reference has been made.¹

It was seen again in the Chinese diplomacy. If President McKinley had been asked, "To whom belonged the credit of the achievements of the United States in China?" no doubt he would have replied, "To my Secretaries of State and of War, John Hay and Elihu Root." When a President invites into his Cabinet two men of such commanding eminence, he runs the risk of having it said that he is not responsible for his own Administration. But McKinley's relations with these two men were peculiarly intimate. Both regarded him with genuine affection, mingled with admiration and respect. Both listened to his counsel. Both performed their duties in close daily conference with the President, except that during the Chinese difficulties Mr. Hay was prevented by illness, during a part of the time, from active participation, though he kept in touch with affairs, so far as practicable, from his summer home in New Hampshire. Mr. Hay said, referring to the Chinese

¹ See ante, pp. 207-212.

negotiations, "He disposed of every question as it arose with a promptness and clarity of vision that astonished his advisers, and he never had occasion to review a judgment or reverse a decision."¹ Those who were most closely associated with President McKinley in the work of his administration are a unit in the statement, as expressed by one high in authority, that "McKinley never played second fiddle to anybody." No other President was ever more closely in touch with the activities of his cabinet officers. So strong were the bonds of mutual confidence that the achievements commonly credited to one or another branch of the Government were in truth the work, not of one man, but of the Administration. Yet above it all towered the dominating spirit of the President. As ex-President Taft once remarked to me, "He had such a good heart that the right thing to do always occurred to him."

Another monstrous offense, almost equal in heinousness to the crime of "amiability," was charged against McKinley. It was said that "he always kept his ear to the ground." The American Indian, from whom this expression is borrowed, kept his ear to the ground because that was his way of gathering information. If this is what is meant, the charge is true. McKinley had a way of keeping his

¹ From the Memorial Address, February 27, 1902.

ear so close to the hearts of the people that his mind registered, like a seismograph, the slightest tremor in any part of the country. He was no egotist. He did not assume that the possession of the presidential chair necessarily implied a monopoly of administrative wisdom. Public opinion was to him a composite thing, made up of the best thought of the ablest men in public life, in the editorial sanctum, in the pulpit, and in the lyceum, with a strong admixture of the sturdy common sense of the farm, the store, the factory, and the home. Like Lincoln he had a firm faith in the people. He listened for their voice because he knew he would gain wisdom from it. Yet because he listened he was none the less a leader. Grant consulted his generals, for all the information and suggestions he could get, and then worked out his own plans. So McKinley went to the people. When the peace negotiations with Spain were in progress, he made a trip through the Middle West. One cannot read the speeches of that period without realizing that while the President was feeling the pulse of the people, he was steadily preparing them to face new responsibilities, "to help the oppressed people who have by the war been brought within the sphere of our influence," and to know that "God bestows supreme opportunity upon no nation which is not ready to respond to the call of supreme duty."

Here one sees plainly the process, not of following but of moulding public opinion. In the thousands of speeches which he made throughout the country, he appealed to the reason of the people. If he followed public sentiment, it was usually the same sentiment he had himself cultivated. Throughout his public career he sought to inculcate the loftiest ideals and at the same time to utilize the results of his teaching for the good of the country. This is the best statesmanship. There is no place in it for the trimming of sails. It contains no sham reforms, no running after popular "isms" for the sake of temporary advantage. His faith in the people led to the desire to follow their wishes, so far as these seemed to him right in principle. He was eminently practical. He was no mere academic statesman. He knew that the ultimate power in a free government rests with the people. He knew their limitations and understood that it was necessary in dealing with them to get down to ordinary human levels to meet their ideas, to sympathize with them, and so to govern and control their inclinations. This the purely philosophical and academic statesman, shouting reforms from the housetops and printing high-sounding theories in the newspapers, could never do.

There is much of Abraham Lincoln in this quality of leadership by close contact. Indeed, there was

much of Lincoln in McKinley's character. In his address on the Great Emancipator McKinley gave an excellent reflection of his own ideals, for he was a sincere disciple of the man whom he considered one of the greatest in all history. Among other things he said: "Lincoln had that happy, peculiar habit, which few public men have attained, of looking away from the deceptive and misleading influences about him — and none are more deceptive than those of public life in our capitals — straight into the hearts of the people. He could not be deceived by the self-interested host of eager counselors who sought to enforce their own peculiar views upon him as the views of the country. He chose to determine for himself what the people were thinking about and wanting to do, and no man ever lived who was a more accurate judge of their opinions and wishes."

The beginnings of McKinley's trust in the people and of their faith in him may be traced back to his earliest public career. He lived among the miners and mill-workers in Ohio in his boyhood. He took their part as a lawyer. He championed their cause from his first entrance into Congress. With never a suspicion of that hypocrisy which characterizes the average politician's "love for the workingman," he earnestly labored to secure better pay for the laborers and better conditions of living. Their rep-

representatives were received at the White House with every courtesy and left with faith in his sincerity and confidence in his judgment. The friendliness with which the laboring classes of his own home regarded him may be illustrated by an incident which occurred in Canton in the summer of 1900. The President sat by an open window of his house, talking over the long-distance telephone with Washington about some important question connected with China. A workingman came across the lawn with a pail, for some water, and turning a faucet directly under the President's window made so much noise that the telephone conversation was interrupted. The President looked out and said, "Mike, won't you please stop that noise till I get through?" Mike lighted his pipe, and sat down under the window, where he listened intently to what the President was saying. At last the conversation was over and McKinley told Mike he might go ahead. "Major," said the Irishman (everybody called him "Major" in Canton) — "Major, what are yez goin' to do with thim haythen?"

In his congressional career, McKinley developed unusual capacity for making friends, showing never-failing courtesy to his opponents as well as to those upon whom he depended for support. He was gentle in manner, but forceful in execution; polite but ag-

gressive; considerate of others, but firm in determination to do what he believed to be right. His patience, when interrupted by petulant or insinuating remarks or queries, was often noticed. He never lost his temper, never replied with sharp or angry repartee, but calmly, truthfully, and conscientiously met the attack. So much of a gentleman was he that he won courteous treatment even from his strongest opponents. His serenity of mind was a source of power, his kindliness a magnet that drew men to him, and his sincerity a rock of safety that inspired both faith and trust. Behind these qualities was a determined ambition to use the full force of his ability for the benefit of his native land.

He had confidence in the boundless possibilities of his country. His patriotism was like that of Hamilton and Washington and Madison, who devoted their lives to the work of placing the new nation upon a firm foundation. The fathers had made a beginning, but builders were still needed. McKinley accepted the task, and having put his hands to the plough, there was no thought of turning back. Patiently he worked, with absolute trust in the wisdom of his efforts. When he left the halls of Congress and walked out into the blackness of the night of defeat, it was with no dejected mien. He knew that in time the people would understand. He knew that the dawn

would soon appear. With the same serenity that had marked his course through Congress, masking his determination behind that same composure, which was so often mistaken for weakness, he went forth to meet the future without fear, strong in the courage which a righteous purpose begets, and firm in the faith that sooner or later the people would approve his course. When at last the sun of returning confidence arose and spread over the land the brightness of a widely diffused prosperity, it found William McKinley enshrined in the hearts of the people, with a degree of affection which few statesmen have achieved.

It was not alone because McKinley brought prosperity that the people loved him. In his extensive travels throughout the country he came face to face with millions. He talked familiarly to his fellow citizens, explaining the motives which actuated him, taking them into his confidence as he elucidated in clear language the problems he had to meet and the principles underlying them. He made the people a part of the Government. He asked their coöperation. He liked to meet them in the hotels and clubs and in their homes. It rested him, after a day of public speaking, to sit in the midst of a group of friends and listen to their conversation. When he held a public reception, he clasped hands with thousands, giving

his undivided attention, for a few moments at least, to each one with whom he talked. Charles Emory Smith, in his eloquent eulogy,¹ said: "He went over the land and across the continent, and his engaging personality and rare powers of oratory won their persuasive way. He had every element of popular winsomeness. A face of sweetness and light: deep-set and piercing eyes under a Websterian brow; a personal fascination which took hold of all who came within its influence; a voice sympathetic, resonant and full of vibrant melody; a style of limpid clearness and simplicity, tipped at times with the divine flame of eloquence; an almost unrivaled power of seizing the central and controlling facts and presenting them with sharp, luminous, and convincing force; the allied faculty of clarifying and crystallizing a truth or an argument in a phrase or an epigram; the capacity to take the tumbler from the table on the platform and make it the illustration, lucent as the sunbeam, of a theory or policy so that the simplest child could understand and the memory carried it forever; and over all that subtle and indescribable charm of sincerity and suavity which is irresistible — such were the rare attributes which swayed and carried vast multitudes."

¹ Memorial Address before the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York, March 4, 1902.

Of the quality of McKinley's oratory, Mr. Cortel-you says in his diary of February 16, 1899, referring to the speech before the Home Market Club of Boston, on that day:—

“The President began his address in a low tone of voice as is his custom. As he progressed with it, he became exceedingly earnest and delivered each point with telling effect. He was greeted with frequent applause and the more beautiful and effective portions of the speech aroused the audience to great enthusiasm. Frequently he was compelled to stop for a considerable time to allow the applause to subside. The business men of the city, bankers and merchants generally, appeared to be greatly pleased with the drift of the speech and were loud in their praises of the strong argument presented of the present condition of our relations with the Philippines. . . . Some of the most effective portions of the President's speech were added to what he had already prepared, very shortly before he left for the reception in the afternoon, notably the paragraph relating to the fact that the matter was now in the hands of Congress; that paragraph also, wherein he says: ‘No imperial designs lurk in the American mind’; also certain changes, for the better, in the phraseology of certain portions of the speech. This has been the case in many of the public addresses of the President,

portions which have attracted public attention being introduced at the last minute. The now famous speech delivered at the State Capitol at Atlanta, Georgia, was prepared but a short time prior to its delivery by the President; the speech from his box at the Auditorium in Chicago, wherein he added the expression, 'The currents of destiny flow through the hearts of the people,' was impromptu almost entirely, and many of the notable utterances upon the Western trip would come in the same category.

"The President has developed a remarkable breadth and facility of expression since his inauguration and his speeches are constantly improving in their vigor and literary excellence. So much is this so that the comments upon this memorable speech before the Home Market Club have been widespread and the highest praise has been given it by such men as President Seth Low, Parke Godwin, Chauncey M. Depew, and others. 'Holland,' the well-known correspondent of the *Philadelphia Press*, states that frequently since the delivery of this speech he has heard portions of it compared to Lincoln's immortal address at Gettysburg and the concluding paragraph likened to the peroration of Blaine's matchless eulogy on Garfield.

"The President for a long time has been a master of wholesome English. The tendency to use direct

speech is becoming more marked in him every day and his public addresses are becoming almost classic in their way. John Hay says of them that they are already recognized as 'political classics.'"

Thus the people came to appreciate the real worth of McKinley's achievements as a statesman and to understand the human quality that lay beneath it all. The kindliness of his nature became a frequent topic of conversation. One Sunday, when the train which carried the presidential party had stopped for the day at El Paso, Texas, most of the members went over to Mexico to see a bull-fight. The President remained near his car. A Russian Jew, with his wife and child, wandered into the railroad yard, hoping to catch a glimpse of the head of the American nation. The President beckoned to them to come nearer, shook hands and gave a word of friendly greeting. The Russian was filled with amazement, and afterward went about telling everybody he knew that he had had to run away from the Czar in his own country, but here the ruler took him kindly by the hand! It all seemed very wonderful!

During one of his congressional campaigns McKinley was followed from place to place by a reporter for a paper of the opposite political faith, a shrewd, persistent fellow, quick to see an opportunity and skilled in making the most of it. While McKinley

was annoyed by daily misrepresentations he admired the skill and persistency with which he was assailed. He had compassion for the man, too, for he noticed that he was poorly clad, seemed ill, and had an annoying cough. One night the candidate took a closed carriage to speak at a neighboring town. It was an unusually disagreeable night. The wind was raw and cold. Suddenly he heard the familiar cough and realized that the offensive reporter was riding with the driver. He stopped the carriage and alighted. "Get down off that seat, young man," he called out, and the reporter thought the time for vengeance had come. "Here, you put on this overcoat and get into that carriage," was the next command. "But, Major McKinley," replied the astonished scribe, "I guess you don't know who I am. I have been with you the whole campaign, giving it to you every time you spoke and I am going over to-night to rip you to pieces if I can." "I know," said the Major, "but you put on this coat and get inside so you can do a better job."¹

During the Spanish-American War, the mother of a young lieutenant lay dying. Her heart was breaking because no word had come from her son and she feared he might be dead. Her pastor sent a message

¹ From "A Christian Gentleman," by Frederick Baxter, in the *Chautauquan*.

to the President asking if it would be possible to get into communication with the young soldier. Two days later he received a telegram which read: "On receipt of your telegram the President put himself at once in communication with the Signal Corps and has just received a telegram informing him that —— is alive and well. Please advise his mother." In the midst of tremendous pressure and responsibilities that kept him busy until a late hour every night, the President paused to give his personal attention to this little act of kindness.¹

McKinley's life was filled with "those little, nameless, unremembered acts of kindness and of love." Mrs. Long, the wife of the Secretary of the Navy, once expressed her disappointment that she would be unable to attend a cabinet dinner which happened to come on her birthday. "I'll send Mrs. Long a dinner," said the President when he heard of it. And he did send a part of the banquet, deliciously served. On another occasion Mrs. McKinley was bidding farewell to a guest. She had a bunch of orchids. Her husband quietly pulled her sleeve as a reminder, and the flowers were promptly presented to the lady. It was trifles such as these that endeared McKinley to those who knew him best. "He was

¹ From a sermon by the Reverend J. J. Carson, D.D., Brooklyn, New York.

more thoughtful of others than any other man I ever knew," said Senator Root. "Some men asserted their authority as President and made people uncomfortable in their presence. McKinley was not so, but always considerate of the rights and feelings of others."

This habitual thoughtfulness was no doubt due, in large measure, to McKinley's lifelong habit of caring for his wife. One of the compensations of sorrow is that it not infrequently develops qualities of mind and heart that might otherwise be absent. The sufferings of Mrs. McKinley and her dependence upon her husband, brought lessons of patience and forbearance, which were reflected in his tactful consideration for others. McKinley never paraded nor did he conceal the side of his character which thoughtless persons might call sentimentality. All the little attentions of romance and chivalry were a part of his daily life. When he was Governor it was his invariable custom, upon entering the Capitol grounds on the way to his office in the morning, to pause for a moment, turn around and raise his hat to his wife, who sat watching for the salute from her window in the hotel where they lived; and every one about the Capitol knew that at precisely 3 P.M. business in his private office was momentarily suspended, for at that hour, no matter who was with him nor what

business was pending, he invariably excused himself and went to the window to wave his handkerchief, and across the street, from her window, Mrs. McKinley would respond to the signal. Sentimental? Silly, perhaps? Yes, for some less sincere people. But Mrs. McKinley was an invalid and this was one of the ways of cheering her life. An intimate friend recalls that when McKinley was in Congress he once received a telegram that his wife was ill. She was then in Canton. He left for home at once and on arrival was met by the family physician who told him gently that Mrs. McKinley was unconscious, had been so for hours, and would never rally. All the resources of the medical profession had been exhausted, the doctor said, and there was no hope that she could be aroused. The major dismissed the physician, and when the others in the house had retired commenced a lonely but patient struggle with what seemed to be imminent death. He chafed her hands, smoothed her forehead and caressed her face with loving touch. "Ida, it is I," he whispered again and again, pouring forth all the endearments of a lover, pleading with her spirit to return, begging, imploring her to speak to him. Midnight passed and there was no response. Hour after hour the watchers in the house, who dared not intrude, waited for some sign of hope. Undismayed, the faithful husband con-

tinued his vigil, bending every effort to restore consciousness, ceaselessly hoping, praying. Dawn came and still no response. His efforts were redoubled. At last she moved, opened her eyes and tightened her grasp of the hand that held her own. "I knew you would come," she whispered, and fell into a sweet natural sleep.

An incident, showing how tenderly the President protected his wife from possible embarrassment on account of her malady, seeming to conceal and even to ignore it, was related to me by ex-President Taft. It was at the time when Mr. Taft dined with the President in Canton, prior to his appointment as head of the second Philippine Commission. It was on the evening of election day and while at dinner the guests received the returns. "I took a piece of paper," said Mr. Taft, "to tabulate the figures, and, not having a pencil, asked for one. Mr. McKinley put his hand to his pocket, and just at that moment we heard a peculiar hissing sound. Instantly McKinley threw a napkin over his wife's face, and simultaneously, without a trace of excitement, handed me his pencil. In two or three minutes the napkin was removed and Mrs. McKinley was asking about the election as though nothing had happened. Not a word was said about the incident by anybody in the room."

It is the universal testimony of those who knew him best that the comfort and happiness of his wife was always in McKinley's mind. No matter what he was doing, the slightest call would bring him to her side. "A thousand times," said a neighbor in Canton, "I have seen him spring from his chair with an almost startling speed of movement to those not accustomed to his watchful care." Sometimes he would be called from an important meeting or conference in the White House for the most trifling reason — as to express a preference between two shades of ribbon, or to help select a present for a friend. He never expressed the slightest annoyance, but would say, after attending to the request, "Is that all, Ida?" and then he would gently excuse himself and return to the business in hand.

"He really gave his life for Mrs. McKinley," said the wife of a former cabinet officer, to whom I am indebted for some of these incidents. "He lived in close, stuffy rooms, for she was afraid of taking cold. He rode in closed carriages. He did not take sufficient exercise because all his leisure time was given to her. When he was shot there was not sufficient vitality to enable him to recover, as a man physically stronger might have done." This is confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Mann, at the trial, who said that the patient was somewhat weakened

by hard work and want of air and that this undoubtedly had something to do with the result.

There was a social side to McKinley's nature which remained unrevealed to all except a very few intimates. He liked to have these friends gather in the White House in the evening after dinner or on Sundays and sing familiar hymns. He took great delight in making Mark Hanna and Charles H. Grosvenor join in with the rest. On one occasion he requested Secretary Wilson, who is a Scotchman, to sing "Bonnie Doon." Wilson, who did not pretend to sing, nevertheless regarded a request from the President as a command and bravely let out a series of bellows. Sometimes he would get up a Virginia Reel and have great fun watching the caperings of Secretary Gage and other dignified members of the Cabinet. He would usually stay with the ladies for a while and then gradually draw away into a group of men, where he could talk and smoke.

Mr. Hanna would often sit and smoke with the President, on the south porch of the White House, on summer evenings, after the last cabinet officer had gone and the business of the day was over. "During these meetings," Hanna wrote,¹ "he had little to say of the serious and sad things of life, but was always an optimist and his enthusiasm was infectious. He

¹ In the *National Magazine*.

was particularly fond of telling and listening to stories and cracking jokes, always in that good-humored and gentle way which never possessed the rapier touch of satire or temper." He would frequently open the cabinet meetings with some good-natured story or joke. He was full of fun and one had to look out for him. He was capable of sharp thrusts of wit at the expense of one or another, though there was never any sting. Judge Day, who is famous for his dry humor, on the occasion of the last cabinet meeting attended by him prior to his departure for Paris, remarked jocosely that he felt sorry to go away and thus deprive the President and the members of the Cabinet of that restraining influence which he had been able to exercise over them. Quick as a flash the President replied, "Well, Judge Day, every change so far in the office of Secretary of State has been an improvement!" Day had succeeded Sherman who was incapacitated by age, and as all knew that John Hay was to take Day's place every one laughed and none more heartily than Judge Day.

Major Charles R. Miller, of Cleveland, who was an officer in the Spanish-American War, once found his troops without food and unable to obtain a supply. Seeing a train approach (though it was not intended for him), he said to the conductor in a dignified way, "You may unload those provisions here." The

soldiers went to work with a will and soon unloaded the food. They were so hungry that they even sucked the eggs. Major Miller never heard of the incident again until several months later, when President McKinley asked him to perform some difficult piece of work. Miller feared he could not do it, but the President said, with mock solemnity, "Charlie, a man who can steal the rations of a whole regiment can do anything."

President McKinley always manifested a marked respect and liking for his predecessor. Often, when looking over various documents or memoranda prepared by Mr. Cleveland, he would say to his Secretary, "Fine old fellow, was n't he?" or make some similar expression of admiration. Mr. Cleveland, on his part, fully reciprocated this feeling of esteem. In his Memorial Address at Princeton, he related an incident which occurred on the way to the Capitol, where McKinley was to take the oath of office. "As we sat side by side amid the cheers of many thousands of his rejoicing fellow citizens and friends, while he acknowledged these hearty greetings in the most friendly manner, he wore the sober expression that plainly showed his thoughts were on the solemn things that awaited him. I shall never forget his manner when he turned to me and said: 'What an impressive thing it is to assume tremen-

dous responsibilities.' I have always thought since that I was in possession of the key to his manner of administration."

Of William McKinley's religious creed there need be no doubt. It is plainly written, over his own signature, and copied in his letter-book, under date of May 26, 1899: "My belief embraces the Divinity of Christ and a recognition of Christianity as the mightiest factor in the world's civilization." He maintained that "We need God as individuals and we need Him as a people." In a speech delivered September 6, 1892, he said: "The men who established this government had faith in God and sublimely trusted in Him. They besought His counsel and advice in every step of their progress. And so it has been ever since; American history abounds in instances of this trait of piety, this sincere reliance on a Higher Power in all great trials in our national affairs. Our rulers may not always be observers of the outward forms of religion, but we have never had a president, from Washington to Harrison, who publicly avowed infidelity, or scoffed at the faith of the masses of our people." McKinley frankly observed, but without ostentation, the "outward forms." He was a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church and a regular attendant at public worship. But he was more than that. He was deeply

religious in his private life. The memory of Buffalo is too recent to require extended reference to that fact. Yet some further glimpse may be gained of the depth of his feeling, from the poem which he always regarded as his favorite. It was written by Abram J. Ryan, known as Father Ryan, and the ninth stanza was the one which McKinley most often quoted.

SONG OF THE MYSTIC¹

I walk down the Valley of Silence —
Down the dim, voiceless valley — alone!
And I hear not the fall of a footstep
Around me, save God's and my own;
And the hush of my heart is as holy
As hovers where angels have flown!

Long ago was I weary of voices
Whose music my heart could not win;
Long ago was I weary of noises
That fretted my soul with their din;
Long ago was I weary of places
Where I met with the human — and sin.

I walked in the world with the worldly;
I craved what the world never gave;
And I said: "In the world each Ideal,
That shines like a star on life's wave,
Is wrecked on the shores of the Real,
And sleeps like a dream in a grave."

¹ From the Poems of Rev. Abram Joseph Ryan, by permission of P. J. Kenedy and Sons, New York.

And still did I pine for the Perfect,
And still found the False with the True;
I sought 'mid the Human for Heaven,
But caught a mere glimpse of its Blue:
And I wept when the clouds of the Mortal
Veiled even that glimpse from my view.

And I toiled on, heart-tired of the Human,
And I moaned 'mid the mazes of men,
Till I knelt, long ago, at an altar
And I heard a voice call me. Since then
I walk down the Valley of Silence
That lies far beyond mortal ken.

Do you ask what I found in the Valley?
'T is my Trysting Place with the Divine.
And I fell at the feet of the Holy,
And above me a voice said: "Be mine."
And there arose from the depths of my spirit
An echo — "My heart shall be thine."

Do you ask how I live in the Valley?
I weep — and I dream — and I pray.
But my tears are as sweet as the dewdrops
That fall on the roses in May;
And my prayer, like a perfume from Censers,
Ascendeth to God night and day.

In the hush of the Valley of Silence
I dream all the songs that I sing;
And the music floats down the dim Valley,
Till each finds a word for a wing,
That to hearts, like the Dove of the Deluge,
A message of Peace they may bring.

But far on the deep there are billows
That never shall break on the beach;

And I have heard songs in the Silence
That never shall float into speech;
And I have had dreams in the Valley
Too lofty for language to reach.

And I have seen Thoughts in the Valley —
Ah! me, how my spirit was stirred!
And they wear holy veils on their faces,
Their footsteps can scarcely be heard;
They pass through the Valley like Virgins,
Too pure for the touch of a word!

Do you ask me the place of the Valley,
Ye hearts that are harrowed by Care?
It lieth afar between mountains,
And God and His angels are there:
And one is the dark mount of Sorrow,
And one the bright mountain of Prayer.

The growth in statesmanship of William McKinley is the best exemplification of his latent strength. He did not appear suddenly in the arena of the world's affairs, like Athena from the head of Zeus. He came modestly into Congress, accepted appointments upon minor committees, took up the study of the Tariff under such leaders as Garfield and Kelley, mastered the subject, became the foremost exponent of Protection, and as such went down with his party in defeat. It was his steadfastness in the face of this disaster and the widespread reaction in favor of his principles that nominated him for the Presidency. It was then that he was called a man

of one idea. But, singularly, he paused but a moment after his inauguration to give effect to his ideas regarding the Tariff. Then all the power of his intellect was turned to other and diverse problems for which he had had no specialized training. He gave up Bimetallism when that system became impracticable and became the stanch advocate of a single gold standard. The Spanish War came and without previous military experience, in a large sense, he took up the duties of commander-in-chief of the army and navy, personally directed every important movement, and brought the war to a speedy and successful issue. Without previous instruction in the delicate negotiations of international relations he became a great diplomatist. Mr. John Bassett Moore says: "As a diplomatist McKinley possessed rare gifts. Indeed, I may say that I have seldom come into contact with a man more richly endowed by nature with the faculties and aptitudes that fit one for the conduct of international affairs: and it was fortunate for the country that this was so, for at the time when he assumed the office of President the state of our international relations was difficult and disturbed." He was essentially a man of peace. He brought it to Cuba, to Porto Rico, and to the Philippines, and helped to reestablish it in China. When we were in the midst of a war of our

own, the Czar of Russia sent out invitations to the nations of the world to join in an international congress, to consider the relief of the world from the burden of great armaments. President McKinley's answer was instant. Mr. Moore laid the invitation before him, and without a second's hesitation he responded, "Why, of course we will accept it." He found the country weak in foreign prestige; he left it respected by the nations as never before. In domestic affairs, too, he was one of our greatest diplomats, for, after the bitternesses of a third of a century, he reunited North and South on a foundation of mutual respect. Here, too, his growth was made manifest, for in his younger days he had joined with his party in bitter denunciation of the South.

The steady growth continued throughout the Presidency and reached its acme in the Buffalo address. There he stopped, at the threshold of future greatness, with vast new plans for the development of his country, ready for early execution. It was this latent strength, growing with every emergency, quickly assimilating the facts regarding each new question and handling them with rare poise and wisdom, that enabled him to stand by the helm and pilot the ship through stormier seas than had been faced by any other President since Lincoln.

President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, of the University of California, bestowed upon President McKinley, in the spring of 1901, the degree of Doctor of Laws, in such well-chosen words that Secretary Hay obtained a copy of them and sent them to the President with this letter: —

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: —

President Wheeler sent me the enclosed at my request. You will have the words in more permanent shape. They seem to me remarkably well chosen, and stately and dignified enough to serve — long hence, please God — as your epitaph.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN HAY.

These words, with only a modification of the tense, were inscribed upon the pedestal of the statue which stands before the imposing monument at Canton. President Roosevelt, in dedicating the memorial, quoted them in terms of enthusiastic approval. None more fitting could be chosen to bring to a close this story of the life of a great President and statesman, whose distinguishing quality lay in the fact that no thought of self ever marred his devotion to duty.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY

President of the United States

A STATESMAN SINGULARLY GIFTED TO UNITE THE DISCORDANT FORCES OF GOVERNMENT AND MOULD THE DIVERSE PURPOSES OF MEN TOWARD PROGRESSIVE AND SALUTARY ACTION. A MAGISTRATE WHOSE POISE OF JUDGMENT WAS TESTED AND VINDICATED IN A SUCCESSION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCIES — GOOD CITIZEN — BRAVE SOLDIER — WISE EXECUTIVE — HELPER AND LEADER OF MEN — EXEMPLAR TO HIS PEOPLE OF THE VIRTUES THAT BUILD AND CONSERVE THE STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE HOME.

THE END

APPENDIX

I

THE LAST PUBLIC ADDRESS OF WILLIAM McKINLEY

(Delivered at the Pan-American Exposition, Buffalo, New York,
September 5, 1901)

President Milburn, Director-General Buchanan, Commissioners, Ladies and Gentlemen:—

I AM glad to be again in the city of Buffalo and exchange greetings with her people to whose generous hospitality I am not a stranger and with whose goodwill I have been repeatedly and signally honored. To-day I have additional satisfaction in meeting and giving welcome to the foreign representatives assembled here, whose presence and participation in this exposition have contributed in so marked a degree to its interest and success. To the commissioners of the Dominion of Canada and the British Colonies, the French colonies, the republics of Mexico and of Central and South America, and the commissioners of Cuba and Porto Rico, who share with us in this undertaking, we give the hand of fellowship and felicitate with them upon the triumphs of art, science, education, and manufacture, which the old has bequeathed to the new century.

Expositions are the timekeepers of progress. They record the world's advancement. They stimulate the energy, enterprise, and intellect of the people, and quicken human genius. They go into the home. They broaden and brighten the daily life of the people. They open mighty storehouses of information to the student.

Every exposition, great or small, has helped to some onward step. Comparison of ideas is always educational; and, as such, instructs the brain and hand of man. Friendly rivalry follows, which is the spur to industrial improvement, the inspiration to useful invention and to high endeavor in all departments of human activity. It exacts a study of the wants, comforts, and even the whims of the people, and recognizes the efficacy of high quality and low prices to win their favor. The quest for trade is an incentive to men of business to devise, invent, improve, and economize in the cost of production. Business life, whether among ourselves or with other peoples, is ever a sharp struggle for success. It will be none the less so in the future. Without competition we would be clinging to the clumsy and antiquated processes of farming and manufacture and the methods of business of long ago, and the twentieth would be no further advanced than the eighteenth century. But though commercial competitors we are, commercial enemies we must not be.

OUR REMARKABLE PROGRESS

The 'Pan-American Exposition has done its work thoroughly; presenting in its exhibits evidences of the highest skill in illustrating the progress of the human family in the Western Hemisphere. This portion of the earth has no cause for humiliation for the part it has performed in the march of civilization. It has not accomplished everything; far from it. It has simply done its best, and without vanity or boastfulness, and recognizing the manifold achievements of others, it invites the friendly rivalry of all the powers in the peaceful pursuits of trade and commerce, and will coöperate with all in advancing the highest and best interests of humanity. The wisdom and energy of all the nations are none too great for the world's work. The success of art, science,

industry, and invention is an international asset and a common glory.

After all, how near one to the other is every part of the world. Modern inventions have brought into close relation widely separated peoples and made them better acquainted. Geographic and political divisions will continue to exist, but distances have been effaced. Swift ships and fast trains are becoming cosmopolitan. They invade fields which a few years ago were impenetrable. The world's products are exchanged as never before, and with increasing transportation facilities come increasing knowledge and larger trade. Prices are fixed with mathematical precision by supply and demand. The world's selling prices are regulated by market and crop reports. We travel great distances in a shorter space of time, and with more ease than was ever dreamed of by the fathers.

Isolation is no longer possible or desirable. The same important news is read, though in different languages, the same day in all Christendom. The telegraph keeps us advised of what is occurring everywhere and the press foreshadows with more or less accuracy the plans and purposes of the nations. Market prices of products and securities are hourly known in every commercial mart, and the investments of the people extend beyond their own national boundaries into the remotest parts of the earth. Vast transactions are conducted and international exchanges are made by the tick of the cable. Every event of interest is immediately bulletined. The quick gathering and transmission of news, like rapid transit, are of recent origin, and are only made possible by the genius of the inventor and the courage of the investor. It took a special messenger of the Government, with every facility known at the time for rapid travel, nineteen days to go from the city of Washington to New Orleans with a message to General Jackson that the war

with England had ceased and a treaty of peace had been signed. How different now!

THE TELEGRAPH AND CABLE

We reached General Miles in Porto Rico by cable and he was able through the military telegraph to stop his army on the firing line with the message that the United States and Spain had signed a protocol suspending hostilities. We knew almost instantly of the first shots fired at Santiago, and the subsequent surrender of the Spanish forces was known at Washington within less than an hour of its consummation. The first ship of Cervera's fleet had hardly emerged from that historic harbor when the fact was flashed to our capital and the swift destruction that followed was announced immediately through the wonderful medium of telegraphy. So accustomed are we to safe and easy communication with distant lands, that its temporary interruption even in ordinary times results in loss and inconvenience. We shall never forget the days of anxious waiting and awful suspense when no information was permitted to be sent from Peking, and the diplomatic representatives of the nations in China, cut off from all communication, inside and outside of the walled capital, were surrounded by an angry and misguided mob that threatened their lives; nor the joy that thrilled the world when a single message from the Government of the United States brought through our Minister the first news of the safety of the besieged diplomats.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was not a mile of steam railroad on the globe. Now there are enough miles to make its circuit many times. Then there was not a line of electric telegraph; now we have a vast mileage traversing all lands and all seas. God and man have linked the nations together. No nation can longer be indifferent to any other. And as we are brought

more and more in touch with each other, the less occasion is there for misunderstandings, and the stronger the disposition, when we have differences, to adjust them in the court of arbitration, which is the noblest forum for the settlement of international disputes.

PROSPERITY OF THE COUNTRY

My fellow citizens, trade statistics indicate that this country is in a state of unexampled prosperity. The figures are almost appalling. They show that we are utilizing our fields and forests and mines, and that we are furnishing profitable employment to the millions of workingmen throughout the United States, bringing comforts and happiness to their homes, and making it possible to lay by savings for old age and disability. That all the people are participating in this great prosperity is seen in every American community and shown by the enormous and unprecedented deposits in our savings banks. Our duty in the care and security of these deposits and their safe investment demands the highest integrity and the best business capacity of those in charge of these depositories of the people's earnings.

We have a vast and intricate business built up through years of toil and struggle, in which every part of the country has its stake, which will not permit of either neglect or undue selfishness. No narrow, sordid policy will subserve it. The greatest skill and wisdom on the part of manufacturers and producers will be required to hold and increase it. Our industrial enterprises which have grown to such great proportions affect the homes and occupations of the people and the welfare of the country. Our capacity to produce has developed so enormously and our products have so multiplied that the problem of more markets requires our urgent and immediate attention. Only a broad and enlightened policy will keep what we have. No other policy will get

more. In these times of marvelous business energy and gain we ought to be looking to the future, strengthening the weak places in our industrial and commercial systems, that we may be ready for any storm or strain.

By sensible trade arrangements which will not interrupt our home production, we shall extend the outlets for our increasing surplus. A system which provides a mutual exchange of commodities is manifestly essential to the continued and healthful growth of our export trade. We must not repose in fancied security that we can forever sell everything and buy little or nothing. If such a thing were possible it would not be best for us nor for those with whom we deal. We should take from our customers such of their products as we can use without harm to our industries and labor. Reciprocity is the natural outgrowth of our wonderful industrial development under the domestic policy now firmly established.

FOREIGN OUTLET TO TRADE

What we produce beyond our domestic consumption must have a vent abroad. The excess must be relieved through a foreign outlet, and we should sell everywhere we can and buy wherever the buying will enlarge our sales and productions, and thereby make a greater demand for home labor.

The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of goodwill and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times; measures of retaliation are not.

If perchance some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and protect our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad? Then, too, we have inade-

quate steamship service. New lines of steamers have already been put in commission between the Pacific Coast ports of the United States and those on the western coasts of Mexico and Central and South America. These should be followed up with direct steamship lines between the eastern coast of the United States and South American ports. One of the needs of the times is direct commercial lines from our vast fields of production to the fields of consumption that we have but barely touched. Next in advantage to having the thing to sell is to have the conveyance to carry it to the buyer. We must increase our merchant marine. We must have more ships. They must be under the American flag, built and manned and owned by Americans. These will not only be profitable in a commercial sense; they will be messengers of peace and amity wherever they go. We must build the Isthmian Canal, which will unite the two oceans and give a straight line of water communication with the western coasts of Central and South America and Mexico. And, finally, our interests in the Pacific Ocean will no longer tolerate delay in the construction of a cable which shall connect us with Hawaii and the Philippines.

WORK OF THE EXPOSITION

In the furtherance of these objects of national interest and concern you are performing an important part. This exposition would have touched the heart of that American statesman whose mind was ever alert and thought ever constant for a larger commerce and a truer fraternity of the republics of the New World. His broad American spirit is felt and manifested here. He needs no identification to an assemblage of Americans anywhere, for the name of Blaine is inseparably associated with the Pan-American movement which finds here practical and substantial expression, and which we all

hope will be firmly advanced by the Pan-American Congress that assembles this autumn in the capital of Mexico. The good work will go on. It cannot be stopped. These buildings will disappear; this creation of art and beauty and industry will perish from sight, but their influence will remain to

" Make it live beyond its too short living
With praises and thanksgiving."

Who can tell the new thoughts that have been awakened, the ambitions fired and the high achievements that will be wrought through this exposition? Gentlemen, let us ever remember that our interest is in concord, not conflict; and that our real eminence rests in the victories of peace, not those of war. May all who are represented here be moved to higher and nobler effort for their own and the world's good, and out of this city may there come not only greater commerce and trade for us all, but more essential than these, relations of mutual respect, confidence, and friendship which will deepen and endure.

Our earnest prayer is that God will graciously vouchsafe prosperity, happiness and peace to all our neighbors, and like blessings to all the peoples and powers of earth.

II

THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN

THE trial of Leon F. Czolgosz, the assassin, which began September 23, 1901, was a model of dignity, deliberation, consideration for the criminal's legal rights, and swift justice. It was in striking contrast with the endless delays and tangles of technicalities which characterized the trial of Garfield's murderer. It was all accomplished within two days and required exactly eight hours and twenty-six minutes. The Guiteau trial, on the contrary, did not get under way until after many tiresome preliminaries and then dragged along, to the exasperation of the country, for nearly two months and a half. At the trial of McKinley's assassin, Judge Truman C. White, one of the oldest and most experienced of the Supreme Court Justices, presided. The prisoner would not employ counsel, because he did not believe in law or government. He had for several years attended meetings of anarchists and had studied their doctrines, becoming possessed of the idea that every king, emperor, president, or head of government was a tyrant and should be put out of the way. Although at first it was generally believed that he was the chosen agent of some conspiring group of anarchists, it was subsequently developed that he had acted independently. Two of the most distinguished alienists of the country examined him and agreed that he was quite sane. There could be no defense on any other ground than that of insanity. The crime had been witnessed by many and the prisoner admitted his guilt.

Nevertheless, two of the most distinguished ex-Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New

York, Loran L. Lewis and Robert C. Titus, were selected by the Bar Association of Erie County, and formally appointed to defend the prisoner. It was a disagreeable task, but the two gentlemen accepted the duty and saw that their client received all the rights to which he was legally entitled.

After the evidence was in, the venerable Judge Lewis, white-haired and white-bearded, rose to address the jury. In a speech, probably the most remarkable of its kind ever delivered in defense of a prisoner, he stated first of all that he and his colleague, having been assigned to the case, found it their duty to proceed, regardless of personal feeling. He explained the law regarding insanity and then said that the prisoner was entitled to a trial under our laws. He could not be permitted to plead guilty. His guilt must be proved by the People beyond a reasonable doubt. He said the doctrine of anarchy was dangerous and criminal, but pointed out the fact that the danger was not equal to that of the belief, now becoming so common, that men charged with crime should not go through the form of trial, but that lynch law should take the place of the calm and dignified administration of justice.

The aged jurist seemed to be struggling between a conscientious determination to perform the painful duty assigned to him, and a sense of profound grief for his client's fatal work. In a voice trembling with emotion, he concluded this strange defense in these words:—

“This trial is a great object-lesson to the world. Here is a case where a man has stricken down the beloved President of this country, in broad daylight, in the presence of hundreds and thousands of spectators. If there was ever a case that would excite the anger, the wrath, of those who saw it, this was one. Here was a man occupying an exalted position, a man of irreproachable

character; he was a man who had come here to assist us in promoting the prosperity of our great exposition and he was shot down while holding a reception.

“His death has touched every heart in this community and in the whole world, and yet we sit here and quietly consider whether this man was responsible for the act he committed. That question is one for you to decide.

“The law presumes the defendant innocent until he is proved guilty, and we start with the assumption that the defendant was not mentally responsible for the crime he committed. We have not been able to present any evidence on our part. The defendant has even refused, on almost every occasion, to talk with his counsel. He has not aided us, so we have come here unaided to consider this important question. But I know there is in every human being a strong desire to live. Death is a specter that we dislike to meet, and here this defendant, without having any animosity against our President, without any personal motive so far as we can see, committed the act which, if he was sane, must cause his death. How can a man with a sane mind perform such an act? The rabble in the streets will say — No matter whether he is insane or not, he deserves to be killed. The law, however, says that you must consider the circumstances and see if he was in his right mind or not when he committed the deed. If you find he was not responsible, you would aid in lifting a great cloud from the minds of the people of this country. If the beloved President had met with a railroad accident and been killed, our grief could not compare with what it is now. If you find that he met his fate through the act of an insane man, it is the same as though he had met it by an accident.

“I had the profoundest respect for President McKinley. I watched him in Congress and during his long public career and he was one of the noblest men God ever made. His policy we care nothing about, but it always met with

my profoundest respect. His death was the saddest blow to me that has occurred in many years."

As the concluding sentence was uttered, the speaker's voice broke and tears flowed freely down his face. Many of those in the courtroom were unable to restrain their emotion.

In less than an hour after Justice White began his charge to the jury, the verdict of "Guilty" was brought into court. The prisoner was executed at the Auburn State Prison on October 29.

III

THE MCKINLEY MONUMENTS

It has been estimated that within a year after McKinley's death nearly a million dollars was contributed or appropriated from public funds for the building of monuments, and that within four years more memorials had been erected than had been done for any other man in like space of time in the history of the country and probably of the world.

The first of these to be dedicated was the gift of Charles H. Hackley to the city of Muskegon, Michigan. The artist was Charles Henry Niehaus, who received his commission from the donor six weeks after the President's death. Mr. Niehaus had the advantage of knowing the President, who had given him sittings for a bust. His memorial, which took the form of an exedra, with a bronze statue in the center, was unveiled on Memorial Day, 1902.

Toledo, Ohio, was the first to build a monument by popular subscription. Within one week the sum of fifteen thousand dollars was collected from twenty-six thousand contributors. Albert Weinert was the sculptor. This memorial is a bronze statue representing McKinley making an address and at a moment when he had paused, apparently, to allow an outburst of applause to subside. It stands on a granite base, in front of the court-house.

The statue at Adams, Massachusetts, in front of the public library, was unveiled October 10, 1903. It is the work of Augustus Lukeman, and represents the contributions of many factory employees and school-children. The statue is in bronze, eight feet in height, standing

on a granite pedestal six feet high. It represents the President, with left arm uplifted and head thrown slightly back, his right hand resting on a standard, enveloped by a flag. Four bronze plates on the pedestal suggest significant episodes in McKinley's life. The one on the front is a relief picture of Congressman McKinley addressing the House of Representatives on his famous tariff measure. Another commemorates the scene at Antietam, when the young commissary sergeant brought coffee and food to the soldiers at the front. A third pictures the first inauguration, and the fourth is inscribed with the words from the Buffalo speech, "Let us remember that our interest is in Concord, not Conflict, and that our real eminence is in the Victories of Peace, not those of War."

The people of Buffalo dedicated an imposing monument in Niagara Square, on the sixth anniversary, not of the shooting, but of the famous speech, September 5. It is a shaft of Vermont marble, rising sixty-nine feet, from a base twenty-four feet high. At the four corners of the base, somewhat after the style of the Nelson Monument in Trafalgar Square, London, are massive sculptured lions, the work of A. Phimister Proctor.

The monument in Columbus, Ohio, stands in front of the Capitol, at the place where Governor McKinley always paused, before entering, to wave his handkerchief to his wife, who watched from the hotel opposite. It is a statue by Herman A. MacNeil, flanked by two symbolic groups. It was unveiled on the fifth anniversary of McKinley's death.

A beautiful statue by Philip Martinez was erected in Springfield, Massachusetts. It is a bust portrait in bronze, surmounting a shaft on which is sculptured a female figure reaching upward with a palm branch in her hand.

In McKinley Park, Chicago, there is a memorial in

the form of a semicircular exedra in granite, with a figure in bronze by Charles J. Mulligan.

Among others which should be mentioned are those in Philadelphia and San Francisco and San José, California.

More significant, perhaps, than any of these is the new memorial now in process of erection in Niles, Ohio, near the site of President McKinley's birthplace, the corner-stone of which was laid on the 20th of November, 1915. It will be a long, low building of white marble, the central feature of which will be a court of honor, corresponding with the atrium of an old Roman palace, and approached through a colonnade of imposing design. As in the old Pompeiiian houses, the atrium is to have a pool, back of which will stand a bronze statue of heroic size. The court will be encircled with a peristyle of Doric columns. The right wing of the building is to contain an auditorium and the left wing will be used as a library and reading-room. Joseph G. Butler, Jr., a former school-mate of McKinley and a lifelong friend, is the chief promoter of this memorial, the cost of which will be about three hundred thousand dollars. In aid of this memorial, Congress has recently (February, 1916) authorized the coinage of one hundred thousand souvenir gold dollars.

On July 14, 1914, a painting of McKinley, presented by Mr. Butler to the Westminster Central Hall, London, was unveiled with appropriate ceremonies and an address by Walter H. Page, the American Ambassador.

President McKinley's well-known fondness for flowers led to another memorial of unique character. His favorite flower was the carnation—deep pink in color—and he wore one habitually in the button-hole of his coat. "The Carnation League of America" was formed shortly after his death, with the object of encouraging the general observance of his birthday by the wearing of carnations.

The Nation's Memorial to William McKinley was erected at Canton, Ohio, at a cost of about six hundred thousand dollars. The contour and wide extent of the land covered by the monument, with its approaches and the broad scale upon which it is designed, suggest the dignity and greatness, as well as the simplicity, of McKinley's character. A mausoleum, circular in form, seventy-five feet in diameter, and rising ninety-seven feet from the granite platform upon which it stands, looks down from the summit of a green terraced hill. The platform is a circular emplacement, one hundred and seventy-eight feet in diameter, reached by a main staircase, fifty feet wide, one hundred and ninety-four feet long, and broken into four flights with broad landings between. On the lower edge of the central landing, surmounting a marble pedestal, is a colossal bronze statue of McKinley, nine feet six inches high. It is the work of Charles Henry Niehaus, the sculptor of the Muskegon memorial, and represents the President in the delivery of his famous Buffalo speech, the artist skillfully using a photograph made at the time. On the pedestal are carved the words of President Wheeler spoken on the occasion of McKinley's investiture with the degree of Doctor of Laws.¹ On the reverse are the words:—

THIS MEMORIAL WAS ERECTED BY THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MORE THAN ONE MILLION MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES AND MANY OTHERS IN FOREIGN LANDS.

The circular interior of the mausoleum is constructed of pink Milford granite. Four arched recesses, flanked by engaged Doric columns, and surmounted by an entablature, form the keynote of the interior decoration. In the frieze of the entablature are the well-known words:—

¹ See ante, p. 375.

LET US EVER REMEMBER THAT OUR INTEREST IS IN CONCORD, NOT CONFLICT, AND THAT OUR REAL EMINENCE RESTS IN THE VICTORIES OF PEACE, NOT THOSE OF WAR.

In the center of this mortuary chamber are the two sarcophagi, inscribed WILLIAM McKINLEY and IDA McKINLEY. They are designed to appear as two in one. Each is hewn from a single block of polished dark-green granite from Vermont. They rest upon a high base of polished Wisconsin granite, of a dark-maroon color, surrounded by a parapet of Knoxville marble.

At the foot of the great stairways leading to the monument is a long basin of water, subdivided into five levels, each twenty inches lower than the one above, thus producing four cascades over which the water pours in curved lines. A sloping grassy mound lines the basin, and on each side is a road, bordered with trees, the two uniting at the foot of the steps. Thus the mausoleum is seen from a distance, surmounting a green hill, through a long vista between walls of foliage, the water basins seeming to be broad steps connecting with the granite stairway beyond.

This imposing memorial was dedicated on the 30th of September, 1907. Mr. Justice Day, President of the Memorial Association, opened the ceremonies by introducing the chairman of the day, Andrew L. Harris, the Governor of Ohio, and later made an address on the "Building of the Memorial." The statue was then unveiled by Miss Helen McKinley. President Roosevelt, the orator of the day, closed the ceremonies with an eloquent eulogy of the character and achievements of his predecessor, pointing out the lesson of broad human sympathy taught by his career.

Perhaps the most beautiful and touching feature of this tribute of love and respect was the reading, by James Whitcomb Riley, in musical tones and with pa-

thetic fervor, of the poem which he had prepared for the occasion: ¹ —

He said: "It is God's way;
His will, not ours, be done."
And o'er our land a shadow lay
That darkened all the sun;
The voice of jubilee
That gladdened all the air
Fell sudden to a quavering key
Of suppliance and prayer.

He was our chief — our guide —
Sprung of our common earth,
From youth's long struggle proved and tried
To manhood's highest worth;
Through toil, he knew all needs
Of all his toiling kind,
The favored striver who succeeds,
The one who falls behind.


The boy's young faith he still
Retained through years mature —
The faith to labor, hand and will,
Nor doubt the harvest sure —
The harvest of Man's love —
A Nation's joy that swells
To heights of song, or deep whereof
But sacred silence tells.

To him his Country seemed
Even as a mother, where
He rested — slept; and once he dreamed —
As on her bosom there —
And thrilled to hear, within
That dream of her, the call
Of bugles and the clang and din
Of war — And o'er it all

His rapt eyes caught the bright
Old Banner, winging wild
And beck'ning him, as to the fight
When — even as a child —
He awakened — And the dream
Was real! And he leapt
As led the proud flag through a gleam
Of tears the Mother wept.

¹ From the Biographical Edition of the *Complete Works of James Whitcomb Riley*. Copyright, 1913. Reproduced by permission of The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, Indiana.

His was a tender hand —
Even as a woman's is —
And yet as fixed, in Right's command,
As this bronze hand of his;
This was the soldier brave —
This was the Victor fair —
This is the Hero Heaven gave
To glory here — and There.



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